Necip F. Bahadir
Can we say that certain signs of an early election have appeared in Turkey? Yes… When the Turkish singer İbrahim Tatlıses asked Erdoğan in Şanlıurfa, “Are you up for candidacy again?” he didn’t respond with, “What does that have to do with anything… Is this the time?” Instead, he said, “If you are, then I am too!” Not only did he signal his candidacy, but he also, in a way, gave the green light to an early election. It would be correct to say that the AKP government has initiated a new ‘political process’ that will culminate in an election.
Furthermore, following Erdoğan’s statement, there has been a noticeable increase in political preparations and activity. The DEVA, Felicity, and Future parties have come together to form a new structure called ‘Yeni Yol’ (New Path). The ultimate goal of this alliance is undoubtedly an election. Establishing a parliamentary group to gain a stronger opposition voice is important, of course. However, if this alliance does not turn into an electoral coalition, it will be meaningless. The ‘umbrella structure’ is directly linked to elections.
The judicial decisions targeting Ekrem İmamoğlu, both directly and indirectly, indicate that Erdoğan has kicked off the election process. The judiciary continues to surround AKP’s biggest rival, İmamoğlu, from all sides. Not a day goes by without a new investigation being opened against him. There have even been instances where the prosecution took action before he could even finish a speech.
It is also noteworthy that MHP leader Devlet Bahçeli, without waiting for his group meeting the next day, posted on social media in the evening, calling on İmamoğlu to resign from his mayoral position and announce his candidacy. Even if this was intended to cause internal turmoil in CHP, it has nevertheless helped familiarize the public with the idea of İmamoğlu’s candidacy—something Erdoğan does not desire at all.
CHP Could Force the Regime into an Early Election
CHP is already prepared for an early election. Given that it emerged as the leading party in the March 31st elections, it is only natural for CHP to want to extend its local success to national governance. In fact, one could argue that they have been too passive and weak in this regard. While it may be mathematically difficult to push for a decision in Parliament, it should not be that hard to develop policies that pressure the AKP government into an election.
With the judiciary’s increasing moves against İmamoğlu, CHP has officially launched its ‘candidacy process.’ During his party’s parliamentary group meeting, Özgür Özel stated, “The ballot box is coming in 2025…” and followed with, “We are starting today…” CHP will consult its ‘1.6 million registered party members’ to determine its presidential candidate. In essence, a ‘primary election’ will be held. Turkish politics has long forgotten about primary elections.
In the past, parliamentary candidates were determined through primaries overseen by judges. Party leaders were only given a ‘5% quota.’ First the right-wing, then the left-wing parties abandoned this practice. The party headquarters—especially the party leader—became the sole decision-makers for candidate lists. Party organizations and grassroots lost their significance.
Now, CHP will determine its ‘presidential candidate’ through a widespread ‘primary election.’ Every registered party member will have a say in the outcome. As far as I know, this is a first. In the past, there were polls and preference surveys within the party, but ultimately, the final decision was left to the party leader. This is how AKP operates as well.
Preference surveys are rarely adhered to because they are unofficial, not conducted under judicial supervision, and their results are not shared with the public. Only the top leadership of the party knows the results—if the chairman decides to reveal them. The process of selecting a presidential candidate has always played a significant role in Turkish politics. Before the late Turgut Özal, candidates were always chosen from outside Parliament and had military backgrounds. It was the ultimate ambition of the Chiefs of General Staff to become president. Until Özal, all presidents except Celal Bayar were from the military.
Özal paved the way for ‘civilian presidents.’ Süleyman Demirel and Recep Tayyip Erdoğan followed this path. Then, the system changed, and Turkey transitioned to a system where the president is elected directly by the people instead of Parliament. This was the right move. However, a democratic system was never built on top of it. Parliament lost its influence and became almost irrelevant.
CHP’s Move Is a Democratic Step
The fact that CHP will determine its candidate by consulting its members is a democratic step. The word ‘organization’ carries a negative connotation today. Right-wing parties refer to their provincial and district branches as ‘organizations,’ while left-wing parties use the term ‘party structure.’ We are still at the beginning of the process. How it will unfold remains unclear. Who will be eligible to enter the primary election? What criteria will be required for candidacy? If dozens or even hundreds of people apply, how will chaos be prevented? Will the party leadership remain impartial? What kind of campaigns will candidates conduct during the primary process?
CHP’s Potential Candidates Are Clear
Now that Özel has officially announced the primary election decision, it is safe to assume that all of these questions have been considered. Even if some surprise candidates emerge, the ‘potential candidates’ are clear. There are not even three of them—it is evident that the election will be a contest between two individuals: the mayors of two major cities—Ekrem İmamoğlu and Mansur Yavaş. Party members will choose between these two. In fact, the outcome is somewhat predictable… The party organization will likely favor ‘İmamoğlu.’ Period. Mansur Yavaş is someone who joined CHP from the outside. He has no real influence or power within the party organization.
Some might even interpret the primary election decision as a move to block Mansur Yavaş. And they wouldn’t be entirely wrong. Like all parties, CHP’s grassroots naturally rally around one of their own. Mansur Yavaş is both an outsider and comes from a nationalist-right-wing background (MHP), which is ideologically distant from CHP and left-wing politics. While he has adapted well to CHP, he is still seen as an ‘outsider.’ When compared with İmamoğlu, he is bound to lose.
İmamoğlu’s Real Challenge Is Not the CHP Process—It’s the Judiciary
İmamoğlu’s real challenge is not CHP’s internal candidacy process but the judicial sword hanging over his head like ‘Damocles’ sword.’ At any moment, he could be confronted with a ‘political ban,’ which would postpone his candidacy indefinitely. His case is currently in the appeals court. A decision will likely be made once the election process becomes more concrete. After that, everything will depend on signals from Ankara. Of course, if İmamoğlu’s path is blocked, it will only make him politically stronger—just like Erdoğan’s own political story.
I find CHP’s decision to initiate the ‘candidacy and early election process’ through a primary election significant. This also serves as a response to the judicial actions against İmamoğlu. Will 2025 be an election year? Many believe it will. Some signs have already appeared. The public, having lost hope in the AKP government, is in favor of an early election. It is up to CHP and the opposition to push the government toward elections and place the ballot box before the people.
If not in 2025, then in 2026. But definitely not as late as 2028…
