Abrahamic Movement CEO Tom Wegner tells Politurco that Israel’s harder security posture is rooted less in Benjamin Netanyahu’s political survival than in the trauma of October 7 and the regional threats Israelis believe they face. He also acknowledges settler violence, Israel’s deepening internal divisions and the growing international cost of its military policies.
Interview by Cumali Önal
Israel is approaching its October 27 election amid one of the most consequential periods in its recent history. The Gaza war, confrontation with Iran and its regional allies, continuing controversy over the West Bank, judicial reform and deep divisions between secular and religious Israelis have transformed the country’s political landscape. The election campaign itself reflects these divisions, with Itamar Ben-Gvir’s Otzma Yehudit running separately from Bezalel Smotrich’s Religious Zionist Party.
Against this background, Politurco’s Cumali Önal spoke with Tom Wegner, co-founder and CEO of the Abrahamic Movement and author of The Abrahamic Revolution.
Wegner is a veteran Israeli media strategist who has advised Israeli leaders and international organizations and previously served as a spokesperson for the Peres Center. His Abrahamic Movement seeks to develop a shared regional identity among Jews, Muslims, Christians and other communities as an alternative to decades of conflict.
In this interview, Wegner presents a distinctly Israeli security perspective on the transformations that followed October 7. His central argument is provocative: even if Netanyahu loses power, the basic direction of Israeli security policy is unlikely to disappear.
At the same time, Wegner acknowledges serious divisions inside Israel, condemns attacks on innocent Palestinians by radical Jewish activists and warns that Israel is paying a substantial international price for its current security doctrine.
POLITURCO: Is the Israeli government’s current hard-line approach primarily Netanyahu’s policy, or is it driven by coalition partners such as Itamar Ben-Gvir and Bezalel Smotrich? If those figures left government, could Israeli policy fundamentally change?
TOM WEGNER: I don’t think the basic security approach is primarily about Netanyahu, Ben-Gvir or any particular Israeli politician.
Israelis believe we are facing organizations that openly seek to attack us—Hamas, Hezbollah, the Houthis, Islamic Jihad and other armed groups. We tried different approaches in the past. Israel withdrew from Gaza because there was an expectation that this could create a different reality. Instead, from the Israeli perspective, Gaza became a base for tunnels, missiles and militias, culminating in the October 7 attack.
So when you describe Israel’s policy as a “hard approach,” many Israelis would describe it differently. They see it as self-defense.
The question Israelis ask is: What is the alternative? Should Israel wait for Hamas to attack again? Should it simply accept missiles and drones from Hezbollah or the Houthis?
That is why I do not believe the fundamental security doctrine would disappear simply because Netanyahu or Ben-Gvir left government. Pasted markdown
Would another Israeli government therefore pursue essentially the same security policy?
On the central security questions, probably yes.
Israel distinguishes between Muslim countries with which it has normal or cooperative relations such as the United Arab Emirates, Morocco, Jordan and others, and organizations that reject Israel’s existence and attack Israelis.
Specific operations would obviously be debated. Different prime ministers, generals and governments would make different tactical decisions.
But I do not believe any foreseeable Israeli government would adopt a policy of simply waiting for another October 7 while armed organizations continue preparing attacks.
That is now much deeper than Netanyahu. Pasted markdown
There are reports of disagreements between Israel’s political leadership and parts of the military and security establishment. How significant are those differences?
Differences naturally exist. In any democratic system, generals, intelligence officials and elected politicians will disagree over timing, tactics and particular operations.
But there is another distinction that is important.
We are also seeing violence in the West Bank by individuals acting independently. Unfortunately, there are Jewish activists who harass or attack Palestinians who have done nothing to them.
That behavior was not authorized by the Israeli government. It is illegal under Israeli law, and many Israelis—including people inside the security establishment—want a stronger response against those radicals.
Israel, like other societies at war, has extremists of its own.
The state must retain control over the use of force. Military force must be exercised through the government and legitimate authorities, not by individuals taking the law into their own hands. Pasted markdown
Has Israeli public opinion changed fundamentally since October 7, 2023?
Yes.
Before October 7, there was still a significant belief that Israel could protect itself primarily by defending its borders. Many Israelis believed that withdrawing from Gaza could eventually allow Palestinians there to concentrate on their economy and build a different future.
October 7 shattered much of that assumption.
