The conflict between the United States and Iran is no longer merely a war in which military targets are being struck. It is evolving into a broader struggle that is reshaping the region’s energy, trade, and security architecture. Washington’s objective appears to be less about occupying Iran than restricting Tehran’s military capabilities and economic room for maneuver. Iran, meanwhile, is retaliating in an effort to demonstrate to the United States and its regional allies that the war carries a price.
At the center of this struggle lies the Strait of Hormuz.
Hormuz: Iran’s Powerful Lever—and Its Vulnerability
Approximately 20 million barrels of oil pass through the Strait of Hormuz every day, accounting for roughly one-quarter of global seaborne oil trade. Iran’s threats against the strait therefore affect not only the United States and the Gulf states but also Asian economies—China foremost among them.
This creates a significant paradox for Iran.
Closing the Strait of Hormuz may be one of Iran’s most powerful instruments of pressure, but overusing that weapon could also inflict serious damage on Iran itself.
Many of the countries that purchase Iranian oil are in Asia. A prolonged closure of the strait would also hurt Iran’s customers and encourage them to accelerate investment in alternative energy routes.
One of the war’s most consequential outcomes may therefore be an intensified effort by the Gulf states to reduce their dependence on Hormuz.
The Goal Is No Longer Merely to Protect Hormuz, but to Bypass It
Saudi Arabia’s East-West Pipeline carries oil to the Red Sea port of Yanbu, while the United Arab Emirates has alternative export routes through Fujairah. These options provide the Gulf states with a degree of strategic flexibility.
Their existing capacity, however, is not sufficient to replace all the oil currently passing through Hormuz. The strait is therefore unlikely to lose its importance in the short term.
The long-term strategic shift lies elsewhere:
The real issue is not whether Hormuz will become irrelevant, but whether Iran’s bargaining power over the strait will diminish.
If the Gulf states invest more heavily in new pipelines, ports, and alternative maritime routes after the war, Iran’s geographic advantage could gradually erode.
In other words, by using Hormuz as an instrument of pressure today, Iran may simultaneously be encouraging its rivals to build the infrastructure needed to neutralize that instrument tomorrow.
China and Russia: Support, but No Military Alliance
Another important dimension of the war concerns the limits of the support Iran can expect from China and Russia.
Beijing and Moscow may condemn US attacks and provide Iran with diplomatic and economic support. That does not mean, however, that they are prepared to enter the war directly on Iran’s side.
Energy security and the stability of global trade are particularly important to China. A prolonged crisis in the Strait of Hormuz would also seriously affect the Chinese economy.
It is therefore more realistic to interpret Beijing’s approach not as “fighting alongside Iran,” but as “preventing Iran from collapsing completely.”
The situation is similar for Russia. Moscow has strategic ties with Tehran, but that relationship does not require Russia to enter into a direct war with the United States on Iran’s behalf.
The conflict is thus also exposing the limits of Iran’s relationships with the major powers.
Economic Pressure May Be the War’s Most Critical Front
For Iran, the greatest danger is not limited to airstrikes. It also lies in the war’s economic consequences.
Declining oil revenues, shrinking export channels, currency depreciation, and high inflation are steadily narrowing the government’s room for maneuver. The rial’s sharp fall against the dollar and the decline in oil exports demonstrate that economic pressure is now directly affecting everyday life.
Yet hasty conclusions should be avoided here as well.
An economic crisis alone is not enough to bring down a regime.
The Iranian government possesses powerful security institutions. A wartime environment may also allow the leadership to blame its economic failures on an external threat.
For economic collapse to produce political change, therefore, it would take more than widespread financial hardship. The balance of power within the state would also have to break down, accompanied by signs of fragmentation within the security apparatus.
Five Possible Paths Ahead
There are several basic scenarios for how the war may develop in the coming period.
The first scenario is a negotiated settlement.
The parties could reach a new agreement on Iran’s nuclear program and regional activities in exchange for the safe reopening of the Strait of Hormuz. Such a formula could allow both sides to claim victory without escalating the conflict further.
The second scenario is a prolonged war of attrition.
The United States could continue its airstrikes while Iran carries out limited retaliatory attacks. Under this scenario, the conflict could last for months. Iran would face mounting economic pressure, while Washington would have to contend with rising energy prices, the financial cost of the war, and domestic political opposition.
The third scenario is the large-scale closure of Hormuz.
This would be the most dangerous possibility for global energy markets. Oil prices could surge dramatically. Yet such a move by Iran could provoke not only the United States and the Gulf states but even China. For Tehran, it would therefore be an extraordinarily powerful—but equally dangerous—step.
The fourth scenario is a political rupture within Iran.
If the economic crisis, wartime destruction, and public discontent converge, the internal balance of power within the regime could shift. This would not necessarily mean the complete collapse of the regime, however. It could instead result in a change of leadership, a reconfiguration of power, or the adoption of even harsher security policies.
The fifth scenario is a permanent transformation of the regional order.
This may prove to be the war’s most important consequence.
The Gulf states may invest more heavily in alternative energy-export routes, the United States may redesign the region’s maritime security architecture, and Asian countries may begin treating dependence on Hormuz as a more serious risk in their energy-supply calculations.
If that happens, the prewar order may never fully return—even after the fighting ends.
Conclusion: The Real Contest May Not Be Over Who Controls Hormuz, but Who Needs It Less
For now, it is too early either to declare that Iran has lost the war or to proclaim a decisive American victory.
Tehran still possesses significant military capabilities, geographic advantages, and instruments of regional influence. Washington, meanwhile, is using air power, economic sanctions, and its influence over the global financial system to restrict Iran’s room for maneuver.
The outcome of the war will therefore not be determined solely by the number of strikes carried out on the battlefield.
The decisive question will be:
Can Iran endure longer, or can the United States and its allies sustain pressure on Tehran for longer?
If Washington can continue the war without launching a ground invasion and maintain economic pressure, Tehran may eventually be forced to make more substantial concessions.
If the war drags on, oil prices rise, and Iranian retaliation drives up the costs borne by the United States and the Gulf states, however, political pressure on Washington could intensify.
The war’s most significant outcome may therefore be neither Iran’s defeat nor an American victory.
The real outcome will be determined by the extent to which the Middle East can overcome Iran’s geographic advantages.
The Strait of Hormuz will not disappear. But if Iran’s ability to use it as a bargaining chip diminishes, one of the most important levers in Tehran’s regional strategy may lose much of its former strength.
Perhaps this is the war’s greatest irony:
The more Iran uses Hormuz as a weapon, the more it may accelerate the world’s efforts to reduce its dependence on the strait.
