Ahmet İnsel*
Reliable public opinion polls in Hungary had been indicating for nearly a year that the general elections held on April 12, 2026, would result in the defeat of Viktor Orbán and his party Fidesz (Hungarian Civic Alliance), which had been in power for sixteen years. When the results were announced, most polls had also predicted the fifteen-point lead of the opposition party Tisza (Respect and Freedom Party) over the ruling party. What had not been clear beforehand was how this margin would translate into a parliamentary majority and how Orbán and his party would respond to such a result.
In the end, in 93 of the 106 electoral districts that the Orbán government had redrawn to secure an absolute majority, the opposition came first. With 52.4% of the national vote, it secured a two-thirds majority in parliament. In the proportional representation segment, Fidesz and Tisza obtained almost equal numbers of seats (43 and 44 respectively). Even before the final results were officially announced, Orbán declared defeat and congratulated his opponent. Despite all inequalities and obstacles created by those in power, the architect of “illiberal democracy” had not completely closed the door to a transfer of power through elections within the system he built. He had also not resorted to imprisoning his opponents. Perhaps Hungary’s EU membership made it difficult to follow the path taken by some of his close allies.
In 2022, Fidesz and its ally, the Christian Democratic People’s Party, had won 54% of the vote, while the opposition alliance of six parties, ranging from far-right to left, received 34%. This reinforced the belief that Orbán, as the leader of a hegemonic party, would continue his one-man rule for a long time. Four years later, the situation has almost completely reversed, for several reasons—three of which stand out for their uniqueness.
A first-past-the-post system similar to that of the United Kingdom, also used in Turkey’s metropolitan mayoral elections, determines 53% of the Hungarian parliament. Mayors are elected in the same way. In this system, for the opposition to defeat a hegemonic party, it must unite behind a single list. Otherwise, even if opposition parties close the gap in the proportional representation segment, the fragmentation of votes among four or five parties in single-member districts prevents them from compensating for the deficit. For this reason, four of the six parties that had formed an alliance against Orbán in 2022 decided not to participate in the 2026 elections and called on their voters to support Tisza and its candidates. The remaining two parties could not prevent their voters from shifting to Tisza. The Democratic Coalition received 1% of the vote, while Jobbik, the former main far-right party, received only 0.1%. Thus, particularly the Socialist Party, along with the Greens and other left-wing movements, accepted the cost of not being represented in parliament in order to end Orbán’s sixteen-year autocratic rule and the extensive network of interests and corruption built around it. Of course, the rapid rise in Tisza’s popularity over two years and the loss of part of their voter base also played a role in this decision. By taking this difficult but courageous step, the left and Green opposition played a significant role in the fall of the Orbán clique. Meanwhile, the near 80% voter turnout—the highest in thirty years—and the fact that three-quarters of young voters supported Tisza were also decisive. Compared to 2022, Fidesz lost 680,000 votes, a decline of 22%, while Tisza received slightly more votes in 2026 than Fidesz had in 2022.
The second and dominant factor lies in the political strategy pursued over the last two years by Péter Magyar, the leader of Tisza, which won the elections by a landslide. For many years, Magyar had been a loyal member of the Fidesz system alongside his wife Judit Varga. In February 2024, following a scandal that led to the resignation of President Katalin Novák and then-Justice Minister Judit Varga—his former wife—he launched a campaign against Fidesz. Varga and Magyar had announced their divorce in March 2023. The scandal, which shook Hungary and contributed to their divorce, stemmed from the president’s pardon in April 2023 of a child abuser linked to the ruling circle. Ultimately, two prominent female figures of the Orbán government were forced to resign. The day after these resignations, Magyar called for exposing “the real criminals hiding behind women’s skirts,” launching his rebellion against the Orbán system. His YouTube interview containing this call was viewed by 2.5 million people in a country of 10 million. He also exposed corruption that his former wife had concealed during her time in office. The model couple of the Orbán regime, married for sixteen years with three children, began making serious accusations against each other after their divorce.
Magyar quickly began revealing the fraud and corruption within the Orbán system, which he knew intimately from the inside. While not opposing the conservative themes of Fidesz, he advocated a conservative-democratic line reminiscent of the party’s early 1990s stance—against one-party dominance and in favor of strong relations with the European Union. He called for restoring the rule of law and judicial independence, ending the ruling party’s media monopoly, and addressing the concerns of those suffering from Hungary’s deep economic crisis. Within months of entering the opposition, he achieved unexpected success in European Parliament and local elections, pushing Fidesz back. From that point on, Magyar and his party rapidly replaced long-ineffective opposition parties as the main challenger to Orbán. Meanwhile, in Hungary’s major cities, leftist and Green parties retained the mayoralties they had won in 2019, though in many municipal councils they now needed Tisza’s support for a majority.
