Yavuz Acar
Developments around the Strait of Hormuz and Bab el-Mandeb demonstrate how quickly a regional crisis can spread into the global trade and energy system. On one side, shipping traffic through Hormuz has fallen sharply. On the other, the Houthis have strengthened their position in Yemen near the entrance to the Red Sea. Together, these developments have brought two of the world’s most critical maritime chokepoints into the same strategic equation.
Add Qatar’s, Oman’s, and Pakistan’s diplomatic initiatives, Washington’s reluctance to intervene directly, and Saudi Arabia’s search for security, and the result is an exceptionally complex picture.
The central issue is no longer simply which side will prevail.
The more urgent question is this: How long can this crisis constrict the arteries of global trade?
Gridlock in Hormuz: Maritime Traffic Becomes a Bargaining Chip
Shipping traffic through the Strait of Hormuz has declined dramatically in recent days. According to available data, only seven commercial vessels passed through the strait on September 10, compared with a prewar daily average of roughly 125.
These figures may not capture the full scale of the crisis, since some ships have switched off their tracking systems. The broader picture, however, is clear: one of the world’s most important energy corridors is facing a severe bottleneck.
Hormuz matters for more than its geography. Any disruption there has an immediate effect on oil and natural-gas markets. Insurance costs rise, tankers change course, transit times lengthen, and markets quickly price in the uncertainty.
Indeed, Brent crude has climbed above $100 a barrel.
Yet the crisis in Hormuz is political as well as economic.
For Iran, the strait is a strategic instrument with which it can increase pressure on the United States. For Washington, freedom of navigation is too fundamental a principle to become a bargaining chip.
The question, therefore, is not merely whether ships can pass.
Hormuz has become a negotiating arena almost as important as the war itself.
Qatar’s Difficult Balancing Act
Qatar’s diplomatic initiatives are especially noteworthy. Doha has called for the unconditional reopening of the Strait of Hormuz while arguing that the “neither war nor peace” standoff between Washington and Tehran is unsustainable.
It would be inadequate, however, to describe Qatar’s role simply as neutral mediation. Doha also has direct economic interests at stake.
Qatar’s liquefied natural-gas exports depend heavily on the maritime routes of the Persian Gulf. A prolonged crisis in Hormuz could directly affect both its energy revenues and its relationships with customers worldwide.
Qatar is therefore both a mediator and a party exposed to the consequences of the crisis.
That dual position does not necessarily diminish Doha’s diplomatic influence. On the contrary, a country seeking a solution to protect its own interests may have an even stronger incentive to make diplomacy work.
Qatar’s advantage is its ability to maintain close relations with Washington while keeping channels of communication with Tehran open.
Oman possesses a different advantage.
Muscat has longstanding ties with Iran and trusted channels of communication with the parties. Qatar and Oman could therefore play complementary roles.
The most realistic option may not be a comprehensive peace agreement, but a temporary maritime-corridor arrangement.
Technical measures—such as permitting designated vessels to pass, establishing advance-notification mechanisms, providing security guarantees, and restoring maritime services—could be implemented even before the larger political disputes are resolved.
Such an arrangement would not end the war.
But it could provide breathing room.
And in crisis management, the first objective is sometimes not to secure peace, but to prevent the conflict from expanding further.
Pakistan’s Fine Line
Pakistan faces an even more difficult balancing act.
On the one hand, Islamabad is one of Saudi Arabia’s important defense partners. On the other, it shares a long land border with Iran and does not want relations with Tehran to collapse entirely.
The new defense agreement Pakistan signed with Saudi Arabia and Turkey has made this equation even more complicated.
The agreement is based on the principle that an armed attack against one of the three countries concerns the others as well. It remains unclear, however, whether this clause will translate into a direct military operation against the Houthis.
For now, Islamabad is emphasizing diplomacy.
That choice is not accidental.
Pakistan’s relationship with Iran extends beyond diplomacy to border security, energy, trade, and regional stability. Saudi Arabia, meanwhile, is a major financial and strategic partner for Pakistan.
Pakistan’s principal risk lies in being forced to choose sides.
If it joins a direct military operation against Iran, its relations with Tehran could suffer a severe blow, and it could largely lose its credibility as a mediator.
If it openly leaves Saudi Arabia isolated, its relationship with Riyadh could be damaged instead.
Islamabad’s current strategy therefore appears highly pragmatic:
Preserve the defense partnership with Saudi Arabia, keep communication with Iran open, and avoid entering the war for as long as possible.
This policy, however, has limits.
As the fighting moves closer to Saudi territory and to areas where Pakistani forces are stationed, the distance between diplomacy and military obligation will narrow.
Bab el-Mandeb: The Alternative Route Becomes a New Front
The crisis in Hormuz has made Bab el-Mandeb even more important.
