Necip F. Bahadir
The other day, Tayyip Erdogan received the DEM delegation at the Presidential Palace. What they discussed for an hour and a half remains unknown. Was there an agreement or a consensus? That too is unclear. Neither side has provided a ‘satisfactory’ explanation of the meeting’s content. The nature of Erdogan and the AKP government is to conduct business ‘behind closed doors.’ Perhaps the most opaque government ever…
The public has some general awareness of Öcalan’s demands and DEM’s requests. DEM spokespersons haven’t held back from sharing their views with the media. And rightly so. Without their openness, it would be impossible to comment based solely on silence and official statements. Since October, DEM members have voiced a 13-item list of demands. All of them share a common theme: democracy…
In other words, democratization is non-negotiable.
According to DEM, a “written list of demands” was not on the table during the meeting with Erdoğan. They denied such claims. However, it’s clear that at least a general framework was discussed—otherwise, the meeting would have had no meaning. Weeks ago, Erdoğan reportedly told DEM member Sırrı Süreyya Önder, “Let’s meet after the holiday; we have some preparations…”
What were those preparations? No answers yet.
Once again, it was DEM that opened Pandora’s box. Pervin Buldan spoke in Italy. For some reason, politicians tend to be more open and bold when abroad. And Buldan is no ordinary figure. She was a central figure in both the Öcalan meeting and the Erdoğan meeting. She’s right at the heart of the negotiations.
The Process Will Conclude in 2.5 Months
Buldan gave a timeline… “It is foreseen that this process will be completed within a few months. In other words, the expectation is for the process to be successfully concluded by the end of June. This is the view both from Öcalan’s side and from state officials…”
So now we have a timetable: the end of June. It’s mid-April now. That leaves 2.5 months to wrap things up! That’s quite soon. Which means the process must move quickly from here on. Even Bahçeli, the architect of the previous Öcalan initiative, had been pressing with statements like “Hurry up, move fast…”
Has Bahçeli’s insistence—and his health—also played a role in speeding things up? It’s still unclear whether he’ll return to lead the party. He was seen visiting Türkeş’s grave but has remained silent. He hasn’t resumed work in the party, nor returned to Parliament for group meetings. One appearance—and then silence again.
Bahçeli’s health is crucial to the process… because no one else could pave the way for this initiative, support it, or hold the party together. The notion that “MHP’s policies never change” isn’t entirely accurate. Without a long-established leader like Bahçeli, no one else could attempt an Öcalan initiative. The party would fall apart. Even Türkeş once faced rebellion from his base. Bahçeli has a rare talent for silencing nationalists and hardliners.
Since the end of June is targeted, the PKK must convene its congress in May, decide to dissolve, and either bury or surrender its weapons. A specific date is being floated in Ankara: “May 5, in Sulaymaniyah!” Sounds reasonable… How the conditions will be prepared, and how Öcalan will participate, is unclear. But a video appearance at the congress is likely. A live feed from prison or physical attendance is highly unlikely. Perhaps Erdoğan’s “preparations” referred to this video!
Just a few days ago, DEM was still complaining that the conditions were not yet ready. Sezai Temelli, one of the party’s parliamentary leaders, said, “The government has been in a state of paralysis since February 27.” Can a party come out of paralysis this quickly? When it comes to the AKP, it’s hard to say “yes” or “no” for sure.
If Pervin Buldan’s words are to be believed, we can say Erdoğan has snapped out of that paralysis. Though nothing guarantees he won’t fall right back into it tomorrow.
To Whom Will the Weapons Be Surrendered?
Buldan’s statements must be taken as credible data. May 5 is a critical date… But once the PKK decides to disband, what happens to the weapons? Who will take them? The Kurdish administration in Northern Iraq? Or Ankara directly? The fact that MİT Chief İbrahim Kalın was also present at the meeting in the palace raises the question: “Could it be Ankara?” Let’s say the weapon issue is resolved—what about the people holding them, the PKK militants? Will they return home? Will the charges against them be dropped? Or will they be relocated to a third country?
There’s no guarantee that we won’t see another “Habur fiasco.” True, lessons should have been learned—but despite all their time in power, the AKP has been botching things lately. If the disbanding process is indeed beginning, the fate of PKK members must also be clarified. So far, there hasn’t been any leak from DEM. The government, for its part, has no intention of talking. But soon, the truth will surface… Nothing stays hidden in this world—especially not in this age.
Öcalan, who met with the DEM delegation in prison, called on the PKK to lay down arms on February 26, 2025. The PKK responded a few days later, stating it would comply. But no action has been taken yet…
One more noteworthy sentence from Pervin Buldan: “We know that every step taken will also be a step toward Öcalan’s physical freedom. And alongside all this, we have high expectations from European countries…”
Will Öcalan Be Released?
Wait a minute… What does “physical freedom” mean? Is Öcalan going to be released? Will his imprisonment end? Will a house be built for him on İmralı? Wasn’t it Erdoğan who once said, “He doesn’t want to get out…”? Does this path lead to Öcalan’s freedom? Does “end of June” mean Öcalan will be free?
And what about the other imprisoned PKK members? Take Selahattin Demirtaş, for example—he’s been in detention for over 8 years. In a context where Öcalan’s freedom is being discussed, can Demirtaş and other PKK inmates remain imprisoned? Sure, there’s the idea of a “right to hope”… But how many will benefit from it? Can Demirtaş benefit? Is it plausible for “Öcalan to be out while Demirtaş is still inside”? Would the Kurdish street accept this? Would it sit well with people’s conscience? A peace process without Demirtaş is not possible!
The Most Important Question: Can Erdoğan Launch a Democracy Package?
Can the AKP government or Erdoğan introduce a ‘democracy package’? Can they take steps toward democratization in Turkey? Can they redefine terrorism? Review the execution of prison sentences? Put general amnesty on the table? Everything hinges on this. If Erdoğan embraces democratization, then the process can reach its conclusion.
But when I look at Erdoğan, I don’t see any signs or hope. I don’t get that light of democracy from him. The smoke from the “Imamoğlu coup” he signed off on is still rising… Transitioning from “coup-minded Erdoğan” to “democratic Erdoğan” doesn’t seem very realistic to me.
Of course I want the sun of democracy and justice to rise… No matter whose hand it comes from… I’d even say “yes” to Erdoğan. Because the sun does not rise on prisons. The whole country has turned into an open-air prison.
Could there be an absurdity like “a general amnesty only for the PKK”? Anything’s possible with the AKP. Imagine—democracy and justice only for the Kurds… No, no one could stomach that.
But this is Erdoğan—we’ve seen what he’s capable of… He might release Öcalan and his associates while leaving the rest behind. Still, I want to remain hopeful. Who knows, maybe at the end of his political career, he will repent and embrace democracy and justice…
