Israeli-born scholar and writer Shaiel Ben-Ephraim argues that the political transformation that followed October 7 goes far beyond Benjamin Netanyahu. In an interview with Politurco, he says a broad consensus has emerged across much of Israel’s political and security establishment around permanent military pressure, opposition to Palestinian statehood, and the permanence of the settlements.
By Cumali Önal
What would happen to Israeli policy if Benjamin Netanyahu and his far-right coalition partners were removed from power?
For many outside Israel, the assumption is that a change of government could mark the beginning of a substantially different era: less confrontation, a renewed peace process, greater restraint in Gaza and the West Bank, and perhaps a revival of the two-state solution.
Israeli-born scholar and writer Shaiel Ben-Ephraim, who has worked extensively on Israeli politics, foreign policy, military strategy and U.S.–Israel relations, offers a considerably more pessimistic assessment.
In an interview with Politurco, Ben-Ephraim argues that the ideological transformation of Israeli society has advanced to the point where replacing Netanyahu would not necessarily mean replacing the fundamental assumptions underlying Israeli security and Palestinian policy.
According to him, figures such as Bezalel Smotrich, Itamar Ben-Gvir and Moshe Feiglin should not be understood merely as politicians exploiting nationalist sentiment.
“This is a deeply held ideology, at least for many of them,” Ben-Ephraim said.
He distinguishes Netanyahu from some of his more ideological allies, describing Smotrich, Ben-Gvir and Feiglin as “true believers” whose ideas are also shared by substantial parts of their electoral constituencies.
Even if a future coalition excluded them, he argues, their influence would remain.
“Their ideas and influence have permeated so deeply in Israeli society that no government will be able to ignore them,” he said.
October 7 Changed the Security Consensus
Perhaps the most consequential shift identified by Ben-Ephraim concerns the relationship between Israel’s political leadership and its security establishment.
Historically, senior figures in the Israel Defense Forces and security agencies did not necessarily share the worldview of Israel’s political right. Disputes over settlements, relations with the Palestinians, military escalation and Israel’s international standing could produce meaningful differences between elected governments and the security establishment.
Ben-Ephraim believes that distinction has substantially eroded.
He attributes the change partly to appointments made under Netanyahu and partly to institutional adaptation. He argues that officials who disagree with government policy still exist inside the security establishment, but many now maintain a lower profile.
More important, however, is what happened after October 7, 2023.
Before the Hamas attack, Ben-Ephraim says, an influential school of thought within Israel favored some combination of containment and deterrence. October 7 devastated the credibility of that approach among much of the country’s security and political elite.
What replaced it is a far more forceful doctrine.
Ben-Ephraim points to the Israeli strategic concept commonly known as “mowing the grass”—the idea that threats that cannot be permanently eliminated must repeatedly be degraded through military action. In his assessment, this logic is increasingly being applied beyond Gaza and the West Bank to Israel’s wider regional environment, including Lebanon, Syria and Iran.
“There is a very strong alignment between the political needs of the government and the perceptions of the security brass on the international posture,” he said.
The political leadership benefits from demonstrating strength, he argues, but this should not be dismissed simply as political theater. Many officials genuinely believe that overwhelming and recurring military action is necessary to prevent another October 7.
“There is near total agreement on this matter,” Ben-Ephraim said.
Netanyahuism Without Netanyahu?
This raises a more difficult question: could Israel undergo a change of government without undergoing a fundamental change of policy?
Ben-Ephraim believes it could.
There remain significant disagreements within Israeli society over domestic issues, including religion and state, judicial power and the military conscription of ultra-Orthodox yeshiva students.
But on the Palestinian question and regional security, he sees considerably less distance between the government and much of the opposition than outsiders sometimes assume.
“There used to be a deal of disagreement on issues like the settlements or a two-state solution,” he said. “But now there is a good deal of consensus that the Palestinians should never have a state and that the settlements are here to stay.”
In Ben-Ephraim’s analysis, even Israel’s international reputation—which historically concerned liberal and centrist elites more than the nationalist right—has become less capable of restraining policy.
He describes the resulting political atmosphere as a “depressing consensus” surrounding the use of force.
The implication is significant. A post-Netanyahu government could change Israel’s language, presentation and diplomatic style without necessarily reversing the strategic direction established after October 7.
‘A Nicer Face’ Would Not Necessarily Mean a Different Policy
Ben-Ephraim is particularly skeptical that Israel’s current opposition leadership would embark on a serious peace initiative if it came to power.
A new government, he argues, might present Israeli policy more effectively to Western governments and international audiences. But he does not believe this would automatically translate into fundamental changes toward the Palestinians.
