Abstract
This article examines the figure of Khidr as the name of a state rather than a historical individual or a purely symbolic construct, positioning the discussion between Carl Gustav Jung’s analytical psychology and Henry Corbin’s imaginal ontology. Drawing primarily on Daniela Boccassini’s comparative study of Jung and Corbin, the article explores two competing yet intersecting interpretations of Khidr: as an archetypal guide emerging from the depths of the human psyche, and as an ontological principle of guidance operative within the imaginal realm (ʿālam al-mithāl).
The study situates this divergence within a broader debate on the nature of revelation, guidance, and divine knowledge in modern thought, particularly by relating the Jung–Corbin tension to the hermeneutical contrast between Fazlur Rahman’s internalist reading of revelation and Sufi ontological approaches rooted in Ibn ʿArabī. While Jung’s framework confines Khidr to the transformative dynamics of consciousness and symbolic perception, Corbin’s interpretation affirms Khidr as a transhistorical mode of divine guidance that transcends yet manifests through the human subject.
Building on Corbin’s concept of theophany and creative imagination, the article advances the notion of the “Khidr principle” as an ontological threshold: a mode of operation activated when human consciousness aligns with divine intention, rendering time, space, and causality dynamically permeable. In doing so, the article argues that Khidr is best understood neither as a psychological archetype nor merely as a metaphysical entity, but as an existential function mediating between historical human experience and the divine order.
Keywords
Khidr; Carl Gustav Jung; Henry Corbin; imaginal realm; archetype; theophany; Ibn ʿArabī; revelation; Sufi hermeneutics; ontology of guidance; creative imagination
Introduction
Daniela Boccassini, in her study “The Invisible Teacher and His Disciples: Jung’s and Corbin’s Approaches to ‘the Green One’,” examines how the figure of Khidr is conceptualized along two distinct trajectories within Western thought. According to Boccassini, these trajectories can be read through the difficult yet productive intellectual relationship between Carl Gustav Jung and Henry Corbin. Jung interprets Khidr primarily as a manifestation of the “wise teacher” archetype emerging within the inner field of human consciousness, whereas Corbin defends the same figure as an ontological guide who possesses reality within the imaginal realm and directs the human being toward truth (Boccassini, 2002).
The tension between these two approaches crystallizes around a central question: Is Khidr an inner teacher or a divine guide that transcends the human subject? This tension marks a nodal point in modern debates concerning the nature of revelation, knowledge, and guidance.
At this juncture, Boccassini’s Jung–Corbin comparison also clarifies the theoretical background of the tension we previously identified between Fazlur Rahman and Sufi hermeneutics. Rahman’s conceptualization of revelation as, at the same time, the Prophet’s historical and moral inner experience aligns closely with Jung’s reading of Khidr as an archetypal figure arising within the internal structures of consciousness.
By contrast, in Henry Corbin’s approach—grounded in Sufi ontology and particularly in Ibn ʿArabī—revelation is an ontological epiphany that transcends the human being while simultaneously becoming manifest in and through the human being. For Corbin, therefore, Khidr is not a symbolic figure tied to inner psychic layers, as in Jung, but a real guide with ontological presence in the imaginal realm who directs the human being toward truth. In this way, the Rahman–Sufi hermeneutical tension and the Jung–Corbin divergence reveal how modern thought reproduces, on two distinct fronts, a fundamental ontological difference: whether revelation and divine knowledge are understood as internalized experiences of consciousness or as transcendent guidance actively intervening in the order of being.
As Boccassini reminds us, Corbin and Jung first met in 1949 within the Eranos circle in Ascona; in 1953, Corbin wrote a long and striking evaluation of Jung’s Answer to Job. Over time, Corbin became so deeply integrated into the Eranos atmosphere that, in 1962, he emerged as the only figure capable of delivering memorial addresses for both Olga Fröbe-Kapteyn and Jung himself. Nevertheless, their relationship was never “comfortable”; on the contrary, it continuously generated tension. According to Boccassini (2002), this tension was not personal but theoretical and ontological in nature.
Henry Corbin calls Khidr “the Green One,” because green, in his thought, symbolizes the continuity of life, ever-renewed existence, and the living vitality of divine manifestation. Khidr is thus the name of an ontological guidance that never ages, that continually reappears in time.
