Ahmet Kemal Genç-TR724
There is intense tension along the Iran–Israel axis—so much so that in June 2025 it escalated into a 12-day open war. Although there is currently no active fighting, there is neither a formal peace agreement nor a solid ceasefire. The region is on edge. According to media reports, neither side is backing down. Experts describe the current situation as “a crisis that could erupt again with the smallest spark.” It is an extremely fragile interim phase.
So, what happens if a second Iran–Israel war breaks out? In such a case, the war would not remain confined to Iran; it could spread to many fronts—from the country’s internal fault lines to the Gulf, from the Jordan corridor to Syria and Iraq.
Iran’s decision to name its new floating naval bases “Kurdistan” and “Khuzestan” was more of a political signal than a military choice—directed at the country’s most vulnerable internal fractures. After the 12-day conflict with Israel, Tehran does not hide that it expects a second operation; it is simultaneously accelerating its missile program and reinforcing its internal ethnic belts.
The Kurdish provinces in the west and the Arab-populated Khuzestan in the southwest constitute the first rings that could weaken the country from within during a potential war. Indeed, after the Israeli attack, internal security alerts were concentrated most intensely in these regions. Yet most of the people arrested on espionage charges turned out to be from Tehran and of Persian origin—a sign of how scattered Iran’s internal threat perception has become.
Last week’s weapons operation reinforced this picture: the seizure of large quantities of weapons and explosives smuggled in through the Hakkari–Van corridor shows that Tehran has shifted its attention to the Turkish border routes. Meanwhile, in the east, there is movement in the Baloch region. Iranian media claim that Israel is attempting to organize anti-regime elements in Sistan-Baluchestan as a “frontline.” If true, this suggests Iran is facing a multi-front strategy designed to bog it down simultaneously.
Iran’s “axis of resistance” narrative has also weakened in practice. Syria is no longer a fully aligned ally. Hezbollah has taken a blow; Hashd al-Shaabi in Iraq is under pressure. The ideological discourse presenting a single, unified chain of resistance across the region corresponds on the ground to a fragmented and fragile architecture.
Lebanon is the front where the likelihood of conflict is highest. Israel is signaling an operation; Hezbollah guarantees retaliation. Yet both Iran and Najaf are trying to prevent a major war. Tehran wants Hezbollah to maintain its deterrence but also wishes to avoid being dragged into a regional conflagration.
Syria, once Iran’s front line, is now at the center of special U.S. planning. Moreover, its internal consensus has collapsed, its state structure is brittle, and if a multi-front war spreads across the Middle East, it will be among the first countries to be shaken.
In short, Iran is trying to stabilize its internal fault lines before external threats. In a potential major confrontation with Israel, it will not be the missile program but the resilience of these internal fractures that will determine the outcome of the war.
Saudi Arabia, Pakistan, and Turkey’s Moves Toward Iran
Power balances in the Middle East shift constantly and rapidly. The latest moves by Saudi Arabia, Pakistan, and Turkey add a new dimension to the regional Iran equation.
Saudi Arabia is pursuing two strategies simultaneously. On one hand, it aims to sign a NATO-like security agreement with the United States; on the other, it seeks to assume a mediating role that would ease Iran–U.S. tensions. But Washington conditions this agreement on Saudi–Israeli normalization—something Riyadh refuses to accept without the establishment of a Palestinian state.
After Israel’s attack on Qatar, Riyadh’s security priorities shifted; the Israeli threat has now surpassed the Iranian threat. This shift is raising Iran–Saudi normalization to a new level. Furthermore, the defense agreement signed with Pakistan is viewed by regional observers as a move “not against Iran, but against Israel.” Interestingly, Tehran also welcomed this agreement.
In contacts between Turkey and Iran, Syria stands out as the main issue. Ankara emphasizes the importance of Iran avoiding actions in Syria that would deepen instability, while also seeking a joint balancing approach against Israel’s Syria policy. This channel is of critical importance for understanding the region’s fragile equilibrium.
One of the most notable developments in the region was the Iranian President’s letter to Mohammed bin Salman. Although official statements framed it within the context of “bilateral relations,” the timing brought to the agenda the possibility of renewing Iran–U.S. talks. Some sources claim the letter was sent with Khamenei’s approval. The fact that Turkish Foreign Minister Hakan Fidan traveled to Tehran on the same day indicates that Ankara might also play a role in this messaging process.
All these developments show that the Saudi Arabia–Turkey–Pakistan triangle is trying to keep diplomatic channels open to reduce the risk of regional war. If indirect U.S.–Iran talks resume, the main tableau shaping the region’s near future will likely be drawn at that negotiation table.