Magyar is a devout Catholic politician with strong right-wing references. He expresses the widely shared opposition within Hungarian society to immigrant settlement. A conservative supporter of the EU, he also frequently emphasizes the need to defend national identity. However, unlike the Orbán government’s increasingly aggressive rhetoric, he does not turn this defense into a discourse that excludes those seen as different or labels dissenters as internal enemies. During his campaign, traveling from town to town and village to village, he responded calmly to smear campaigns and disinformation spread by pro-government media and Russian-aligned trolls, often stating that he would return to Fidesz’s early policies but above all would fight corruption and propaganda.
The third factor lies in Orbán’s focus over the past five or six years on international relations rather than domestic issues. During the recent campaign, he was not very active, once again emphasizing the theme of “war at our doorstep” and other global issues, accusing his opponent of being a puppet of Kyiv and Brussels. The pre-election visit of J.D. Vance, along with Trump’s and Netanyahu’s open support and Putin’s implicit but strong backing, may have backfired, according to some observers. Orbán appeared as “the man of foreign powers.” Moreover, Trump’s support came at a time when far-right movements in Europe were beginning to distance themselves from him.
Magyar, on the other hand, avoided engaging with foreign media and focused instead on concrete economic and social problems: the collapse of the healthcare and education systems, the erosion of democratic institutions, high food inflation since 2019, and the blatant crony capitalism enriching Orbán’s relatives and close associates through public tenders. Drawing on his insider knowledge, Magyar announced after his victory that one of his first actions would be to apply for membership in OLAF (the European Anti-Fraud Office), where extensive files on EU fund misuse had long been prepared. Corruption in EU funds is currently estimated at around €3 billion. Meanwhile, The New York Times reported that twelve businessmen close to Orbán accumulated wealth equal to one-fifth of Hungary’s GDP over the past fifteen years. The Financial Times published data showing how public tenders had been monopolized during the same period.
In Africa, the term “cathedrals in the desert” is used to describe wasteful investments and corruption in public tenders. Similar projects had been carried out in Hungary using EU funds. Magyar exposed all of this calmly but firmly. Attacks from pro-government media, false news, and allegations of domestic violence from his ex-wife did not resonate with voters. When a private video surfaced, he responded by stating he was “a 45-year-old single and sexually healthy man” and attributed the leak to “a person revealed to be a Fidesz agent.”
On social issues, such as the banning of Budapest’s Pride March in 2025 under an anti-LGBT law passed in 2021, Magyar remained silent, likely to preserve conservative Catholic support, leaving opposition to Budapest’s Green-left mayor Gergely Karácsony. He also announced that his first foreign visit as prime minister would be to Warsaw—not Brussels, Berlin, or Paris—signaling a renewed constructive role for Central Europe within the EU. While he supports financial aid to Ukraine, he opposes direct military assistance and insists that Ukraine’s NATO membership is not feasible in the near future. On immigration, the main difference between him and Orbán is tone rather than substance.
It would be unrealistic to expect major social and economic transformations from Tisza’s parliamentary group, many of whom come from Fidesz and include technocrats. However, if they avoid abusing their large majority, they could significantly dismantle the Orbán system. How much can be achieved in four years remains uncertain. The younger voter base, more committed to democratic values and open to environmental and leftist ideas, may play a decisive role.
Magyar has already called for the resignation of Orbán’s allies in key positions, including the president, the head of the State Audit Office, and the chief prosecutor. If they refuse, it is unclear what steps he will take, though corruption investigations will likely accelerate. He has also proposed limiting the prime minister to two terms, clearly aiming to prevent Orbán from returning to power.
Given the extent to which the judiciary, media, universities, and civil society have been brought under government control, dismantling the one-man regime will not be easy. Magyar has promised to “repair” the constitution and “heal Hungary’s wounds,” including widespread racism combining anti-Roma, antisemitic, and increasingly Islamophobic elements. The trauma of the 1920 Treaty of Trianon, which cost Hungary two-thirds of its territory, continues to shape national consciousness. While Orbán and Hungarian nationalism frame this as “Hungary was the greatest loser of the 20th century; it will not be so in the 21st,” Magyar differs more in style and governance approach than in substance.
Finally, after the new government takes office, the left must develop a strong and constructive extra-parliamentary political strategy, supported by its presence in major cities. This requires internal transformation, abandoning past support for neoliberal policies, and reconnecting with working-class communities. The failure of center-left parties to respond to economic insecurity and social marginalization played a major role in enabling the rise of “illiberal democracy.” Now, having acted responsibly in enabling a democratic transition, the left faces the challenge of ensuring that the rebuilding of the rule of law also includes freedom, equality, and solidarity.
*Born in Istanbul, in 1955, Ahmet İnsel is an economist and political scientist. He studied in Paris, and served as a faculty member at Sorbonne University (Paris 1) and Galatasaray University (Istanbul). He extensively published on Turkish politics and economics, neoliberalism, and socialism. İnsel is the author of numerous books in Turkish and French, including, most lately, La nouvelle Turquie d’Erdogan. Alongside his academic work, he regularly contributes to progressive daily papers and political journals as a public intellectual.
*This article was originally published in Turkish in Birikim Magazine and translated into English by Politurco.
