AHMET KEMAL GENÇ /TR724
When the war began, the United States and Israel had sweeping objectives on the table. Regime change in Iran, the complete destruction of its nuclear capabilities, the dismantling of the “Axis of Resistance” that Tehran had spent years building—and even the establishment of an Iranian Kurdistan—were all being discussed. Within a few weeks, however, realities on the ground overtook these ambitions.
Today, the debate is no longer about regime change but whether the Strait of Hormuz can remain open. Washington’s priority appears to have shifted from transforming Iran to safeguarding global energy flows and preventing the war from spiraling out of control. The situation has effectively reached the point where keeping Hormuz open would itself be considered sufficient.
This shift demonstrates how the war’s political objectives have been tested against realities on the ground—and how the initially ambitious strategy has been significantly narrowed.
The Fighting Stopped Repeatedly, but the Crisis Never Ended
The 14-point agreement signed by the United States and Iran on June 17, 2026—widely known as the Islamabad Agreement—was initially presented, or at least portrayed, as a major diplomatic achievement that had brought the fighting between the two countries to an end. Its primary purpose was to halt active hostilities and restore maritime traffic through the Strait of Hormuz.
But events did not unfold as expected.
Although commercial shipping through the strait partially resumed, the fundamental dispute remained unresolved. While the United States defended the principle of “freedom of international navigation,” it also wanted that freedom to operate under its own supervision. Iran, meanwhile, refused to relinquish its sovereign claims and security controls over the strait.
The underlying cause of the war therefore did not disappear; it merely took on a different form.
In reality, the agreement failed to produce a lasting peace. The two sides had merely paused direct, large-scale warfare.
A New Phase Began While the NATO Summit Was Still Underway
Tensions began rising again on July 8. The United States launched a new wave of airstrikes, accusing Iran of threatening commercial vessels passing through the Strait of Hormuz and endangering maritime security. Washington justified the operations as necessary to enforce the agreement and protect international shipping.
Iran regarded the attacks as a clear violation of the agreement. According to Tehran, the United States was exploiting the diplomatic process to continue exerting military pressure.
Iran subsequently retaliated against U.S. bases in Iraq, Bahrain, Qatar, Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, Jordan and Syria. It also threatened Kurdish groups. The two sides were once again at war, but this time the confrontation entered a new phase that could be described as a “controlled conflict.”
Iran Has Realized That Washington’s Objective Extends Beyond Hormuz
Washington’s strategy is apparently not limited to keeping the Strait of Hormuz open. The United States is pursuing a gradual military campaign designed to keep Iran under constant pressure without entering a full-scale war.
During the initial stage, the attacks targeted coastal defense systems, radar installations, maritime surveillance posts and military facilities. Over time, however, the target list expanded to include transportation networks, logistics centers, bridges and other critical infrastructure.
This shift is significant. The objective is no longer merely to prevent Iran from controlling maritime traffic. It is also to erode Tehran’s war-fighting capabilities and weaken its military logistics.
Through sustained, low-intensity pressure, Washington is seeking to wear Iran down both militarily and politically.
Iran Is Resisting—but for How Long?
The challenge facing Iran today is not limited to U.S. attacks. The more fundamental problem is that Tehran’s existing retaliation strategy has failed to force Washington to back down. Iranian attacks on American bases have so far done little to disrupt the pace of U.S. operations.
Tehran is therefore confronting an increasingly difficult choice: It can accept the growing pressure and enter negotiations on Washington’s terms, or it can take more aggressive steps to raise the costs for the United States.
Recent developments suggest that Iran has begun choosing the second option.
The July 17 attack on electricity generation and water desalination facilities in Kuwait was the most striking example. For the first time, Iran moved beyond military targets and struck critical civilian infrastructure, signaling a transition toward a new strategy that might be described as “active deterrence.”
Tehran’s goal is no longer simply to retaliate against individual attacks. It is now attempting to make Washington’s low-cost pressure campaign unsustainable. There are also assessments that military institutions are gaining greater influence than civilian political actors within Iran’s decision-making process.
This new strategy, however, carries considerable risks. Expanding the range of targets could push the conflict into a far more violent phase—one that would be significantly harder to contain.
Is the Middle East on the Brink of a New War?
At this point, the Islamabad Agreement has not completely collapsed. Yet the already limited trust between the two sides has largely disappeared. While the United States continues to target Iran’s military infrastructure and logistical capabilities, Tehran has begun retaliating not only against American bases but also against Washington’s broader economic and strategic interests in the region.
What stands out most is how dramatically the objectives of the war have changed.
The conflict began with ambitious talk of regime change in Iran, dismantling the Axis of Resistance and reshaping the regional order. Today, however, it is largely centered on the security of the Strait of Hormuz and control over maritime trade.
That does not mean the crisis has diminished. On the contrary, Hormuz is becoming the most critical front in the emerging power struggle between the United States and Iran.
The greatest danger lies in the strategies pursued by both sides. As the United States intensifies military pressure, Iran takes increasingly aggressive and hazardous steps. As Iran broadens its target list, Washington responds with further military action. Whether this dynamic is the result of a deliberate pressure strategy or simply reciprocal escalation, it is pushing the conflict toward an increasingly dangerous threshold.
The central question today, therefore, is not whether the war will resume. It is when—and at what point—the supposedly controlled confrontation will slip beyond either side’s control.