For Jung, Khidr is one of the guiding figures emerging from the collective unconscious—a derivative of the “Wise Old Man” archetype. Yet Khidr is not limited to wisdom and guidance; he also possesses a disruptive and unsettling dimension. In this sense, Khidr is a boundary-violating figure who intervenes unexpectedly and enables transformation by breaking existing orders. His function is to unsettle the habitual world of meaning constructed by consciousness and to force the individual beyond safe mental patterns.
Thus, in the Jungian reading, Khidr appears as an inner guiding image that dismantles the structures built by consciousness and propels the individual—often against their will—toward a broader level of awareness. His guidance is not comforting; it is frequently disturbing and transformative.
Here, the meaning of the concept of the “unconscious” becomes decisive. In Jung, the unconscious is not an independent layer of being. It is neither conceived as a transcendent world nor accepted as an ontological domain existing independently of the human being. Rather, the unconscious expresses the structural depth of the human psyche: an inner dimension that consciousness cannot directly control but that continuously influences it. This dimension functions as the fundamental ground that enables meaning-production and transformation.
For Corbin, by contrast, Khidr is irreducibly ontological. He is neither a purely psychological content nor a mythological image; he is a transhistorical principle of spiritual guidance operating within the imaginal realm. While Jung situates Khidr “inside,” Corbin places him neither inside nor outside, but within the real imaginal domain.
Boccassini’s original contribution lies in her attempt to read this difference not as a rupture but as a point of intersection. In her formulation, Jung and Corbin seek the place where two seas meet—a clear allusion to the Qur’anic narrative of Moses and Khidr. This metaphor represents the threshold where psychology and metaphysics, symbol and theophany, come into contact.
Ultimately, Boccassini does not reduce the Jung–Corbin relationship to a story of harmony or conflict. Rather, by centering the figure of Khidr, she demonstrates that the idea of a universal teacher within modern Western thought risks either being reduced to psychology or confined to inaccessible metaphysics. Jung and Corbin, each in his own way, resist this risk. One locates Khidr in the depths of the human soul; the other in the imaginal realm of being. Boccassini’s proposed reading stands precisely in between: Khidr is neither merely a product of the mind nor an unreachable metaphysical entity, but an invisible teacher who appears at the threshold between historical human experience and divine order.
Khidr as the Name of a State
Henry Corbin considers theophany to be a central concept, which in its most basic sense means this: the human being assumes an existential function by mediating God’s self-manifestation in and through the human being. The term “function” is crucial here, because what is at stake is not the human speaking about God or representing God, but God making Himself visible through the human being. This function is not a moral role, an intellectual achievement, or a mystical “title”; it is an ontological position directly related to the structure of being itself (Corbin, 1969, pp. 38–68).
In classical metaphysics, an unbridgeable distance is often maintained between God and the human being: God is conceived as absolute transcendence, and the human can think about God only through concepts. In Ibn ʿArabī’s thought, however, God is as absolutely manifest as He is absolutely transcendent. God is not only “beyond,” but also the Transcendent who reveals Himself. Divine self-manifestation is the result of this will to appear; the human task is to become worthy of this appearance.
A critical distinction must be made here. God’s self-manifestation does not mean the disclosure of God’s essence. God remains unknowable in essence. Manifestation occurs through divine names and attributes, under specific forms. These forms are neither mere products of imagination nor material objects; they appear in what Corbin insists on calling the imaginal realm—a mediating domain that is neither sensory nor abstract. The human being capable of perceiving this realm is one who can read the embodied forms of divine meaning.
Thus, divine manifestation does not replace reason with mystical intuition. On the contrary, it marks a threshold where reason and unveiling operate together. Reason thinks God through concepts; manifestation allows God to present Himself in a form. Ibn ʿArabī’s simultaneous “yes” and “no” to Ibn Rushd points precisely to this: reason cannot entirely deny the possibility of manifestation, yet manifestation cannot be fully contained within reason’s conceptual framework.
The Encounter of Two Modes of Knowledge: Ibn Rushd and Ibn ʿArabī
To understand the background, one must first recognize the two figures. Ibn Rushd, the great Andalusian philosopher, maintains that human reason, when properly employed through logic, can attain truth. Truth speaks the language of reason; experience supplies material, but reason sets the measure. Ibn ʿArabī, by contrast, claims that truth cannot be grasped solely through concepts; there exists an “opened” knowledge within the human interior—disclosure, inspiration, theophany. This knowledge does not negate reason but accesses a domain beyond its reach.