Using highly critical terms, Ben-Ephraim said such a government could put “a nicer face” on what he characterizes as Israeli “genocide and apartheid.”
Those descriptions remain heavily contested politically and legally. Israel rejects allegations that its Gaza campaign constitutes genocide, while international legal proceedings and debate over the characterization of Israeli policies remain ongoing.
Ben-Ephraim’s larger point, however, is about the domestic political constraints facing any successor government.
If a new coalition merely moderated Israel’s rhetoric or occasionally demonstrated restraint, he believes the political backlash from the right could remain manageable.
Actually moving toward a negotiated peace would be another matter.
“If a new government tried to take actual steps towards peace, the backlash they would face would be relentless,” he said.
But political pressure from the right is only part of the explanation.
“The leadership of the opposition is also not particularly interested in making peace,” Ben-Ephraim argues. “They are also part of the post-October 7th worldview.”
His conclusion is stark: “The differences on foreign policy are minor.”
Has International Isolation Failed to Materialize?
Ben-Ephraim also acknowledges that his own expectations about the international consequences of Israeli policy have changed.
He once believed increasingly aggressive policies toward Palestinians would eventually leave Israel internationally isolated.
“I used to believe that aggressive policies would bring about isolation for Israel,” he said. “But the truth is, there is little sign of that.”
In his assessment, Israel’s economic and strategic importance provides it with considerable insulation from diplomatic pressure.
Israel remains an important supplier and partner in technology, defense, intelligence and trade. Governments that criticize Israeli conduct may nevertheless have powerful incentives to maintain those relationships.
Ben-Ephraim argues that even relatively limited demonstrations of restraint could be enough to reduce international pressure further.
His assessment of the human consequences is considerably darker.
“No one really cares what happens to a Palestinian child,” he said. “That is the sad truth.”
The statement reflects Ben-Ephraim’s own assessment of the international response rather than a measurable consensus among governments or publics, where reactions to the Gaza war have varied substantially.
The Judicial Overhaul Is Not Necessarily Over
Another major fault line in Israeli politics has been Netanyahu’s attempt to reshape the judiciary.
Mass demonstrations before October 7 appeared to demonstrate the limits of how quickly the government could transform the judicial system.
Ben-Ephraim nevertheless cautions against concluding that the project has disappeared.
Judicial overhaul still retains powerful supporters on the Israeli right, particularly Justice Minister Yariv Levin and his allies. But instead of attempting another immediate and comprehensive confrontation, Ben-Ephraim sees a more gradual process taking place.
“The right has been moving its reforms piecemeal and has had some success with it,” he said.
He also believes the Supreme Court itself has shifted rightward, attributing this partly to personnel and broader social changes and partly to what he describes as institutional self-preservation.
His long-term prediction is bleak: “Eventually the courts will cease to be independent one way or another.”
The Arab Party Dilemma
The arithmetic of forming an alternative government creates another problem.
The Islamist Arab party Ra’am previously demonstrated that an Arab party could play a role in sustaining an Israeli governing coalition. But Ben-Ephraim doubts that repeating that experiment would be easy in the post-October 7 political environment.
In theory, political figures capable of bridging the gap could make cooperation with Ra’am more acceptable to a future coalition.
In practice, Ben-Ephraim argues that anti-Arab sentiment has become a formidable political obstacle.
He sees one possible alternative: Ra’am could support a minority government from outside the formal coalition.
But he warns that such an arrangement would probably be inherently fragile.
The Deeper Question Is No Longer Netanyahu
Ben-Ephraim’s analysis ultimately challenges one of the most persistent ways Israel’s current political crisis is understood abroad: the tendency to interpret Israeli policy primarily through Netanyahu.
Netanyahu remains extraordinarily consequential. His alliances with Israel’s religious and nationalist right have reshaped the country’s institutions and political boundaries.
But if Ben-Ephraim is correct, the deeper transformation can no longer be reduced to one prime minister.
October 7 may have accelerated trends that were already underway, producing greater convergence between political leaders, security elites and significant portions of Israeli public opinion around several fundamental assumptions: Palestinian statehood is increasingly rejected, settlements are treated as permanent, and recurring military force is regarded as an essential instrument of national security.
That distinction matters because governments can change faster than political cultures.
A future Israeli government may therefore look very different from Netanyahu’s coalition. It may speak differently to Washington and Europe, clash less openly with the judiciary, and distance itself from some of the rhetoric associated with Ben-Gvir and Smotrich.
Ben-Ephraim’s argument is that the underlying security consensus could nevertheless prove much harder to change.
In that sense, the most important question facing Israel may no longer be simply what comes after Netanyahu.
It is how much of Netanyahu’s Israel will remain after he is gone.
