Süheyla Gültekin – TR724
Since Öcalan’s call in February to dissolve the organization, a new resolution process has been on the agenda—though it does not seem to be progressing on particularly solid ground. In this article, I will first briefly examine the emergence of what we call the Kurdish question, then turn to whether the current process is moving forward in a healthy way, and finally explain, from my own perspective, how I believe the issue could be resolved at its roots.
As you know, Ottoman lands were home to many peoples—Kurds, Arabs, Jews, Armenians/Greeks, Syriacs, Albanians, Circassians—who lived together in harmony, in an environment of tolerance that far exceeded what today’s modern world celebrates as cultural diversity. In the Ottoman Empire, communal identities were defined not by ethnicity but by religion. In broad terms, societies were categorized as “Muslims” and “non-Muslims.” Law operated according to each person’s own faith tradition: Christians were judged by Christian law, Jews by Jewish law, and Muslims by the Sharia. Looking from today’s world—where modern Western societies that once boasted of multiculturalism now direct all their resentment toward foreigners at the slightest economic downturn—it is impossible not to admire how so many different nations lived together in wealth or poverty for centuries.
So what happened that turned us into such an ethnically polarized society? When the Ottoman Empire, left with few options in the face of Western wealth produced through geographic exploration and colonialism, collapsed, the new Republic defined its identity not on the basis of religion but nationhood. As a result, people who had lived in peace for centuries through the bonds of religious brotherhood and toleration of different faiths suddenly found themselves divided into “Kurds” and “Turks.”
In a land inhabited by so many different peoples, the worst thing that could be done was to separate them according to ethnicity. Indeed, many of today’s unresolved problems can be traced back to the founding ideology’s attempt to ignore society’s deep religious bonds and instead define them through a nationalist lens.
As an outcome of this ideology, the Kurds—who, unlike other groups, had both a large population and strong religious devotion—fell under the radar of the new nationalist establishment and began to be perceived as a threat. These people, with whom we had lived for centuries and fought shoulder-to-shoulder against the enemy, ceased to be seen as our Muslim brothers and instead came to be treated as a separate nation.
Ultimately, assimilation policies pursued by nationalist administrators, the denial of Kurdish identity, the operations of JİTEM, unsolved murders, village burnings, mass killings, and torture gave rise to the PKK—an organization whose emergence was, to a great extent, encouraged by the state itself. Caught between PKK violence and state oppression, ordinary people found themselves forced for years to explain to others that they were not terrorists whenever asked where they were from. They were seen as second-class citizens not only by the state but also by society. The instinct to look down on people based on their ethnicity—a mindset gifted to Turks by nationalist ideology—took hold even among supposed adherents of a religion that teaches that superiority lies only in piety.
Now, in the aftermath of Öcalan’s announcement of dissolution, the manner in which the new resolution process is unfolding is under scrutiny. The fact that such a significant statement—one for which so many lives were sacrificed—was made suddenly and without context inevitably fueled numerous speculative interpretations as of February. Still, many were hopeful about the possibility of finally resolving a long-standing national wound. Respected analysts interpreted this announcement in relation to developments in the Middle East, Israel’s expansionist policies, and the Syrian issue. They saw it as Turkey’s effort to reconcile with the peoples of the region—Kurds and Arabs in particular—in preparation for increasing global polarization and the rising expectation of a broader world conflict. Leaving aside the foreign-policy dimension, I will focus more on its domestic dynamics.
From a domestic perspective, the key question is clear: Is the process truly progressing in a way that will address the problems of the Kurdish people? Or is it being pushed through as a series of power bargains, hush payments, temporary concessions, and backroom deals among the stakeholders—Kurdish political actors, the PKK, and the government—without genuine concern for the people?
Based on the statements made—or not made—so far, it is difficult to claim that the Kurdish political movement, the PKK, or the government has seriously reflected on a plan that would genuinely heal the wounds of the Kurdish population.
What would sincere intent look like? To put it bluntly, neither the government, nor the Kurdish political movement, nor the PKK has even been able to clearly articulate what the actual problems of the Kurds are, let alone pave the way toward a solution.