Today, many Israelis believe that simply protecting the border is insufficient when missiles and drones can arrive from hundreds or thousands of kilometers away.
Children grow up hearing sirens and going into shelters. Israelis therefore increasingly see security as something that sometimes requires action beyond Israel’s immediate borders.
But there is another side to this.
Military operations have a human cost. Civilians and children are killed, and many Israelis are deeply troubled by that. There is also serious concern about the damage to Israel’s international image.
The dilemma is how to confront armed organizations while minimizing the suffering of civilians who are not involved in the fighting. There is no easy answer to that question. Pasted markdown
Has Israel itself become increasingly divided between liberal and secular Israelis on one side and nationalist, conservative and religious Israelis on the other?
Absolutely. That division exists.
In one sense, external attacks have united Israelis because people become dependent on one another when they feel threatened.
At the same time, domestic political divisions have become extremely intense.
Some of the deepest disagreements are not actually about Iran, Hezbollah or Hamas. They concern the character of Israel itself—the relationship between religion and the state, secular and religious Israelis, the ultra-Orthodox community and questions about the country’s political institutions.
So Israel can simultaneously become more united against an external threat and more divided internally. Pasted markdown
How much does Netanyahu personally determine Israel’s long-term foreign and security policy?
A different prime minister could certainly change some policies.
You might see a different approach toward settler violence, for example. You could also see different efforts to build relationships with Lebanon, Jordan, Egypt, Saudi Arabia and other countries.
But any Israeli prime minister will still have to deal with Iran, Hezbollah, Hamas and the Houthis.
Those problems do not disappear when a government changes.
So I think it is important to distinguish between Netanyahu’s policies and what has become a much broader Israeli security doctrine. Pasted markdown
Judicial reform deeply divided Israel before October 7. Could bringing it back to the center of politics deepen those divisions again?
Certainly. Judicial reform was extremely divisive, and I think the way it was originally pursued was a mistake.
But Israel today is overwhelmingly focused on security.
The central question is how Israelis can protect their children and their future while remaining humane and committed to democratic and Western values.
That is not an easy balance.
At the same time, Israel is trying to develop new regional relationships. Relations with Morocco and the UAE have expanded, and there have been efforts to develop ties or forms of cooperation with other actors in the region.
Those efforts matter because military power alone cannot create a stable Middle East. Pasted markdown
International public opinion, particularly in the West, has turned increasingly critical of Israel. Does that represent a strategic danger?
Of course it does.
Israel cannot ignore its international legitimacy or its relationships with Western societies.
But Israelis also ask themselves what the alternative is when they believe they are being attacked.
From their perspective, the choice cannot be between defending themselves and remaining popular internationally.
The real challenge is finding a way to provide security while reducing civilian suffering and preserving Israel’s legitimacy abroad. Pasted markdown
Beyond Netanyahu
Wegner’s argument provides an important window into a view that extends beyond Israel’s current governing coalition.
His contention is not that Israeli politics is united. Quite the opposite: Israel remains sharply divided over religion, the judiciary, settlements, the ultra-Orthodox community and the future character of the state. Those divisions remain central to the October 2026 election.
Rather, Wegner argues that October 7 produced a more durable change in Israeli thinking about security: the assumption that threats can simply be contained behind borders has lost credibility among a large part of Israeli society.
That does not settle the debate over whether Israel’s military actions are proportionate, effective or sustainable. Nor does it answer the profound questions surrounding Palestinian civilian casualties, Gaza’s future or the occupation and settlements in the West Bank.
But it suggests that international observers may misunderstand Israeli politics if they reduce the country’s current trajectory entirely to Netanyahu, Ben-Gvir or Smotrich.
For Wegner, Netanyahu is a political actor operating within a much larger transformation.
And that leads to perhaps the most consequential question raised by the interview:
If Netanyahu leaves office but the security consensus created by October 7 remains, how much of Israel’s regional policy would actually change?
Tom Wegner is the co-founder and CEO of the Abrahamic Movement and author of The Abrahamic Revolution. The organization describes itself as a grassroots initiative promoting dialogue and cooperation among Jews, Muslims, Christians and other communities across the Abrahamic world.
Cumali Onal is a journalist & Middle East Consultant covering Turkey, Egypt, Syria, Iraq, Sudan and Libya, with a focus on Kurdish affairs and the Sahel. Independent reporting and analysis.
