Prof. Dr. Meir Litvak/TR-724
I believe that many Kurds in Iran would like to see regime change. However, I am not convinced that most Kurdish people want to separate from Iran altogether. What they have generally demanded is some form of cultural or political autonomy, yet the Iranian regime has consistently refused to grant it.
There have long been grievances among Kurdish communities. Kurdish regions remain among the poorest areas in Iran. Baluchistan is in an even worse situation, but Kurdish areas are probably only slightly better off. In Baluchistan, the population is both Sunni and non-Persian, meaning they face two layers of disadvantage.
In recent years, there have also been complaints that the number of Kurds executed by the regime has been disproportionately higher than that of other groups. The government claims that those executed were criminals, yet many argue that they were in fact Kurdish activists.
If you look at the protests that followed the death of Mahsa Amini in 2022โwho herself was Kurdishโyou can see that demonstrations were especially widespread in Kurdish regions, as well as in other parts of the country. Many people believed she had been killed by the police, and some suspected she had been treated more harshly because she was Kurdish.
For these reasons, I believe there is a deeper sense of anger toward the current regime among many Kurds in Iran. My assumption is that many of them want regime change. They seek autonomy, equality, and greater rightsโbut they clearly do not believe the current regime is capable of delivering these.
Azeris and Persians Could Rally Around the Regime
Even if Kurdish groups received support from the United States or Israel, I am skeptical that they could play a decisive role in overthrowing the Iranian regime. I also do not think it would be a wise policy.
Imagine that several thousand Kurdish fighters take up arms. They would still face tens of thousands of fighters from the Revolutionary Guards (IRGC), the Basij militia, and other security forces. Kurdish regions are also hundreds of kilometers away from Tehran. It is difficult to see how forces based in these remote areas could realistically overthrow the regime in the capital.
Perhaps even more importantly, if Kurds were to launch an uprising today, it would likely be perceived as a Kurdish rebellion. This perception could push many Persians and Persian-speaking populations to rally around the regime out of fear that Iran might fragment or collapse.
History offers a relevant precedent. In 1945โ46, during the Soviet occupation, a semi-autonomous Azerbaijan Peopleโs Government and the Mahabad Republic were established in northern Iran. However, relations between Azeris and Kurds were not particularly good at the time; there were tensions between them.
Therefore, if a Kurdish uprising were to emerge today, it is far from certain that Shiite Turks and Azeris would welcome it. For this reason, I doubt that such a strategy would be wise or effective in bringing about regime change in Iran.
Azeris Do Not Want the Breakup of Iran
My assessment is that most Azeris in Iran do not want the country to break apart. Some may favor cultural autonomy or greater recognition, and at times they may feel the government does not treat them fairly.
One example is the tragedy of Lake Urmia in Iranian Azerbaijan. Once the largest lake in Iran, it has nearly dried up, creating a massive ecological disaster. Many Azeris have complained that the government has failed to take sufficient action to save it. Some even claim that authorities neglected the issue because the region is predominantly Azeri.
At the same time, many Azeris are well integrated into Iranโs political system. They occupy numerous high-ranking positions within the state. Consider former Prime Minister Mir-Hossein Mousavi, who is Azeri and served as Iranโs prime minister for nine years. There are many other examplesโgenerals, senior clerics, and high-ranking officials. For this reason, I do not believe most Azeris want to leave Iran.
Another example illustrates this point. Around thirty years ago, protests erupted in the city of Ardabil in Iranian Azerbaijan. The protesters demanded that Ardabil become a provincial capital. Their argument was striking: during the Iran-Iraq war, they said, the region had given the highest number of martyrs defending Iran. Therefore, they deserved greater recognition. Eventually, their demand succeeded. Importantly, they framed their protest not in separatist terms but in strongly patriotic Iranian language.
For these reasons, I seriously doubt that most Azeris would support breaking up Iran.
Israel Has No Real Connection with Iranian Kurds
Historically, Israel maintained good relations with Iraqi Kurdish groups. However, these ties effectively ended in 1975, when the Shah of Iran abandoned the Iraqi Kurds.
Israelis generally feel a certain sympathy toward the Kurdish people. Yet in practical terms, it is difficult to see how Israel could establish strong relations with Kurdish groups inside Iran. Geography alone presents a major obstacle: Iranian Kurds are surrounded by Turkey, Iraq, and Iran itselfโnone of which support Kurdish political ambitions.
During the Shahโs era, Israel could maintain contact with Kurdish groups through Iran. Today, that route no longer exists.
It is also unlikely that Kurdish groups in Syria or Iraq would participate in operations against Iran. Syrian Kurdish forces were largely abandoned by the United States and ultimately lost their war. Some Iraqi Kurdish factions might theoretically participate, but that would depend on which faction we are talking about.
The Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK), historically associated with Jalal Talabani, has traditionally maintained closer ties with Iran. The Barzani movement, on the other hand, has been closer to Turkey. They would be reluctant to jeopardize their relationship with Ankara.
The Barzani camp may harbor resentment toward Iran, especially because Qassem Soleimani played a key role in suppressing their independence referendum several years ago. But whether such resentment could translate into concrete action is another matter entirely. That would depend on external support in the form of weapons, funding, and logistical backing.
Prof. Dr. Meir Litvak
Director, Alliance Center for Iranian Studies
Parviz and Pouran Nazarian Chair in Modern Iranian Studies
Department of Middle Eastern and African History
Tel Aviv University
