Necip F. Bahadır
Once again, the Republican People’s Party (Cumhuriyet Halk Partisi – CHP). Yes, I must write about the CHP. The court is about to issue its verdict in the “convention lawsuit.” It could declare the party congress null and void—a concept usually reserved for family law.
But who in Turkey still cares about the law? Does the judiciary even have a concern for justice anymore?
Could the court actually remove Özgür Özel’s leadership? Absolutely—it’s not even a remote possibility. One can already sense that government circles favor annulment. The CHP itself doesn’t rule out that scenario.
The court is ready. The hearing was moved to a larger courtroom. The verdict, expected in September, was postponed to October 24—forty days later. During that time, the CHP held extraordinary provincial conventions. In Istanbul, the judiciary objected; the governor’s office sent a letter ordering police to block them. But the Supreme Election Council (Yüksek Seçim Kurulu – YSK) met in emergency session and said, “Proceed.” That decision effectively nullified the lower court’s order. Now the YSK and the trial court stand at odds.
A similar conflict could erupt in the convention case itself.
If the congress that elected Özgür Özel as party leader is annulled, the former administration will be back in play. Kemal Kılıçdaroğlu could once again become head of the CHP. That’s the real issue—an internal war between the old and new guards. Despite mounting pressure, Kılıçdaroğlu has stayed silent, neither rejecting nor accepting the idea of returning. Factions within the party are already positioning themselves for his comeback.
The court’s decision will be critical.
Meanwhile, Fatih Erbakan, head of the New Welfare Party (Yeniden Refah Partisi – YRP), said recently, “We’re hearing things in Ankara,” and passed along the rumor:
If Ekrem İmamoğlu (mayor of Istanbul) and Mansur Yavaş (mayor of Ankara) run, Erdoğan could easily lose. So, let’s bring back Kemal Kılıçdaroğlu and stage a controlled election.”
One hardly needs inside sources to see that logic. President Erdoğan’s game plan is clear—he doesn’t want to face a rival he might lose to. Losing the presidency would mean losing far more than his office.
Still, the term “controlled election” is interesting. Since consolidating power as an autocrat, haven’t all elections under Erdoğan been controlled? Didn’t he mobilize the entire state apparatus each time? During the difficult May 2023 elections, didn’t he manipulate the opposition’s “Table of Six” coalition to ensure Kılıçdaroğlu’s candidacy?
Fake polls inflated Kılıçdaroğlu’s popularity. Meral Akşener was used to fracture the opposition bloc. With Kılıçdaroğlu as opponent, Erdoğan could win—and did.
Under the AK Party’s rule, has there ever been a fair contest? Erdoğan and his candidates always started several steps ahead. Yet even that had limits: in the March 31 local elections, the anti-Erdoğan wave became a storm. His advantages and “bonuses” no longer worked.
Erdoğan suffered the worst defeat of his career. He still hasn’t recovered from the shock of March 31. His current spree of “political transfers”—poaching opposition politicians—is a desperate attempt to reclaim what voters denied him through ballot-box tricks in Ankara. He forgets that such maneuvers never truly pay off.
Fatih Erbakan now complains about Erdoğan’s policies. But let’s be honest: he’s one of Erdoğan’s partners in crime. During the May 2023 presidential race, despite objections from within his own ranks, Erbakan backed Erdoğan and played a pivotal role in his victory. Had he said no, Erdoğan might have lost. Every vote mattered.
If only Erbakan could show some self-criticism and face his share of guilt. What did he expect? Erdoğan before May was the same Erdoğan after May. How could he not see that simple truth?
He should have listened to his father, Necmettin Erbakan—the late Islamist prime minister who once mentored Erdoğan. Who knew Erdoğan better than he? Didn’t he warn, “After doing what you’ve done, even if you spent the rest of your life in prayer, you could never escape this sin”?
And what Erdoğan has done since then is far worse. He has trampled on justice and law, turned oppression into policy, and driven the economy into a spiral of record-high interest rates—the very thing his old mentor opposed most fiercely. For power, he’s sold every moral principle. History and destiny both bear witness.
To be fair, Fatih Erbakan made one correct observation:
“People see all this. Resentment is building. This stubbornness and obsession with staying in power will backfire. In Anatolia we can feel it: if you ban İmamoğlu and Yavaş and reinstall Kılıçdaroğlu, another figure—perhaps me or someone else—will rise and you’ll lose again. As long as people can vote, you can’t escape defeat. Economically and morally, Turkey is collapsing.”
Those words deserve to be remembered.
Back to the CHP: judicial interference in Istanbul was a test run. The court appointed Gürsel Tekin, a former CHP MP, as “trustee” (kayyım) over the provincial branch.
The result? A total fiasco.
The so-called “call committee”—what were they supposed to call? Another convention? The current administration held it anyway. Tekin and his allies watched from the sidelines. Beyond a few headlines in pro-government media, Tekin accomplished nothing. Even he, and the court that appointed him, seem unsure what to do next.
He could have withdrawn—but it’s easy to guess why he’s waiting: all eyes are on the court’s coming verdict in the national congress case. If the convention is annulled, Tekin may align with Kılıçdaroğlu and seek a new role. That might buy him time, but not legitimacy. Neither the leftist base nor advocates of democratic politics will forgive him—or Kılıçdaroğlu.
It’s hard to understand how both men fail to see this basic truth. Personal motives? Perhaps. But this is no longer about personalities—or even about a party. It has become a national issue. With Özgür Özel’s leadership giving the CHP new momentum, anyone who helps Erdoğan by sowing chaos will be judged harshly by both society and history. The country is already paying for Kılıçdaroğlu’s mistakes from May.
I know a column about the CHP won’t attract much attention. That’s why I chose a title without mentioning it. Still, this looming court ruling could shake not only politics but the entire national agenda. I wanted to prepare you for that.
No matter how much Erdoğan meddles with the CHP, he can’t escape his own dead end. The real opposition no longer resides in any party—it’s in the people themselves. He can toy with the CHP all he wants.
But what will he do about the people?
The old political magic tricks no longer work. Rather than wasting time on doomed schemes, he’d do better to prepare himself for the inevitable and seek an honorable exit.