The dominant answers to the questions “What do Kurds want?” and “What steps must be taken toward a solution?”—namely “recognition of Kurdish identity” and “official status for the Kurdish language”—often function as deliberate or inadvertent distractions.
Because the answer to “What is the cause of the Kurdish issue?” is in fact very clear: Kurds are exhausted from being belittled, scorned, and humiliated solely because of their God-given identity. Like all human beings created by God, they want to live normal lives in the lands where they have lived for centuries—lives in which they are not oppressed, not suspected, not forced to prove themselves; where health and education services are equal to those in other provinces; where they are not othered; where their human dignity is respected.
Kurds are being humiliated in their own homeland, and this cannot be resolved merely by recognizing Kurdish identity or officializing the Kurdish language.
This region needs educated, capable, well-prepared human capital. All social problems can only be solved by raising competent and thoughtful individuals.
A community lacking human capital, leadership ability, diplomatic skill, engineering development, or a mature culture cannot live freely—even if it establishes its own state—without falling under the influence or exploitation of powerful countries such as the U.S. or Israel. Which of the nation-states formed from the remains of the Ottoman Empire today can truly be described as free and prosperous? And if not, how could this be possible for the Kurds?
Conversely, a society that has become educated, developed, and capable—one that has regained its self-confidence and escaped humiliation—would already have solved its fundamental problems. Would such a community still want to establish a separate state? That is another question worth deep reflection. It would be speculative to judge it now, but if one day they do desire it, by that point they will already possess both the right to make such a decision and the diplomatic capacity required to pursue it.
I trust you will not dismiss what I describe here as elegant but impossible proposals. Because you know better than I do that some people have already tried—and partly succeeded—in implementing these very ideas.
Those people were not the Kurdish political movement nor the PKK. Perhaps that is why it has been so difficult to believe that the Kurdish political actors or the PKK—again, acknowledging individual exceptions—are sincerely working for the Kurdish people. Some unknowingly, others deliberately, prioritized securing positions for organization members rather than serving the Kurdish public; or else, instead of helping Kurds, chose actions that ultimately benefited the state.
So who were those people? They were the community (cemaat) members—who, with no material gain or desire for office, and solely out of devotion to God and love for their homeland, went to regions where many civilians hesitated to work; who opened educational institutions, schools, and study centers; who possessed values aligned with the conservative Kurdish population; who did not pretend to serve the Kurds while actually seeking personal benefit but genuinely focused on raising human capital; who saw raising upright generations helpful to their country and religion as a duty. (To those who might object, “The community was raising people for itself,” I respond in advance: The community was already formed with the purpose of serving the nation and the faith. Thus, raising individuals aligned with its worldview and raising individuals beneficial to the country are, as you would agree, not contradictory goals.)
And who tried to trip up these people? Who stoned their school windows and tried to intimidate them? The supporters of the Kurdish political movement and the PKK. It was they who attempted to impose a Marxist-Leninist ideology—a worldview with virtually no societal resonance in the region—onto the Kurds, oppressing them and forcing them to choose between the brutality of the PKK and the brutality of the Kemalist ideology. And it was they who accused the community of assimilation while themselves pressuring the overwhelmingly conservative Kurdish population to abandon their natural identities and adopt strange ideologies foreign to their culture. (Why Marxism was chosen in a region with such weak industry and production is itself a topic worth writing about, but I will not diverge from the main theme here.)
In truth, attempting to sever a population that is already 90% conservative from its own heritage by force and imposing upon them ideologies with no real roots in the region is a definition that fits “assimilation” far more accurately.
I believe I have conveyed my point. The problem is clear, the ingredients are clear, the solution is clear—and those who had come closest to “making the halva” were thrown into prisons. Many applauded this. Now the arena has been left to those who claim to be solving the problem while not even daring to define it. Apparently, everyone will strike their bargain behind closed doors, take their share, and then act as though the problem has been solved; those who fail to secure their desired cut will continue pretending to lament for the Kurds while trying to extract what they can.
May God grant relief to this nation, which rarely finds protectors who genuinely care for it. And may He grant salvation to those who truly seek to heal its wounds.
