Iraq’s parliamentary elections on Tuesday delivered a result that surprised few: the “Construction and Development Alliance” led by Prime Minister Mohammed Shia al-Sudani emerged as the leading bloc. The coalition, formed just in May, is expected to secure around 50 seats.
In second place came the State of Law Coalition of former Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki, finishing just one seat ahead of former Speaker Mohammed al-Halbusi’s Taqaddum Party, which won around 30 seats.
The central question now is who will be tasked with forming the next government—and whether that government will tilt toward the United States or Iran. Maliki’s intention to demand greater influence in a Sudani-led cabinet raises the specter of renewed friction within the Shiite political bloc.
This scenario closely echoes the aftermath of the 2021 snap elections, when political deadlock left Iraq without a government for months. Although Muqtada al-Sadr’s bloc won the most seats, it failed to secure the support of other Shiite factions. Its subsequent withdrawal from parliament plunged the political system into turmoil.
Sadr also boycotted this election. While his absence was expected to depress turnout, the results tell a different story: voter participation reached roughly 56 percent—higher than anticipated. Turnout was notably lower in Baghdad and Najaf, Sadr’s traditional strongholds.
A Government Built on Sectarian Balance
Iraq’s power-sharing system requires the prime minister to be a Shiite, meaning Sudani will almost certainly receive the first mandate to form a government. Before that can happen, however, the newly elected 329-member parliament must choose a president—who, by convention, must be Kurdish and must secure a two-thirds majority.
After electing the president, lawmakers will choose a parliamentary speaker, who must be a Sunni Arab and is elected by an absolute majority.
With more than 40 parties and alliances represented in parliament, the incoming prime minister will need the support of at least half of all MPs plus one to form a cabinet. The new legislature includes numerous armed and religious groups, either running independently or within alliances, ensuring that U.S.–Iran rivalry will once again shape the country’s political trajectory.
Washington, Tehran, and the PMF Factor
The United States continues to press Baghdad to remove Iran-aligned Popular Mobilization Forces (PMF) from the formal political system and exclude them from government.
Since 2022, Sudani has attempted to integrate the PMF into the Iraqi security forces while maintaining strong ties with Washington. His attendance at Trump’s Gaza summit in Sharm el-Sheikh illustrated that balancing act.
Yet Iran’s influence in Iraq—through the PMF, religious institutions, and social networks—is too deeply embedded to simply be pushed aside. This reality represents one of the biggest obstacles to forming a stable government.
Despite being one of the world’s largest oil producers, Iraq’s wealth is largely captured by Iran-backed factions and political patronage networks. Ordinary Iraqis benefit little from this resource abundance.
The result is deepening economic instability and growing public frustration—conditions reminiscent of the 2019 youth-led protests, when demonstrators demanded an end to corruption, the dismantling of the sectarian quota system, and a fair distribution of national wealth.
Because the political system is built on sectarian quotas, economic resources are also allocated along sectarian lines—creating fertile ground for systemic corruption.
Regional Pressures: Syria, Turkey, Water, and Security
The next government will also face a series of complex regional challenges:
- the U.S.’s entrenched military presence in Syria,
- Israel’s continued strikes against Iran and Shiite groups,
- Turkey’s operations against the PKK, and
- ongoing disputes with Turkey over shared water resources.
Ankara and Baghdad recently announced an agreement on water sharing, but persistent drought could easily reignite tensions.
If the process of forming a government stretches on, Sadr—despite his boycott—may choose to re-enter the political arena and mobilize the streets. In 2021, after all, his bloc captured 71 seats, establishing itself as the country’s dominant political force. Although Sadr portrays himself as an Arab nationalist, his long and complicated relationship with Iran continues to make him a polarizing figure.
A Potential Shockwave for Syria
Any instability in Iraq carries the risk of spilling across its borders. Syria—still struggling to rise from the devastation of years of civil war—is particularly vulnerable. Turbulence in Baghdad could easily disrupt the fragile recovery underway in Damascus.
