The Post-PKK Era

Cuma Cicek*

The long-awaited congress in which the PKK officially announced its dissolution and disarmament has finally taken place. According to the initial statement, “historic decisions” were made in line with Öcalan’s call on February 27. Although the details of these decisions have been postponed for later announcements, using former President and Prime Minister Süleyman Demirel’s phrase, it can be said that the “29th Kurdish Uprising” has come to an end.

In his February 27, 2025 call, Öcalan had already laid out an irreversible framework. The contextual analysis he provided, and his justifications for dissolution and disarmament, created a path that was no longer reversible for the PKK, the organization he founded.

That said, until a formal and concrete declaration of dissolution and disarmament is made—and weapons are actually laid down—public concerns that the process could collapse will remain. This concern is justified by numerous failed attempts in various countries to end long-term conflicts. Turkey’s own experiences with dialogue and resolution, dating back to the 1990s, support these doubts. At the beginning of the 2013–2015 Peace Process, Öcalan had similarly declared the “armed struggle over.” Yet the process failed, leaving behind thousands of deaths and immense destruction over the past decade.

The written statement from the congress, remarks by officials from the DEM Party, and comments from Foreign Minister Hakan Fidan indicate that the process is advancing toward dissolution and disarmament. At the same time, unresolved issues remain, and time is still needed. However, the emphasis and tone of the statements suggest that these are not crises but challenges that need to be managed.

A New Era for Turkey

A new era is beginning for Turkey. The centuries-old Kurdish issue in general—and the nearly 50-year Kurdish conflict in particular—have played a major role in shaping Turkey’s regime. The Kurdish conflict has fueled authoritarianism in politics and inequality in economics, making Turkey part of the authoritarian world.

A peace with the Kurds opens a historic window of opportunity for Turkey to move toward democratization in politics, equality in economics, and a rules-based order in foreign policy.

While Turkey made significant strides in democratization during the 2000s, the 2016 coup attempt and the subsequent state of emergency ushered in a rapid period of authoritarian regression. Today, Turkey exists in a hybrid regime somewhere between a flawed democracy and autocracy—though it teeters on the edge of autocracy.

The current regime of uncertainty in the Kurdish region has persisted for nearly a century (excluding the 2002–2015 period). This uncertainty, originally limited to the Kurdish region, has now expanded across the country. Institutions, actors, procedures, mechanisms, relationships, and cultures created in the Kurdish region have spilled over into the rest of Turkey, enabling the dramatic democratic backslide of the past decade. In short, the Kurdish conflict—through its legacy and its recent cross-border dimensions—has been a foundational source of Turkey’s erosion of rights and rule of law.

The dissolution and disarmament of the PKK transcend the goals, aims, and positions of current political actors and hold the potential to structurally reshape Turkey’s regime. The main dynamic of the uncertainty regime is being dismantled.

Of course, this is not a deterministic relationship. If the peace process does not advance with democratization, the current structure may persist—or worse, violence may re-emerge in different forms. This is a real risk. The literature on conflict resolution and peacebuilding based on similar cases highlights two interrelated forms of violence that enable physical violence: structural violence (a combination of political repression and economic exploitation) and symbolic/cultural violence (the reproduction of emotions and ideas that justify inequality). To achieve lasting peace, we need both structural and symbolic reconciliation.

In recent years, both structural and cultural violence in Turkey have undeniably increased amid political and economic crises. Implementing structural reforms to reduce these forms of violence is Turkey’s most critical challenge.

Although MHP leader Devlet Bahçeli’s writings in Türkgün suggest there is a goal in this direction, the widespread disappointment and distrust that spread—especially after the March 19 operation—among the main opposition and its supporters cannot be ignored.

It’s important to emphasize: this challenge is far greater than any short-term electoral interests or the fate of the ruling coalition (AKP-MHP). It encompasses all political parties—and more than that, it requires the participation of civil society organizations, academia, the media, the cultural sector, labor unions, and business associations.

The Great Test for the Kurdish Region

A new era is also beginning for the Kurdish region. The nearly half-century era of direct violence, which began before the 1980 military coup, is coming to an end. Especially after 1980, the multifaceted Kurdish conflict defined the region’s borders, shaped its dynamics, and influenced everything from politics and civil society to media, economics, culture, and everyday life.

Now, the foundational dynamic of this context is disappearing—and this marks a profound test for Kurdish actors.

The current process does not offer a final resolution to the Kurdish issue. We will likely see a process of “returning home” from the mountains, prisons, and exile. There may be an expansion of space for the Kurdish language. Reforms on government-appointed trustees (kayyım) may also be expected in the short term. However, considering the multidimensional nature of the Kurdish issue—political, administrative, social, economic, psychological, and geopolitical—these measures will clearly fall short of addressing the needs of Kurdish society. And Kurdish actors are not claiming otherwise. Meeting these needs now falls under civil and political struggle.

Within this picture, the DEM Party—the main carrier of Kurdish dissent—faces a major transformation test. Since its roots in the People’s Labor Party (HEP), founded in 1990, the political tradition now represented by DEM has served as a hub for a multitude of grievances, aspirations, and mobilizations from the Kurdish public. Can it now evolve into a true political center reflecting the diversity of Kurdish voices? Can it carry out the institutional, organizational, ideological, political, and discursive changes needed for the new era?

Beyond politics, the wider Kurdish civil society—media, academia, and more—also faces a deep transformation challenge. Often overshadowed by politics, this sphere now needs change as much as the political domain.

The coming period will bring both severe crises and historic opportunities for Kurdish political parties, especially DEM, and for broader civil society actors.

Transformation of the Transnational Kurdish Sphere

Finally, the transnational Kurdish sphere is undergoing a major transformation. The Kurdish question long ago transcended Turkey’s borders. Beginning in the early 1990s, and accelerating especially with the founding of the Rojava region in Syria in 2011–2012, this development gained new dimensions.

The current resolution process in Turkey is unfolding alongside three major developments in the transnational Kurdish space. In Iraq’s Kurdistan Region, efforts continue to overcome the dual-governance structure that has lasted over 30 years. Specifically, the unification of the Peshmerga forces and the integration of political control between the Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP) and the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK) are progressing.

In Syria’s Rojava region, a long-standing divide between the Kurdish National Unity Parties (PYNK), led by the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF), and the Kurdish National Council (ENKS), affiliated with the Barzani movement, has recently been bridged. At a conference held at the end of April, Syrian Kurdish groups declared their demand for a federal Syria and expressed willingness to negotiate with the Assad government.

Additionally, a significant breakthrough occurred in the previously strained relations between Rojava and Iraq’s Kurdistan Region. The meeting between SDF Commander Mazloum Abdi and KDP leader Masoud Barzani—covered in the press—signaled a new phase of rapprochement between the two Kurdish regions.

The dissolution and disarmament of the PKK will not only reshape the Kurdish issue within Turkey but will also have structural effects on the internal and mutual dynamics of Rojava and the Iraqi Kurdistan Region, as well as on their relations with Turkey.

In summary, the post-PKK era carries transformative potential for both Turkey and the Kurdish people across the region. To understand where these changes might take us—to evaluate opportunities, threats, and possibilities—we must, as peacebuilding literature suggests, look beyond short-term debates and consider at least a 10-year horizon.

This article was originally published in Birikim Magazine and translated into English by Politurco.

Cuma Cicek is assistant professor in the Faculty of Economic and Administrative Sciences at Mardin Artuklu University, Turkey. He received his PhD from Sciences Po in Paris and has published several books in Turkish.

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