Isil Kurnaz*
The election for the presidency of the Court of Cassation of Turkey has been ongoing for a month, with no elected candidate emerging in 30 rounds. The next round is scheduled for May 6. According to Article 31 of the Court of Cassation Law, a majority of the full membership, which is 175 votes, is required for the election of the President, hence the elections have reached an impasse. However, this deadlock is more than a legal quagmire. We are observing the election of the President of Court of Cassation from beyond the legal boundaries. One of the candidates is the head of the Third Criminal Chamber of the Supreme Court. This is the chamber that did not implement the Constitutional Court’s decision regarding Can Atalay, deciding not to comply with a Constitutional Court decision that technically should not be possible to disregard, and making a complaint for the prosecution of Constitutional Court members who issued a decision identifying a rights violation and declared it “legally devoid” of value.
Another aspect of this candidacy is the promises being made. According to Alican Uludağ’s report, candidates for the Court of Cassation presidency are listing several promises. Prominent among these is the issue of the Court of Cassation members’ salaries not being equal to those of the Constitutional Court members, which is seen as the final straw in the ongoing and significant crisis between the Court of Cassation and the Constitutional Court. Additionally, one candidate who criticizes the 12-year term limits of Supreme Court members as an effort to erase the Court’s memory, is also promising indefinite term limits.
As the Court of Cassation presidency elections continue, the Speaker of the Parliament, Numan Kurtulmuş, is starting discussions on a new Constitution. Behind the facade of a civil constitution, there is actually a flawed system known as the Presidential Government System. These discussions, which we follow along political debate lines, include addressing the flaws of the Presidential Government System, reducing the necessary quorum of %50+1 for the presidential election, and meddling with the two-term limit for the presidency.
Mümtaz Soysal’s article titled “Innocent Constitution” published in the Forum Magazine in 1960, explores the notion of a constitution as an emergency service that could cure all societal problems. Soysal reveals the shortcomings of a political mindset that blames constitutional factors for character weaknesses, irresponsible leadership, and faults that could be attributed to the entire nation:
“Why do we push back our own reflection in the mirror of guilt and put forward the 1924 Constitution instead?”
Soysal’s call for us to reflect our own political processes rather than looking through a mirror that is not our own reflection is still relevant today. The issues we face today have nothing to do with the Court of Cassation Law or the new constitutional discussions, as these discussions predate the necessary connections and relational distances that need to be covered. What judicial candidates can promise and say is limited by constitutional issues because this relates to the fundamental values of judicial processes. This debate originated with the First Amendment of the United States Constitution, which regulates freedom of expression. The U.S. Supreme Court, in the case of Republican Party of Minnesota v. White, ruled that provisions prohibiting judicial candidates from discussing current political and legal issues to be elected were unconstitutional against freedom of expression. The Court mentioned that the provisions limiting the freedom of expression of judges were not narrowly tailored around the independence of the judiciary and thus imposed a significant burden on freedom of expression. This ruling sparked significant public debates that the nominations of judges to high judicial positions are inherently political processes. No constitutional amendment allows the state to extract politics from political processes.
The coincidence of the Court of Cassation presidency elections and the initiation of new constitutional talks is not merely a temporal overlap but reflects two parallel issues: the state and political power trying to extract politics from political processes and confining the issue to a technical legal debate. However, neither today’s crisis in the Court of Cassation presidency elections is independent of the dispute between the Court of Cassation and the Constitutional Court, nor are the constitutional discussions merely for rectifying the system’s shortcomings.
In a climate where lower courts resist decisions of the Constitutional Court, and the political authority’s ability to be checked is blunted, these discussions signify larger political processes.
Unconstitutional constitutional amendments are an age-old issue. The fundamental question today is: If the legislative body enacts a constitutionally contradictory amendment, who has the final say? The main question during today’s constitutional discussions is whether there is an authority left that can oversee the political authority’s actions and constitutionally contradictory amendments. The issue for the Court of Cassation should not merely be about members’ salaries and personal rights but rather the fundamental discussion about the law and politics mutually penetrating each other at an institutional level.
