The Group for the Support of Islam and Muslims (JNIM)—an Al-Qaeda–affiliated coalition that has rapidly consolidated power across the Greater Sahara—now stands merely 50 kilometers from Mali’s capital, Bamako. Since September, the group has blocked fuel tankers traveling through Mali from Ivory Coast and Senegal, effectively placing the capital and other major cities under an economic siege while establishing de facto control over vast rural areas.
JNIM’s fuel blockade has created kilometers-long queues at petrol stations in Bamako and other urban centers. Schools and hospitals are functioning far below capacity; businesses are shutting down one after another.
Despite support from the Russian Africa Corps—formerly known as Wagner—the junta led by General Assimi Goïta, which seized power through coups in 2020 and 2021, has failed to mount an effective response to JNIM’s expansion.
Malian journalists I spoke with underscore that under current conditions, the junta stands little chance of defeating JNIM. Mamadou Karim Traoré, a journalist at a Timbuktu-based media organization, argues that while the regime was preoccupied with Tuareg groups in the north, it failed to notice JNIM’s rise elsewhere. Traoré emphasizes that Mali’s landlocked geography forces it to rely entirely on neighboring countries’ ports. Supply routes run through vast deserts and areas where the army has long struggled to maintain control—conditions that, he says, create “a tremendous opportunity for JNIM.”
Because the independent press has been almost completely silenced, the journalists I interviewed agreed to speak only under pseudonyms.
Modibo Zankey Sidi, a Tuareg journalist based in Tinzawatene near the Algerian border, highlights internal divisions within the junta as another key factor strengthening JNIM. He recounts that in August, numerous soldiers—including high-ranking generals—were arrested on accusations of attempting a coup, alongside a diplomat from the French embassy accused of aiding the plotters.
Ibrahima Lilly, a former specialist with the UN Civil Affairs Department previously stationed in Gao, says Wagner forces’ harsh and indiscriminate treatment of civilians has rapidly eroded public support for the military regime—further empowering groups like JNIM. According to Lilly, JNIM’s leader Iyad Ag Ghali—himself a former diplomat—is an exceptionally intelligent strategist with deep knowledge of the region and the structure of Mali’s armed forces, giving the group a significant advantage.
Traoré notes that JNIM’s reliance on highly mobile small cells equipped with motorcycles and Kalashnikovs allows it to maneuver with extraordinary agility. Without strong air support, he says, the Malian army is “almost incapable” of countering such mobile units.
According to Sidi, some JNIM cells ambush military convoys—slowing the army’s movements, cutting off logistics, and weakening state capacity—while others impose pressure on local communities to sever their ties with the state.
Established in March 2017 through the merger of Ansar al-Din, Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM), al-Mourabitoun, and Katibat Macina, JNIM is a broad coalition. All three journalists agree that the organization does not operate with complete internal cohesion—its greatest vulnerability. Militant cells, often acting semi-autonomously, sometimes carry out attacks without the knowledge of the group’s senior leadership.
After successive military coups in Mali, Niger, and Burkina Faso, the juntas suspended all military and intelligence cooperation with France, the former colonial power—a move that initially enjoyed overwhelming public support. The three countries also withdrew from ECOWAS and formed the Alliance of Sahel States (AES) on July 6, 2024.
Yet their landlocked geography, the cessation of intelligence sharing with Western countries—especially the United States—and heightened trade tensions with neighbors have made these states far more vulnerable to Al-Qaeda and ISIS-linked groups operating across the Sahel.
Although Turkish-made drones initially helped blunt jihadist advances, groups like JNIM quickly developed countermeasures. Meanwhile, Russia’s Africa Corps—the most powerful Russian military structure on the continent—has engaged in heavy-handed operations against civilians and prioritized regime protection over counterterrorism, further eroding public trust in the juntas.
Sidi stresses that JNIM is consciously targeting the country’s economic lifelines. He summarizes the group’s strategy of economic warfare succinctly:
“The goal is to expose the state’s helplessness in full view, make ordinary life unbearable, and prove that the junta in Bamako cannot maintain even basic order.”
If JNIM continues to expand and ultimately seizes control of Mali, the world could soon witness the emergence of a second radical state resembling Afghanistan under Taliban rule.
JNIM maintains a significant presence not only in Mali but also in neighboring Niger, Burkina Faso, Guinea, and Nigeria. Alongside it operates ISWAP (Islamic State West Africa Province), an ISIS-affiliated group active in Mali and the surrounding region; clashes between JNIM and ISWAP occur periodically.
