M. Ahmet Karabay
Erdogan regime in Turkey has long feared the Gezi Park protests back in 2014. The single man who sits in Beştepe Palace today only managed to hold onto his seat back then because of support from two powerful groups.
At the time, the “honeymoon phase” of the Solution Process with the Kurds was ongoing. The Gülen Movement hadn’t yet severed ties with the government. Members of the political group that now forms the DEM Party, concerned that it would harm the peace process, avoided joining the protests. Supporters of the Gülen Movement, particularly within law enforcement, saw the AKP government’s continuation as a matter of national survival. The Movement’s media largely shared a similar stance on the Gezi protests.
Had these two groups not stood by AKP, the protests that began on May 31, 2013, could have ended the AKP’s rule and marked the end of Erdoğan’s era. This is not just my personal opinion; I frequently heard similar assessments from senior AKP figures at the time.
Since then, the Gezi protests have turned into a paranoia for AKP and, especially, for Erdoğan. There has been an ever-present fear that protest movements would escalate into mass mobilizations targeting the government directly. The lingering wind of the so-called Arab Spring, which overthrew governments in the early 2010s, should not be overlooked when considering this paranoia.
As I prepared this piece, the Ministry of Interior announced that a trustee was appointed to Esenyurt Municipality. This historic note is timely, as leaders who took control of Turkey later adopted methods rooted in the old Union and Progress structure, which evolved into the “Deep State.” When it comes to employing these methods, Erdoğan’s predecessors are mere apprentices.
The DEM Party Officials Were Test Cases
The recent experiences of the elected DEM Party officials are fresh in the public’s mind. Representatives chosen by Kurdish voters—whether as local leaders or parliamentarians—were not seen as legitimate by Erdoğan’s autocratic rule. According to the ruling party, only AKP-elected officials could truly represent “the people.” This approach has persisted to this day.
Now, Erdoğan’s regime has turned its sights on CHP-led administrations. Esenyurt Mayor Ahmet Özer represents the symbolic “yellow ox” from the well-known fable. If the recently “normalized” CHP under Özgür Özel does not protest Özer’s imprisonment on flimsy grounds, it won’t be long before they, too, face similar treatment as DEM Party officials.
With a population of 978,000—larger than 57 Turkish provinces—Esenyurt is Turkey’s most populated district. Ahmet Özer was elected with a margin of over 45,000 votes. Today, this representative of the national will sits behind bars.
Merely seven months ago, government bodies deemed him eligible to run for office. Now, citing his academic work during the Solution Process as grounds, they have imprisoned him. What new excuses might be found for others in the future?
CHP’s Failure to Stand by Dismissed Public Servants Led to This Day
Tens of thousands of state employees were dismissed overnight by emergency decree (KHK). Many were not only deprived of their jobs but also imprisoned.
During his leadership, Kemal Kılıçdaroğlu made efforts to support those dismissed by KHK, but after facing government threats, he abandoned the cause. Özgür Özel, who came in as a “hawk,” turned into a “sparrow,” too afraid even to mention the KHK issue.
Although the opposition led by CHP emerged successfully from the last election, Özel’s incompetence has prevented them from taking initiative. This inaction has eroded public trust in politics, and the resulting disillusionment only aids those looking for alternative solutions. The lists of dismissed officials drawn up by AKP insiders today could very well be used against AKP itself in the future.
The biggest disservice CHP’s leadership has done to this country was undermining trust in politics after becoming the leading party in the March 31 elections. Unfortunately, they seem far from taking meaningful steps to address this issue.
If CHP fails to respond decisively to the detention of Esenyurt Mayor Ahmet Özer, it may soon lose the respect of its own base. And should İstanbul’s Mayor Ekrem İmamoğlu—a figure widely viewed as a beacon of hope—face similar targeting, it would spell disaster.
As I noted in my previous article, the Palace has transformed CHP leadership into sparrows under the guise of normalization and is pursuing a new Solution Process aimed at dividing the Kurdish political movement.
Those who hold power are not truly softening but, in fact, growing harsher. Those wondering “How much harder can they get?” should look not to countries with better democratic records but to those trailing behind—and to the Erdoğan of five, ten, and fifteen years ago.
