Tanil Bora*
The concept invoked to calm the bewilderment caused by Turkey’s MHP leader Devlet Bahçeli’s unexpected statement calling for Abdullah Öcalan- leader of the PKK in prison- to come to the Parliament and address his organization, is this: State Mind. It is referred to as the most, or even the only, reliable basis for the possibility of something happening in the Kurdish issue, even if nothing else occurs.
The concept of State Mind is based on the French term “Raison d’État.” Although it is applied to domestic politics, it is most commonly used in foreign policy. It describes the long-term political preferences above the daily affairs and decisions of governments. It implies serenity, common sense, prudence, and foresight; it emphasizes rationality along with the state’s interest.
Raison d’État/State Mind is often compared to the concept of “hikmet-i hükümet” (wisdom of governance) in Ottoman Turkish. Although not entirely identical, there is a difference between the two. The distinction between government and state was relatively insignificant in pre-modern times, but the key term is “hikmet” (wisdom). Hikmet refers to a knowledge that is not easily comprehended, hard to explain, or sometimes indescribable in words; it denotes a type of wisdom. Hikmet cannot always be understood by everyone — at least not by all — and sometimes, it is secretive. The local and national form of State Mind, the “Turkish state tradition,” is, in the words of Kemal Tahir, an intelligence that can leave people astounded, making them think, “What kind of intellect is this? This is a mind that even the devil couldn’t conceive!” It is a high-level intelligence that is not easily understood by everyone.
Indeed, this discourse on State Mind, no longer a concept but rather an ideological narrative, nurtures a sort of sanctification and even eroticism of the deep state. Belief in the existence of state sages who, for the sake of state interests, watch over higher benefits that ordinary people’s minds cannot grasp, brings comfort to those who embrace this discourse.
Mümtaz’er Türköne, who claims to represent the “Turkish state tradition” by stating, “I know the state tradition of the Oghuz tribe to which I belong,” defines State Mind as follows: “State Mind or reflex refers to the more fundamental and lasting institution that stands against the mobilization of all state powers in the direction of the government’s political interests.” Indeed, the foundation of the “Turkish state tradition,” as he mentions, is based on an event that transformed the nomadic-predatory “Oghuz Mind” by limiting the use of power and violence. According to this story, Tuğrul Bey marched against his brother, Çağrı Bey, the founder of the Seljuk state, to prevent the looting of the city of Nishapur, because he had a vision for a lasting state that took “the next hundred years into account” and avoided vendettas.
To see how State Mind worked in the Ottoman phase of “Turkish state tradition,” one can look at the period of the 16th/17th century, particularly the Celali Rebellions. The state would sometimes respond to bandits in a “reasonable” way, sometimes with brutal measures to set an example; at other times, it would limit their background with precautions or concessions, or even incorporate them by offering positions of power. None of these tactics are definitive or permanent; the one who was rewarded with a title could be executed later, and the one who was humiliated might later be forgiven. The essence of “Turkish state tradition” is perhaps summed up in the famous saying: “In the Ottoman Empire, the game is complicated!”
There is indeed a difference between “Western” State Mind and hikmet-i hükümet, but this difference is relative.
The roots of State Mind can be traced, through the lens of political anthropology, back to the ancient first states, even to the very concept of the state itself. That is, to the embryonic state which grew by offering protection in exchange for minimal security and spoils, and became stronger and stronger… State Mind, at its core, is essentially a “self-interested” mind. It safeguards its own survival, seeks to increase its own “state capacity,” and will go to any lengths to achieve it. State Mind is the ego of the state.
Türköne sees the foundation of the Oghuz-Turkish State Mind in the state’s limitation of its own power and violence. (Should one compare it to the ego’s ability to control its impulses!) The state, as a concentration of power, is naturally inclined toward uncontrolled use of force and arbitrariness.
The modern state, as theorized in modern political theories, has evolved within the process of restraining the state’s “instinct” by the State Mind. (Those who trace the roots of State Mind back to the ancient first state might not agree with this view.)
The modern historical form of restraining the state’s instincts is the rule of law. Mithat Sancar’s work is dedicated to this mission: “The Rule of Law Under the Grip of State Mind.”
In recent years, as we can observe in Carl Schmitt’s rising influence in social theory, State Mind is breaking free from its constraints worldwide. Our era is that of the state whose mind has been “disturbed” by “the fight against terrorism,” the time of the Security State. It is the era of the Neoliberal Corporation-State. It is a time when the behavior pattern of “total obedience in exchange for protection and spoils” dominates. This is a time when uncertainty regimes have become institutionalized, and as a result, institutions are eroding, expanding the space for arbitrariness. In some ways, it is a time when global State Mind is converging with “Turkish state tradition!” These are the faces of (post-)modern State Mind.
Is there a single way to reason? Is the path of State Mind also the same? The discourse of State Mind, which positions itself as the boundary of the Political, forbids asking these questions. The discourse of State Mind, as it is beyond politics, also tends toward being beyond reason.
Should we long for the wisdom of State Mind or the return of the lost State Mind? The intelligence we seek is not the wisdom of “Akıl Sır Erdirilemez” (wisdom that cannot be understood) but rather the wisdom that trusts the minds of citizens, of people — the wisdom of democratic political reason.
*Tanıl Bora was born in 1963 in Ankara. He graduated from Istanbul Boys’ High School, then Ankara University Political Science Faculty. He was a journalist at Yeni Gündem, a weekly news journal, in between 1984-88. He has been the research / reading editor in İletişim Publishing since 1988. In between 1993 and 2014, he was the editorial director in Toplum & Bilim Journal, a social science journal published every three months. In 2012, he became the editorial coordinator of Birikim, a monthly socialist culture journal for which he was writing articles since 1989.
This article was first published in Birikim Magazine on November 13, 2024 and translated into English bu Politurco.