Under normal circumstances, the Red Sea can serve as an important alternative route for energy shipments that cannot—or prefer not to—leave the Persian Gulf. Saudi Arabia also has infrastructure that allows it to export some of its oil through the Red Sea.
But a new problem is emerging.
The Houthis’ advance near the southern entrance to the Red Sea is making the alternative route itself increasingly risky.
The Houthis’ capture of the strategically located city of Mocha on September 10 cannot be viewed solely through the lens of Yemen’s civil war. Mocha’s proximity to Bab el-Mandeb makes the military developments there significant for international maritime trade as well.
An important distinction must be made.
The Houthis’ capture of Mocha does not mean they control the entire Bab el-Mandeb Strait. It does, however, indicate growing military and political pressure around the chokepoint.
That distinction matters.
For global commerce, a threat does not always take the form of a strait being completely closed. It may be enough for ships to doubt whether passage is safe.
For a shipowner, the key question is not simply “Can we pass?” but “Can we pass safely?”
And when confidence disappears, trade changes course.
Why Is Washington Avoiding Direct Intervention?
The US position is one of the most striking aspects of the crisis.
Washington attaches importance to secure sea lanes and the defense of its allies. At the same time, it is reluctant to launch a new, large-scale military campaign against the Houthis in Yemen.
It would be too simplistic to interpret this approach merely as evidence of American decline.
A more accurate reading is that Washington is trying to strike a new balance between cost and strategic benefit.
The United States is already confronting a major crisis with Iran. It is maintaining its military presence in the Gulf while also accounting for China’s rise and Russia’s global influence.
Opening a new theater of war in Yemen under these conditions could stretch Washington’s resources even further.
The American public’s reluctance to enter another prolonged Middle Eastern war is also shaping the administration’s calculations.
Washington’s preferred model therefore resembles risk management: provide intelligence to allies, support air defense, and maintain military coordination without placing American troops directly in the conflict.
This approach is less costly in the short term.
But it carries a risk.
If adversaries conclude that the United States will not intervene, deterrence itself may weaken.
Deterrence is not created solely by the possession of weapons.
It rests on the belief that those weapons will be used when necessary.
That is Washington’s real test.
Too much intervention could create another war. Too much restraint could encourage adversaries to push further.
Two Straits, One Strategic Equation
The most important feature of the present crisis is that Hormuz and Bab el-Mandeb can no longer be treated as two separate crises.
Pressure in Hormuz threatens oil and gas flows.
Security risks in Bab el-Mandeb, meanwhile, are placing the alternative maritime route under strain.
The global energy and trading system is thus being pressured at two different points simultaneously.
This could give Iran and its allies a significant strategic advantage. But it would be wrong to regard that advantage as unlimited control.
Iran cannot completely control global commerce, nor can the Houthis be said to exercise absolute dominion over Bab el-Mandeb.
Yet absolute control is not always necessary in the global system.
Limited geographic pressure can produce enormous economic consequences worldwide.
It is enough for ships to take longer routes, insurance premiums to rise, energy prices to climb, and delivery times to lengthen.
Moreover, these costs spread far beyond the belligerents, affecting countries from Europe to Asia.
Is the Real War Being Fought Over Sea Lanes?
It is no longer sufficient to understand the present situation in the Middle East solely through the balance of military power.
Hormuz and Bab el-Mandeb show how geography can be transformed into a political weapon.
Qatar and Oman are attempting to contain the crisis through diplomacy. Pakistan is caught between alliance obligations and neutrality. Saudi Arabia is trying to strengthen both its alternative export routes and its defense capacity. The United States is searching for a new balance between intervention and restraint.
For Iran, the issue is how to use its remaining strategic leverage in response to economic and military pressure.
For the Houthis, it is a matter of turning a regional conflict into an opportunity to increase their geopolitical weight.
But one larger truth stands above all these calculations:
The global economy is far more dependent on the security of a handful of narrow maritime passages than it tends to acknowledge.
That is why any crisis in Hormuz or Bab el-Mandeb can rapidly become a global concern.
In the coming period, the most likely scenario may not be a comprehensive peace, but a prolonged interim phase combining temporary ceasefires, limited maritime corridors, diplomatic contacts, and calibrated military pressure.
None of the parties appears ready to retreat completely.
At the same time, none appears to want the crisis to spiral into a regional war.
This is precisely where diplomacy enters the picture.
Diplomacy does not always have to resolve every problem.
Sometimes a more modest objective is enough:
Get the ships moving again. Get the oil flowing again. And prevent the war from spilling into the next theater.
The future of Hormuz and Bab el-Mandeb will largely be determined within this narrow space.
Because in today’s Middle East, sea lanes are no longer merely channels of commerce.
They have become the new battlegrounds where diplomacy, deterrence, and geopolitical pressure converge.
