Cuma Cicek*
In an article titled “What Happened to the Demand for Peace?”, which I wrote on the occasion of September 1st, I pointed out that the situation regarding peace with the Kurds in Turkey was unfavorable. However, I also underlined that there were three windows of opportunity for those who advocate for a politics of peace:
- The negative references created by conflicts in the region, together with Turkey’s deep economic and political crises, have politically increased the value of achieving internal peace and maintaining stability.
- In recent months, Turkey’s efforts to normalize relations with Syria have also opened a window of opportunity for peace politics.
- The significant demobilization of the PKK/KCK within Turkey’s borders, along with the search for normalization in Syria, offers another opportunity for peace politics.
In the past month, significant developments have taken place around Turkey, making the “need for internal peace and stability” politically even more valuable.
Israel has continued its attacks on Gaza while also expanding the conflict to Lebanon and escalating the scale of the conflict. After attacking Gaza, Israel targeted Lebanon, killing Hezbollah leader Hassan Nasrallah along with many other leaders of various organizations, including Hamas leader Ismail Haniyeh, who was assassinated while visiting Tehran. Iran, which did not respond strongly to Israel following Haniyeh’s assassination—due to promises made by the U.S. for a ceasefire in Gaza—carried out a comprehensive attack on Israel after the assault on Lebanon and the killing of Nasrallah.
In response, Israel announced that it would give a harsh response to Iran at a suitable time. U.S. President Biden’s statement that he would not support a potential Israeli strike on Iran’s nuclear facilities shows that there is a risk of the Israel-Iran conflict expanding and intensifying.
Amidst this situation, debates around “normalization” in Turkey have increased. President Recep Tayyip ErdoÄŸan stated that discussions of early elections were meaningless for them. In his speech to Parliament during the new legislative term, ErdoÄŸan emphasized the need for a new constitution while also recalling Israel’s efforts to spread the war to include Turkey. He called on the opposition to “strengthen the internal front” and pursue reconciliation.
Meanwhile, the CHP (Republican People’s Party) signaled its continuation of “normalization politics” by standing to greet ErdoÄŸan during the October 1st parliamentary session. Unlike the CHP, the DEM Party (Democratic Party) greeted ErdoÄŸan by remaining seated. However, MHP (Nationalist Movement Party) leader Devlet Bahçeli, who has significantly influenced Turkish politics since the sharp turn taken after the July 15 coup attempt, walked over to the DEM Party benches and shook hands with DEM Party Co-Chair Tuncer Bakırhan and other deputies.
Bahçeli’s statements, when explaining his change in attitude toward the DEM Party—which he had previously called for to be banned—further increased public interest. Saying, “We are entering a new era, and while we call for peace globally, we must also achieve peace in our own country,” Bahçeli linked his outstretched hand to the DEM Party to the reconciliation-focused statements made by ErdoÄŸan. Naturally, these developments sparked discussions of “Is a new solution process starting?”
While it is still too early to give a positive answer to this question, certain dynamics increase the likelihood of efforts to end the Kurdish conflict.
The escalating and potentially expanding conflict between Israel and Iran poses significant risks for Turkey, while also presenting new opportunities. In this sense, a new solution process could come to the agenda both as a “preventive strategy” and as part of a strategy to turn the regional crisis into an opportunity.
It is clear that if Israel’s attacks on Palestine and Lebanon expand to include Iran, uncertainty and unpredictability will increase across the region.
Turkey’s Kurdish conflict expanded and became more complex both after the 1990-1991 Gulf War and during the U.S. intervention in Iraq in 2003-2005, as well as with the Syrian civil war that began in 2011 and continues today. Turkey, which is now conducting its Kurdish conflict in the Syrian and Iraqi arenas, could enter a new phase aimed at fully ending the Kurdish conflict in this context. Bahçeli’s extended hand to the DEM Party could be the symbolic first step of a new politics aimed at preventing the regional escalation of the Kurdish conflict.
Even if the Israel-Iran war remains limited, Kurdish peace could become a more “rational” option for the Turkish state, politics, and capital. For a long time, Turkey has drawn back within its “national” and “domestic” boundaries. With Iran weakening in this context, Turkey might seek to fill the regional vacuum with a new Kurdish policy. Hamas and Hezbollah, supported by Iran, have suffered significant blows. Establishing peaceful cross-border relations with the Kurds, who hold significant power in shaping the political landscape in Syria, Iraq, and Iran, could increase Turkey’s political and economic influence regionally. If Iran’s influence weakens, Turkey may want to seize this opportunity.
One point that should also be emphasized in the context of foreign policy is this: The conflicts in the region will push the U.S. to stay in the region longer. In this case, turning the Kurdish issue from a point of conflict with the U.S. into an issue of reconciliation could become an option for Turkey.
Another issue to consider in the context of foreign policy, which has also become a key issue in domestic politics, is the problem of Syrian refugees. The AK Party cannot enter the 2028 elections with its current refugee policy. Beyond the AK Party, the issue has become an important “risk area” for at least certain actors within the Establishment. Solving the refugee issue requires rapid normalization with the Assad regime. Turkey could agree to a Kurdish administration in Syria that is politically, administratively, and militarily limited, and it could seek a middle ground on this matter with both the Assad regime and the U.S.
In addition to foreign policy, Kurdish peace could also be a rational option for the AK Party and MHP in domestic politics. If the People’s Alliance (AK Party and MHP coalition) wants to win the 2028 elections, it must resolve two issues: the refugee issue and the economic crisis. A peaceful Kurdish policy on a regional scale would contribute greatly to solving both of these issues.
Moreover, normalization with the CHP, and a softening stance toward the DEM Party, could buy the People’s Alliance at least a couple of years to manage the economic crisis. In an environment where ongoing leadership debates and crises within the CHP are fueling the widespread public perception that “the CHP cannot govern,” normalization discussions will benefit the People’s Alliance more than the CHP. The optimism that prevailed in the CHP after the March 31st elections, based more on its own performance than the AK Party’s mistakes, has been undermined by the leadership debates and time consumed by internal crises. As recent public opinion polls reflect, this situation has worked in favor of the AK Party. The AK Party may want to take advantage of this window of opportunity by investing in the CHP’s internal leadership debates and promoting normalization politics.
Furthermore, the CHP’s distanced stance toward the DEM Party and its “politics of passive avoidance,” which involves neither engaging positively nor confronting negatively on the Kurdish issue, gives the AK Party considerable maneuvering space on the Kurdish issue. The DEM Party’s emphasis on a third way, its open stance on the new constitution debates, and its recognition of the cross-border dynamics of the Kurdish issue keep the doors open between the two parties. In this sense, even if Bahçeli’s outstretched hand to the DEM Party does not start a new solution process, it holds the potential to reshape the CHP’s relationship with Kurdish politics while the CHP drains its energy internally.
All this presents the Kurdish political actors with a broad field of maneuver. The preferences of the Turkish state, politics, and capital will, to some extent, be shaped by the choices made by Kurdish politics.
This article was originally published in Birikim Magazine and translated into English by Politurco.
Cuma Cicek is assistant professor in the Faculty of Economic and Administrative Sciences at Mardin Artuklu University, Turkey. He received his PhD from Sciences Po in Paris and has published several books in Turkish.
