Necip F. Bahadır
The İmralı delegation has returned, and Öcalan’s messages have been shared with the public. What followed was an odd silence. Erdoğan kept quiet. Bahçeli didn’t rush to comment, waiting instead for his “New Year” message. The MHP leader described the meeting and Öcalan’s letter as “the momentum for an auspicious beginning,” adding, “Words should now give way to action.”
Who Is Ocalan’s Counterpart?
Surely not Bahçeli alone! What can the MHP even do? It’s merely a coalition partner, not a natural part of the ruling government—an unofficial partner at best.
The AKP has been inclined to proceed cautiously from the start. Since Bahçeli shook hands with DEM-affiliated politicians on the opening day of Parliament in October, the AKP and Erdoğan have been trailing behind. Bahçeli’s proposal, “Let Öcalan come and speak in the DEM group,” wasn’t embraced by the AKP, who remained hesitant.
But Bahçeli didn’t give up and raised the stakes each time, suggesting, “If Öcalan can’t come, let DEM go to İmralı.” This was a concrete proposal. The AKP couldn’t ignore or overlook it. Erdoğan gave it much thought, calculating its potential gains and losses. Eventually, he said “Okay,” but refrained from setting a timeline. Was he waiting for the situation to cool off?
While the Ministry of Justice worked on setting a date for the meeting, revolutionary changes unfolded in Syria. The 60-year-old Ba’ath regime collapsed in just ten days. Assad was forced to flee to Moscow, and HTS took control in Damascus at lightning speed, completely upending regional dynamics.
As the Justice Ministry finalized budget discussions and the days of 2024 dwindled, İmralı was finally opened to the DEM delegation. The delegation included Pervin Buldan and Sırrı Süreyya Önder, both of whom had participated in the talks a decade ago. Önder, half-jokingly, remarked, “It seems we’re headed to prison again,” but he didn’t back down. The meeting lasted about three hours. Öcalan and the delegation weren’t alone at the table—two individuals representing the state were also present.
If He Has Power, Why Didn’t He Call for Disarmament?
On Sunday, Önder and Buldan summarized Öcalan’s messages to the public in a written statement. There were no major surprises. Öcalan’s standout remark was, “I’m ready.” This was the same phrase he used on the day he was handed over to Turkey. He also added that he “has the power.” If he’s ready and has the power, why didn’t he call on the PKK to “lay down their arms”? This is what Bahçeli was expecting.
This is the most critical point. The process hasn’t even been officially defined yet. It’s unclear whether we can even speak of a new process. In Ankara, the only person showing their hand is Bahçeli. The AKP and Erdoğan’s reluctance is evident in every statement they make. Their support seems limited to not leaving Bahçeli’s words unfulfilled. There’s no excitement, no framework, no concrete steps coming from the AKP side—though the same can’t be said for their media.
At this stage, if we must name the process, “Bahçeli’s Öcalan Initiative” would be most accurate. It’s a process that has advanced entirely through Bahçeli’s words and concrete steps. If it’s to become a government or state project, the time has come. Bahçeli pushed the button, but the issue has escalated beyond him. Bahçeli has done his part; now Erdoğan must take the lead.
In Öcalan’s messages, the inclusion of terms like Parliament, democracy, Syria, and brotherhood, as well as the specific mention of “Erdoğan and Bahçeli,” is no coincidence. All eyes are on Erdoğan. After Öcalan’s letter, Erdoğan assessed 2024, issued a New Year’s message, and shared his views on topics ranging from Syria to Ukraine—but conspicuously avoided addressing this specific issue.
Couldn’t he at least have said a single sentence to the public? Something headline-worthy like, “I’m ready too…” It might still be too early for such a statement. But shouldn’t he say something, positive or negative? Did he ignore İmralı’s messages, or is he waiting for them to mature behind closed doors?
Who Is the Iron Fist Directed At?
Could it be that—without wanting to play devil’s advocate—the statement “… When necessary, we will not hesitate to activate the iron fist of our state inside a velvet glove,” is the response? Did Erdoğan counter Öcalan’s “I’m ready” message with an “iron fist”? If so, speaking of any process would be futile.
With an “iron fist,” even if wrapped in a velvet glove, there can be no negotiations, no peace. Can you shake hands with a fist? To shake hands, the fist must first be unclenched.
If we’re to speak of an “iron fist,” it wouldn’t just be directed at Öcalan. Wouldn’t it also indirectly include Bahçeli? Could the MHP leader ignore such a challenge?
It’s easy to infer from Öcalan’s statements that the delegation went to İmralı “empty-handed.” Claims that something significant was brewing in the background don’t hold water. Otherwise, Öcalan would have said, “I’m calling on the organization now,” instead of, “I’m ready.” It’s clear there was no prior negotiation or progress. Of course, this doesn’t mean it won’t happen. Could there be a handshake behind the scenes despite the “iron fist” in the foreground? Possible, but unlikely.
We’re still at the beginning. The DEM delegation will meet with political parties and perhaps request an appointment with the Speaker of Parliament. But ultimately, everything hinges on the AKP. Yes, Parliament could provide the groundwork, but who else but the government and state can turn the process into a project and implement it? Erdoğan, who suffered a major blow on March 31, has no plan other than running for re-election and winning.
Given that the peace process carries inherent risks and dangers, it seems unlikely that Erdoğan could derive any “electoral advantage” from it. There’s reason to be both hopeful and doubtful.
The question is this: Can Erdoğan, who maintains his power through repression and fear, respond to Öcalan’s call for “democracy” with democratic steps? Could he release Selahattin Demirtaş? Isn’t that extremely difficult? The process itself is very difficult…
