In my previous article, I analyzed the role of specially authorized courts and demonstrated that the true architect of Turkey’s judiciary is Recep Tayyip Erdoğan. However, to fully grasp how law—and more broadly, legislation—has been used as a political tool by the Erdoğan administration, it is not enough to only look at the courts. Under the AKP government, the practice of lawmaking has often been driven by immediate political needs, crisis management, and securing immunity from accountability, even if this was not openly stated. When you examine the changes made to the Criminal Procedure Code (CMK), you will better understand what I mean.
From “Strong Suspicion” to “Reasonable Suspicion”
Two amendments to Article 116 of the CMK strikingly illustrate how Erdoğan’s government has turned the law into a tactical instrument. In February 2014, through Law No. 6526, the requirement of “reasonable suspicion” was replaced with “strong suspicion based on concrete evidence” under the pretext of protecting individual freedoms. This amendment was primarily intended to nullify search operations targeting Erdoğan’s inner circle in corruption investigations.
However, just nine months later, in December 2014, the same government reversed this change through Law No. 6572, reinstating the “reasonable suspicion” standard. This time, the target was opposition groups, journalists, and academics critical of the government. In other words, the level of judicial protection in search measures was tightened or loosened based on who was being investigated.
Restricting the Right to Defense
A similar tactical move was applied to Article 153 of the CMK, which regulates the defense attorney’s right to examine case files. In February 2014, Law No. 6526 repealed the second, third, and fourth paragraphs of Article 153, thereby removing all restrictions on the defense attorney’s access to case files and documents. Although this was presented as a strengthening of defense rights, in reality, it was intended to allow suspects—including Erdoğan and his close associates—unrestricted access to investigation files.
Just nine months later, in December 2014, Law No. 6572 reinstated the previous restrictions on access to case files, particularly for cases involving “catalog crimes.” Although these restrictions technically required a judge’s approval, in practice, courts routinely granted such orders without reviewing defense requests. Following the July 15 coup attempt, this provision became a tool for completely obstructing defense lawyers. Prosecutors would immediately impose access restrictions under the pretext of “catalog crimes,” forcing suspects and their lawyers to prepare defenses without even knowing the evidence against them.
Facilitating Asset Seizures and Confiscations
Another striking example of this legal manipulation is the successive, contradictory amendments to Article 128 of the CMK. In February 2014, Law No. 6526 mandated that asset seizure orders must be based on concrete evidence and approved unanimously by the High Criminal Court. Additionally, the crime of “forming an organization to commit crimes” was excluded from asset seizure measures. This amendment was designed to invalidate asset seizure orders targeting businesspeople and politicians’ relatives in corruption investigations.
In other words, while this amendment was presented as a safeguard, its real purpose was to shield Erdoğan and his close circle from judicial asset freezes. However, just nine months later, in December 2014, Erdoğan’s administration reversed course again. Law No. 6572 expanded the scope of asset seizures to include crimes against constitutional order (Turkish Penal Code Articles 309-316). Subsequent amendments reintroduced the crime of “forming an organization to commit crimes” into the scope of asset seizures.
Eliminating Threats, Then Targeting the Opposition
Additionally, the requirement that asset seizure orders be issued unanimously by the High Criminal Court was abolished and replaced with a system where a single judge could issue such orders. This time, the target was no longer government corruption; it was the opposition. Having neutralized threats to its own ranks, the government moved into an era of retribution. By including vaguely defined and politically interpretable crimes—such as crimes against constitutional order—under asset seizure laws, the government created a legal foundation for seizing opposition members’ assets.
This legislative shift became the legal basis for the financial destruction of numerous opposition businesspeople, journalists, and politicians in subsequent years. The confiscation of Ekrem İmamoğlu’s company is a direct consequence of these changes.
Enabling Arbitrary Arrests
Another critical amendment made during this period involved Articles 91 and 100 of the CMK. In February 2014, Law No. 6526 replaced the previous “indication” standard for detention decisions with a requirement for “concrete evidence.” Similarly, the “fact-based” standard for pretrial detention was changed to “concrete evidence.”
Although these changes were presented as measures to prevent arbitrary detentions and arrests, their real purpose was to make it impossible to prosecute Erdoğan’s family and inner circle following corruption investigations. At the time, prosecutors had issued detention orders for several individuals close to Erdoğan, but these orders were blocked by direct interventions from the Ministry of Justice and the police. Shortly thereafter, the prosecutors handling these cases were dismissed. The legal amendments ensured that similar judicial actions could never be taken again, effectively granting the ruling elite judicial immunity.
Bending the Law to Fit Political Needs
As seen in these successive and often contradictory amendments to the CMK, the Erdoğan administration has systematically politicized the judiciary. The timing, scope, and targets of these legal changes reveal that lawmaking in Turkey has been driven not by social needs but by the government’s immediate political interests.
In this article, we analyzed only a few CMK provisions, but the issue goes much deeper. In the next article, we will take a closer look at legislative changes involving surveillance measures such as wiretapping, technical tracking, and covert investigators, as well as the restructuring of the judiciary through peace criminal courts and other mechanisms.
The common denominator in all these changes, just like in the recent legal cases against Ekrem İmamoğlu, is the transformation of the judiciary into a weapon that serves the ruling power. The legal proceedings against İmamoğlu are not an isolated incident; they are the latest manifestation of a long and systematic engineering of the judiciary.