The famous “Yes / Yes / No” dialogue crystallizes this tension. Ibn Rushd’s implicit question is whether philosophical reasoning can reach truth. Ibn ʿArabī first answers “Yes,” delighting the philosopher, who interprets this as confirmation that unveiling merely validates philosophical conclusions. But Ibn ʿArabī immediately adds “No.” Yes, reason may reach certain truths, but unveiling is not merely a secondary channel that confirms reason; it sometimes exceeds and even breaks reason’s framework. Ibn ʿArabī’s remark that “between yes and no, spirits fly from matter and necks separate from bodies” names this moment of rupture—the threshold between reason’s secure ground and the abyss of unveiling.
The consequence of divine self-manifestation is that knowledge of God is no longer uniform. Each human being receives a manifestation according to their own existential structure, their own “inner sky.” Ibn ʿArabī’s statement that “everyone knows God as their own Lord” is not relativism; it is the inevitable result of divine multiplicity in manifestation. God is One, but the modes of appearing are many. The human being is one of the mirrors that make this multiplicity possible.
Here, the figure of Khidr becomes decisive. To be a disciple of Khidr, in Corbin’s view, is to consciously assume responsibility for God’s self-manifestation in oneself. Khidr does not negate the general rules of the Law, but he represents knowledge of inner realities. His guidance does not impose ready-made forms; rather, it confronts the human being with responsibility. This responsibility is the responsibility of bearing witness to how God appears to you.
Thus, the disciple of Khidr is not one who repeats another’s image of God, but one who testifies to how God discloses Himself personally. Such testimony both liberates and burdens the individual: one can no longer be content with having seen; one must carry the responsibility of what has been seen (Corbin, 1969, pp. 38–68).
Finally, divine self-manifestation does not render the human being passive. In Ibn ʿArabī, prayer, worship, and orientation are reciprocal: as the human turns toward God, God turns toward the human. Corbin’s notion of “creative prayer” expresses this reciprocity. By fulfilling this function, the human opens space for divine manifestation. The human thus ceases to be merely one who seeks God and becomes a stage upon which God wills to make Himself known.
Khidr as the Name of a State
The principle of Khidr may be understood not as a historical individual or symbolic figure, but as an ontological mode of operation that becomes active when human consciousness reaches a certain threshold. In this sense, Khidr is not a being but the name of a state. When a person fully purifies consciousness and aligns will with divine intention, the ordinary linear functioning of time and space loosens; causality softens.
This understanding does not align with Jung’s interpretation of Khidr. In Jung, Khidr is an archetypal guide emerging from the collective unconscious, limited to triggering inner psychological transformation. Any “bending” of time and space can only be interpreted symbolically, as a shift in perception. Ontological alignment with divine intention or actual transformation in the order of being lies beyond the limits of Jungian thought.
The Relation of This Interpretation to Corbin
By contrast, this approach largely aligns with Henry Corbin’s Ibn ʿArabī-centered ontology. For Corbin, the human being performs a function through which God becomes visible in and through the human. When this function becomes active, the boundaries between being and consciousness become permeable; contact with the imaginal realm becomes possible, and linear time is suspended. In Corbin’s framework, Khidr is not a personalized guide but the mode by which truth operates.
Yet an important difference remains. While Corbin grounds this primarily on metaphysical and hermeneutical levels, interpreting the Khidr principle as a law that touches the actual functioning of time and space extends Corbin’s framework toward a more dynamic ontology. In this view, Khidr is neither merely an inner symbol nor only a guiding figure, but a principle of existence activated when consciousness reaches a threshold of surrender and purity.
From this perspective, the Khidr principle is not a psychological transformation concept but an ontological threshold theory. Time and space cease to be fixed, closed structures and become a field of possibility that flexes according to the degree of alignment between consciousness and divine will. In this sense, the approach diverges from Jungian psychology, largely coincides with Corbinian ontology, and yet completes it by introducing a more dynamic, process-oriented understanding of being.
References
Corbin, H. (1969). Creative Imagination in the Ṣūfism of Ibn ʿArabī. Princeton University Press.
Boccassini, D. (2002). The Invisible Teacher and His Disciples: Jung’s and Corbin’s Approaches to “the Green One”. Journal of Analytical Psychology, 47(3), 443–463.
