Tarık Toros – September 30, 2025
President Tayyip Erdoğan, at the latest cabinet meeting, declared his U.S. visit to be “beyond extraordinary.” In fact, such an expression doesn’t exist in Turkish; it was ironically coined by singer Bülent Ersoy. Erdoğan continued, saying, “I believe we will see the positive results of our meeting with Trump together in the coming period.” But that was an admission that no concrete achievement came out of the trip.
Because Turkey had to both fight for an Oval Office appointment and open its wallet during the talks. Agreements on liquefied natural gas and Boeing aircraft purchases meant Ankara committed to an enormous bill of $80–100 billion.
This colossal expense wasn’t trumpeted in the Turkish press, since it exposed the collapse of the “national jet” and “Black Sea gas” myths.
Two critical points from the Oval Office encounter stand out:
Halkbank — Erdoğan’s Softest Spot
In his one-minute speech, Erdoğan—out of place—brought up the Halkbank case, revealing his subconscious. For over a decade, from Obama to Biden to Trump, this has been the only agenda item during every U.S. trip. After Reza Zarrab became an informant, the corruption case buried in Turkey on December 17, 2013, was carried to the U.S. and continues to haunt Erdoğan. That’s why the money-laundering case around Halkbank has become a matter of life and death for the Erdoğan family. It’s even known that Emine Erdoğan brought it up to Jill Biden.
This is why Halkbank tops the list: it’s Erdoğan’s biggest vulnerability in front of Washington. The U.S. judiciary is deliberately stretching out the case.
The F-35 Deadlock
Then there’s the F-35 program, now a lost dream. Six jets, fully paid for, are sitting in hangars in the U.S., with Turkey footing the maintenance bill. Ankara was not just a buyer but a production partner.
Yet after the reckless decision to purchase Russian S-400s, Turkey was ejected from the F-35 project. NATO rules were crystal clear. The damage didn’t end there—Congress imposed CAATSA sanctions, crippling Ankara’s defense industry.
Right after Erdoğan left the White House, Trump was asked if a deal could be struck on the F-35s. His response was telling:
“If I want, I can easily make it happen. Maybe, maybe we will. It depends. First, he (Erdoğan) will do something for us.”
The reporter did not press further: “What will he do?”
In Turkey, this issue was barely discussed. The supposedly “beyond extraordinary” visit left that mission deliberately vague.
Erdoğan’s Vulnerability = Turkey’s Security Risk
The more serious point is this: Erdoğan’s gallery of sins leaves him wide open to blackmail. That is Turkey’s greatest national security risk.
And it didn’t stop there.
KAAN’s Motor Crisis and Fidan’s Bombshell
Foreign Minister Hakan Fidan, before leaving New York, unexpectedly admitted that the engine of the supposedly “100% indigenous and national” KAAN fighter jet was in fact blocked by CAATSA sanctions. The statement triggered an outburst in the presidential palace.
How do we know?
Defense Industry Chief Haluk Görgün was immediately rushed to Anadolu Agency to insist, “Kaan’s future does not depend on any foreign engine!” The propaganda machine scrambled to label the statement a “communication slip.” Party spokesmen and pro-government media tried to bury the scandal—but the arrow had already left the bow.
Someone with Fidan’s experience—15 years at the top, former intelligence chief, privy to state secrets—doesn’t “slip” like that.
In truth, these developments are directly tied to designing the post-Erdoğan era. The party, bureaucracy, and media are sharply divided, unable to chart a common course. Meanwhile, Erdoğan’s health—clearly visible—is in irreversible decline. Billions have been spent on world-class, experimental, and alternative treatments; specialists flown in from across the globe. At best, they’ve delayed the collapse.
Leaks also tell the story: CHP leader Özgür Özel was likely tipped off by U.S. sources about Trump’s son brokering the Boeing deal. At the same time, detailed notes prepared for Erdoğan’s own plane ride—dictating which media outlet could ask which question—leaked to journalist Faruk Bildirici. The system is boiling inside, its cracks uncontainable.
Why Did Fidan Go Kamikaze?
This is the question.
With Erdoğan’s grip weakening, the spoils of power have shrunk. The economy is collapsing, resources are drying up, and the rules of sharing have changed. The captain’s deck is often empty, the ship adrift. Less money means smaller portions, stoking fear of change and triggering infighting.
Who gets more influence? Which media empire gets handed over to whom? Which companies change hands? These are the battle lines. The palace still controls courts and police, locking up anyone who dares raise their head. Even Devlet Bahçeli cannot make a move—the murder files in prosecutors’ drawers keep MHP chained down.
But Hakan Fidan is a different case. A long-time power player with political ambitions, intelligence credentials, and vast knowledge. Unlike Süleyman Soylu, he’s not someone easily discarded. Armed with information, money, and diplomatic leverage, he’s laying the groundwork for his own long game.
In the short term, Erdoğan will try to consolidate power at home with his newly refreshed “legitimacy” from Washington. Fidan will accelerate operations.
Yet only two paths lie ahead: rule with an iron fist and maintain discipline briefly—or watch the cracks deepen into total collapse.
The Real Question
The real question is whether Turkey will survive the wreckage.
Final note: It’s likely that every current actor will end up in history’s dustbin alongside Erdoğan. Those already in prison may be the lucky ones.
