Turkey’s political, social, and economic transformation is not yet complete; however, 2025 has become a year of political rupture and awakening. Here’s what happened: the “legitimacy paint” of the regime’s election–ballot equation has peeled off. Even regime supporters no longer justify the current administration through “election results”; they don’t even utter the phrase anymore.
Because after twenty-three years, Turkey still has an unchanging and unchangeable one-party rule. In a country that has hit rock bottom in almost every sphere—and in a climate where the leader is never held accountable—the regime now uses all tools at its disposal recklessly, lawlessly, and disproportionately to preserve its position.
All critical processes have been carefully managed for this purpose and—unfortunately—the regime has reached a point that can no longer be changed by existing democratic means.
Thus, the year 2025—especially its first half—not only shoved the government’s intentions into the eyes of those who refused to see, but also exposed that the greatest accomplice of the regime was the organized opposition. The media must also be included in this (and I’m not referring to the pro-government press, of course).
The Two Faces of Power
Turkey’s governance today is divided in two: a regime that oppresses its citizens, and an opposition that serves as a pressure-release valve for the suffering public. Together they manage the country, with clearly assigned roles.
Small parties that initially set out with patriotic intentions, along with their sympathizers, have been gradually squeezed out; the nation’s most qualified people have not only been excluded from the social order but also alienated and driven away.
Socialist, nationalist, Kemalist, and Islamist sentiments are all skillfully exploited in this process—because the exploiters have no new arguments to offer. Recent history and the official narrative are rewritten accordingly, decorated with myths, and engraved into the collective consciousness.
In short, the task ahead is daunting. These entrenched arguments have many backers, and to make your message heard you must strike precisely the right chords. You will have to repair—and, more realistically, rebuild—a structure that is still standing. That is difficult—very difficult indeed.
The Struggle to “Put the Train Back on the Track”
On the other hand, another battle is underway: “Alright, we’ve collectively derailed the country; now let’s get it back on track.”
Let me clarify: the greatest fear—the nightmare—of those currently in power is losing control. They are an organized and armed formation numbering in the hundreds of thousands, willing to do anything to prevent that. Don’t think merely of criminal gangs; I’m talking about a mafia-like state structure, one that has institutionalized its “legal basis” through the security forces and the judiciary.
Yet I am skeptical of those who claim they will take over the administration in order to “restore” the system to its previous settings. Their intentions are dubious. They hope to inherit current powers and build their own order. They foresee no advancement in political or social freedoms, in the judiciary or bureaucracy, or in the realm of free thought. They lack the personnel for it as well. If they had, we would already see shadow cabinets working on solutions to national problems. But alas, even a fraction of the hundreds of millions of liras in state funding allocated to parties is not spent in that direction.
The Palace’s Game Plan
Let us continue with the game plan long set in motion by the Palace—it’s hardly a state secret.
For those in power, public preferences during election periods are irrelevant, and have always been so. It’s now evident that the Presidential Palace considers agreements with the elite sufficient. Therefore, there can be no genuine referendum or real ballot. What matters most to the Palace is parliamentary arithmetic. With calculators in hand, they are figuring out how to reach 400 seats. Recall Erdoğan’s 2015 campaign slogan: “Give us 400 deputies so we can solve this peacefully.” When the people refused, he tried it in parliament—and succeeded.
Erdoğan will not, and cannot, go to a referendum. No matter how it’s packaged, any referendum would be a vote of confidence in the Palace—and it would lose.
That’s what I mean by cooperation with the elites. Securing 400 parliamentary seats is far easier. Notice how, even without granting the opposition anything, that number has already been approached—perhaps even surpassed.
No Ballot in Sight
Here’s the point: under these conditions, the ballot box will not come, and Erdoğan will never be ready for one. As the public movement grows and discontent rises, he seeks to co-opt opposition parties and resolve everything within parliament.
He still has two and a half years, and reshaping parliament is far easier than convincing the people. He’s building his strategy around politicians with no public support—Davutoğlu, Babacan, İYİ Party, and its colorless leader.
A Separate Note on the DEM Party
At this point, the DEM Party deserves its own paragraph.
Erdoğan always singles out one main rival and directs all his fire there. In the past, that was the Kurdish political movement (HDP). After the July 15 coup attempt, CHP helped consolidate the new authoritarian regime. Now CHP is under fire, while the DEM Party is carrying on a “process” with the government.
This “single rival” strategy is crucial—because otherwise, opposing forces might unite and realize Erdoğan’s worst nightmare. If I can see this from here, it’s impossible that Turkey’s opposition forces can’t.
But here’s the question: why does the DEM Party, which stands out with its program that breaks the mold and keeps its distance from regime rhetoric, continue to make efforts to “preserve the process,” despite having gained nothing for over a year?
Perhaps its “gain” is merely the temporary suspension of the trustee (kayyım) policy, the tolerance shown toward memorials for fallen PKK leaders, or the lack of reaction in parliament to slogans like “Biji Serok Apo” (Long live leader Apo).
Politically, that reasoning may seem acceptable—or not. They might say, “A truce with tyrants is better than a lost war.” Or perhaps they believe that once the current regime falls, they will have no seat at the next table.
As I said, these calculations may be politically understandable. But the voters have the right to know.
That is precisely my point. Given this trajectory, I expect no political surprises in late 2025 or early 2026.
It’s after that period that worries me most.
