The ruling issued on May 21, 2026, by the 36th Civil Chamber of the Ankara Regional Court of Justice will likely go down in Turkish political history as a “leadership change imposed through the judiciary.” By nullifying the CHP’s 2023 party congress, the court removed Özgür Özel and his administration, reinstating Kemal Kılıçdaroğlu and the former leadership. This was not a simple intra-party legal dispute. It was an operational maneuver by the regime to replace a figure who, while not genuinely oppositional, still had the potential to create limited problems, with another figure perceived as even less problematic.
In reality, both Kılıçdaroğlu and Özel maintained a political understanding that accepted the CHP’s role as a form of “controlled opposition” within the regime. The key difference between them was Erdoğan’s assessment of which leader posed less of a threat to his rule and which one would be easier to manage. It now appears that the regime concluded Kılıçdaroğlu was the more suitable option and used the courts to bring him back.
To understand that the CHP never truly chose to become a genuine opposition force against the regime, it is enough to look at the post–July 15 Yenikapı rallies. From that moment on, the party almost unquestioningly adopted Erdoğan’s narratives surrounding the “FETÖ terrorist organization” and the “July 15 democracy victory.” It internalized the regime’s central discourse. This approach remained unchanged during both the Kılıçdaroğlu and Özel eras.
The issue of the emergency decrees (KHKs) is perhaps the clearest example of this submission. During both leadership periods, the CHP’s discourse was essentially this: “We will defend the rights of those who were acquitted or whose cases were dismissed.”
This position itself contains a major contradiction. The overwhelming majority of those dismissed through emergency decrees never had any court involvement at all. And those who were tried were acquitted by the very same judiciary that remains under the regime’s control. The same courts are described as “Erdoğan’s courts” when they prosecute figures like Ekrem İmamoğlu or other opposition voices, yet their decisions regarding KHK victims are suddenly treated as legitimate. This inconsistency clearly demonstrates that the CHP never challenged the regime’s foundational paradigms and merely operated within the boundaries permitted by the system.
Under Özgür Özel’s leadership, this approach largely continued. Statements that effectively opened the door for Erdoğan’s re-election, attempts to transform the Saraçhane protests into harmless rallies that would dissipate public anger, and a political profile careful not to escalate tensions with the regime beyond certain limits all reflected the same pattern. In other words, Özel too had accepted the role of being the regime’s opposition. Yet from Erdoğan’s perspective, Kılıçdaroğlu apparently appeared more capable of fulfilling that role with fewer complications.
The most critical consequence of this decision is that the power struggle within the CHP has strengthened the regime’s hand. A serious division is emerging among party members and grassroots organizations. One side supports Özel, the other Kılıçdaroğlu. This internal conflict is causing the CHP to consume its own energy. And that is precisely what the regime wants. An opposition consumed by infighting becomes the government’s greatest guarantee of survival.
With this development, Turkey has crossed another critical threshold in terms of regime character. A system long described as “competitive authoritarianism” has now moved beyond even that definition. Turkey is beginning to resemble countries like Russia, Belarus, and Azerbaijan. Elections are still held, but the opposition’s ability to genuinely compete is being systematically eliminated. The judiciary, media, economy, and security bureaucracy are now entirely under government control, while the opposition remains trapped in internal battles.
Through this maneuver, the regime has both consolidated its internal power and reinforced the appearance that “the rule of law is functioning.” Yet, as the saying among Turkey’s deep-state circles goes, the law has become “the dog of politics,” functioning merely as Erdoğan’s stick. Any rational observer can see that this is not a legal decision but an openly political one. The objective is clear: to control every oppositional dynamic that might create difficulties for the regime. The leadership change within the CHP is simply one part of this broader strategy.
Ultimately, the main problem facing Turkey’s opposition is not who its leaders are. The real issue is the dominance of a political mentality that refuses to step beyond the boundaries drawn by the regime, declines to challenge its rhetoric, and has accepted becoming part of the system itself. The transition from Kılıçdaroğlu to Özel and back again is merely another version of this structural surrender. The regime has reshaped the opposition profile most convenient for itself through judicial intervention.
This picture also demonstrates how rapidly the remaining democratic fragments in Turkey are disappearing. The country is no longer merely a “competitive authoritarian” system; it has become openly authoritarian. If the opposition is ever to become a genuine alternative, it must first challenge the regime’s foundational paradigms and overcome this deeply entrenched culture of submission within its own ranks. Turkey already had a system where elections existed without offering a real choice. Now, even that façade has been transformed into a de facto authoritarian one-party order. Erdoğan has effectively reset Turkey’s journey toward the rule of law and liberal democracy back to zero — much like the destruction of the country’s economic value.
This decision also serves as a litmus test for Turkey’s so-called opposition. If the CHP cannot overcome this internal conflict and break free from the boundaries imposed by the regime, it will become an entirely dysfunctional structure. They were already unable to achieve genuine social democratization because they themselves failed to become truly democratic. Now they have regressed even further — to the point of failing to function as an independent political party at all.
For a party that founded the Republic, this may be even more tragic than its earlier failures. Yet this is exactly the kind of neutralized, decorative, regime-approved opposition that Erdoğan and the deeper power structures surrounding him desire. Managing such an opposition becomes far easier for them.