As we increasingly see the potential for political bargaining over the presidential term limit, we might also need to remember something else: The Constitutional Court of El Salvador, despite the explicit prohibition against consecutive presidential terms in the El Salvador Constitution, broke this law for the current president Nayib Bukele, allowing him to run again, and he was re-elected on February 4 with over 80% of the vote. However, in Bolivia, Evo Morales, who served from 2006 to 2019, wanted to run again but was barred by the Bolivian Constitutional Court from participating in the upcoming elections in 2025. While leaders from Honduras to Bolivia, El Salvador, and Nicaragua are seen trying to leak through the lines of their constitutions to be re-elected, the Bolivian Constitutional Court’s decision was underpinned by another high court’s ruling: The Inter-American Court of Human Rights, in a 2021 advisory opinion, opposed the idea that re-election is a human right for politicians, considering period limits as disproportionate restrictions on political participation rights while reviewing presidential term limits, it also needed to consider the constitutional systems of the countries involved. Therefore, what we need to discuss in both the nominations of high judges and new constitutional discussions isn’t just these individual cases. The important thing is the mutual relationship and design forms of constitutions and politics. On the other hand, another question looms large over all these discussions: In Turkey, is there a judicial mechanism left that could limit the powers or terms of state presidents, bring political power onto a legal ground, like the Bolivian Constitutional Court or the Inter-American Court of Human Rights?
The original name of the Court of Cassation was Divan-ı Ahkâm-ı Adliye, which solved legal and criminal disputes outside the jurisdiction of religious, spiritual, and commercial courts. If the outcome of a case involved a dispute between individuals and the government, it would refer that case to the Council of State.
So today, when the outcomes of cases turn into disputes between individuals and the government, where will the Court of Cassation refer those cases? Or will it consider itself obligated to be a party to the dispute itself? We should therefore look for the answer in what the Court of Cassation will do when caught between individuals and the government, as its history suggests, not in promises like extending the term limits of its members indefinitely. The issue of legal memory is hidden there. Because the state should not be given the power to extract politics from political processes, as legal memory is most clearly revealed in those processes.
*Isil Kurnaz graduated with honors from Bilkent University Faculty of Law. She obtained a master’s degree in International Human Rights Law from Lund University with the Sweden Institute Human Rights Scholarship in memory of Anna Lindh, awarded by the Swedish government. She won the Halit Çelenk Law Award in 2018 for her thesis on “Collective Social Rights in Constitutions.” She is currently working as a doctoral researcher with a scholarship at the Human Rights Institute of Sant’Anna Scuola Universitaria Superiore Pisa in Italy. She also contributes regularly to the Birikim magazine.
This article initially was published in Birikim Magazine and translated into English by Politurco.
Notes and Sources
With thanks to valuable lawyer Çiğdem Hacısoftaoğlu for drawing my attention to the part about the Supreme Court elections.
Paul E. McGreal & James J. Alfini, Debate, First Amendment Limits on the Regulation of Judicial Campaign Speech: Defining the Government’s Interest, 157 U. PA. L. REV. PENNUMBRA 76 (2008)
Advisory Opinion Oc-28/21 On Presidentıal Re-Election Without Term Limits (Inter-Am. Ct. H.R.
Nicola Tommasini, Judicial self-empowerment and unconstitutional constitutional amendments, I•CON (2024), 1–30.
Mümtaz Soysal (2019). Innocent Constitution. Mülkiye Magazine, 43 (4), 829-833. 833
STEPHEN GILLERS, “IF ELECTED, I PROMISE [________]”— WHAT SHOULD JUDICIAL CANDIDATES BE ALLOWED TO SAY?, Symposium on Judicial Campaign Conduct and the First Amendment.
Binder, Christina; Morales Antoniazzi, Mariela: Towards Institutional Guarantees for Democratic Rotation: The Inter-American Court’s Advisory Opinion OC-28/21 on Presidential Re-election, VerfBlog, 2021/10/06, https://verfassungsblog.de/towards-institutional-guarantees-for-democratic-rotation/, DOI: 10.17176/20211007-014026-0.




