The Middle East’s strategic maritime chokepoints are no longer critical solely because of their role in securing global trade and energy flows. The corridor stretching from the Strait of Hormuz to Bab el-Mandeb has also become a central arena in the struggle over deterrence, influence, and the redistribution of security burdens.
As the calculations of Iran, the United States, and Saudi Arabia intersect with the expanding roles of regional and global powers, maritime security is no longer merely a consequence of conflict. It is increasingly becoming an instrument of conflict itself.
Bab el-Mandeb derives its strategic importance from its position connecting the Red Sea to the Gulf of Aden and the Indian Ocean. Because a significant share of trade between Asia and Europe passes through the Suez Canal, any instability around Bab el-Mandeb has direct consequences for global supply chains. Recent Houthi attacks have already prompted some shipping and energy companies to reroute vessels around southern Africa, significantly increasing both transit times and costs.
The Strait of Hormuz, by contrast, represents an even more immediate vulnerability in the global energy system. Before the latest conflicts, roughly one-fifth of global oil production passed through this route. Any substantial disruption therefore affects not only the Gulf states but energy markets worldwide.
From Hormuz to Bab el-Mandeb: Moving Pressure Into the “Gray Zone”
Against this backdrop, Iran’s strategy of expanding the geographical scope of pressure while avoiding direct confrontation has emerged as one of the most consequential dimensions of the crisis.
For Tehran, the objective is to avoid confining the contest to the Gulf and instead extend pressure toward Yemen and the Red Sea. The Houthis provide Iran with a means of exerting pressure on maritime traffic without necessarily allowing every escalation to turn into a direct confrontation between Iran and Western powers.
This approach closely resembles what security literature describes as a “gray-zone strategy”: the use of military, economic, political, and security pressure below the threshold of conventional war, often through allies, proxy actors, and regional networks.
That does not mean, however, that every Houthi operation in Yemen should automatically be treated as an Iranian order. The Houthis have their own interests, calculations, and decision-making structures. At the same time, international reporting and assessments have extensively documented Iranian support for the movement.
The Houthis’ growing influence along Yemen’s western coastline has therefore once again focused attention on the strategic balance surrounding Bab el-Mandeb.
Expanded Houthi influence around Mocha, Dhubab, and Mayyun Island does not mean that the group could necessarily shut Bab el-Mandeb completely. But a durable military presence in these areas increases its ability to threaten maritime traffic, raise transit costs, and create uncertainty for global shipping companies.
Here, geography itself becomes an economic weapon.
The strait does not need to be completely closed. Higher security risks, insurance premiums, fuel costs, and freight charges can produce consequences far beyond Yemen, Iran, or Saudi Arabia. The effects can extend from Egypt and the Suez Canal to Asian producers and European markets.
Saudi Arabia’s Two-Strait Dilemma
Riyadh, meanwhile, has spent years attempting to reduce its dependence on the Strait of Hormuz for oil exports.
The East-West crude oil pipeline, which connects oil-producing regions in eastern Saudi Arabia with the Red Sea port of Yanbu, is one of the most important components of that strategy.
The pipeline gives Saudi Arabia an alternative export route that bypasses Hormuz. But if conflict spreads into the Red Sea, that alternative corridor itself becomes exposed to security risks.
This produces an increasingly complicated geographical equation.
Hormuz is the principal gateway for the Gulf and one of the central arteries of global energy flows. Bab el-Mandeb is the southern gateway to the Red Sea and, through Suez, to European markets.
A serious security crisis affecting both passages simultaneously could transform a regional confrontation into a global energy and supply-chain crisis.
Pakistan: Defending Saudi Arabia Without Being Dragged Into a Regional War
The security relationship between Saudi Arabia and Pakistan takes on renewed importance in this environment.
Islamabad must preserve its strategic security relationship with Riyadh while avoiding becoming a direct participant in a confrontation with Iran.
Recent developments suggest that Riyadh has sought direct U.S. military support in response to Houthi attacks, while Washington has so far appeared more inclined toward intelligence assistance and targeting support than a large-scale direct American campaign against the Houthis.
That makes Pakistan’s potential role more consequential.
Pakistani assistance could potentially be limited to defensive missions such as protecting Saudi airspace and critical infrastructure and intercepting missiles and drones. Such an arrangement could allow Islamabad to honor its security commitments to Riyadh without becoming directly involved in offensive operations in Yemen or a ground war.
For Saudi Arabia, the priority is also to avoid being pulled back into a prolonged and costly war of attrition.
Given Riyadh’s vast economic diversification and investment projects, protecting Saudi territory, energy infrastructure, and airspace is likely to remain more important than expanding the geographical scope of the conflict.
The F-35: More Than an Arms Deal
U.S. approval of a potential sale of 48 F-35A fighter jets to Saudi Arabia, valued at approximately $24.3 billion, marks a potentially significant new stage in Washington-Riyadh relations. The proposed sale would still have to pass through the congressional process.
But the significance of the F-35 file extends far beyond its price tag.
Giving Saudi Arabia access to such advanced combat aircraft could alter the military balance in the Gulf. It would also reflect Riyadh’s broader effort to strengthen its own deterrence capabilities rather than relying exclusively on direct American military intervention for its security.
For Washington, however, the equation is considerably more delicate.
The United States must balance Saudi Arabia’s access to advanced weapons systems against its longstanding policy of preserving Israel’s “qualitative military edge” in the Middle East.
Technology security presents another layer of difficulty.
Saudi Arabia’s expanding economic and strategic relationship with China has heightened concerns in Washington about safeguarding sensitive American military technologies.
The F-35 question, therefore, is not simply about selling fighter jets.
It has become a test of the future of the U.S.-Saudi security partnership—and of how Riyadh intends to balance its relationships with Washington and Beijing.
The Trump Administration’s Iran Dilemma
For the Trump administration, the larger challenge lies in managing the confrontation with Iran without allowing it to produce an uncontrollable regional war.
Continuing the conflict increases both economic and military costs. Expanding it risks opening additional fronts stretching from the Gulf to the Red Sea.
Washington wants to prevent Iran from turning the Strait of Hormuz into a permanent instrument of strategic coercion. At the same time, it has a strong interest in preventing the conflict from spreading to oil and gas infrastructure across the Gulf.
Houthi advances along Yemen’s western coast further complicate that equation.
Even as the United States attempts to manage the consequences of its confrontation with Iran, developments in Yemen raise the prospect that the Red Sea theater could once again expand.
The current crisis therefore increasingly resembles not a traditional war with clearly defined fronts and belligerents, but a multilayered contest in which missiles and drones, maritime routes, energy security, economic sanctions, deterrence, and diplomacy all operate within the same strategic system.
The greatest danger may not be the complete closure of either Hormuz or Bab el-Mandeb. A more durable—and economically more damaging—scenario would be for both chokepoints to become zones of permanent instability.
Complete closure is not necessary.
Elevated risk alone can drive up insurance premiums, destabilize energy prices, lengthen shipping routes, and force companies to reorganize global supply chains.
The sea is thus ceasing to be merely the geographical space separating the parties to the conflict.
It is becoming the center of the conflict itself.
The struggle between Hormuz and Bab el-Mandeb can no longer be understood simply by asking, “Who can close the strait?”
The more consequential question is:
“Who can determine the cost of keeping it open?”
That question is increasingly becoming the center of gravity in the Middle East’s emerging geopolitical order.
