Turkey’s hundred-year political history has been woven with maps drawn at foreign tables, diplomatic engineering, and an unending search for legitimacy. The story that began with the order shaped by England after World War I continues today with a photo taken in the Oval Office in Washington. Yet one thing remains unchanged: Turkey has not been able to free itself from being a pawn on the chessboard played between England and the United States.
At the birth of the Republic, England’s role is often overshadowed in official historical narratives. Yet contemporaneous witnesses painted a different picture. Ellis Ashmead-Bartlett, a Daily Mail correspondent and the first Western journalist to notice Mustafa Kemal at Gallipoli, wrote in his book Extraordinary Correspondent not only about his military genius but also his pragmatism, which was ready to cooperate with England.
Another testimony appears in the memoirs of British intelligence officer John G. Bennett. As cited in Nezih Uzel’s book How I Gave Atatürk a Visa, Bennett claimed to have issued the “visa” necessary for Mustafa Kemal’s landing in Samsun, thereby contributing to the actual start of the National Struggle. Although this account is debated, it suggests that England’s tacit approval lay behind Ankara’s destiny.
British archival documents also reveal that London closely monitored the Ankara government, was concerned about its rapprochement with the Soviets, but considered the emergence of a central authority indispensable. The Treaty of Lausanne effectively sealed Turkey’s independence with England’s stamp.
Today, the words of U.S. Ambassador to Ankara Tom Barrack resonate as an echo of this historical tableau. In a recent speech, Barrack declared: “The Middle East? There is no real Middle East. The nation-state is something the British and French invented in 1916. With Sykes-Picot, they divided Ottoman lands with straight lines and called them nation-states.” But his most striking words were about Erdoğan: “What Turkey wants from the U.S. is not planes or tanks. What it needs is legitimacy. And President Trump gave Erdoğan exactly that with the Oval Office meeting.”
This confession—that what was once sought from England is now expected from Washington—exposes Turkey’s fragility in the balance of international power.
The price of that Oval Office photo was heavy. After Erdoğan’s meeting with Trump, Turkey placed an order for 225 Boeing planes, committing billions of dollars. Liquefied natural gas agreements bound Turkey to the American energy market. An F-16 package was raised, tightening Ankara’s dependence on American defense technology. The photo that pro-government media hailed as a “diplomatic victory” was in fact nothing more than a legitimacy seal purchased with strategic concessions.
Meanwhile, just before Erdoğan’s U.S. visit, MI6 chief Sir Richard Moore gave a striking speech in Istanbul. Praising Turkey’s critical role in NATO, Ukraine, and the Middle East, Moore’s speech was notable for being delivered without the knowledge of Turkey’s MIT. This was a challenge that broke intelligence protocol and carried the message: “Turkey remains within Britain’s historic sphere of influence, and the U.S. does not have a monopoly on granting Erdoğan legitimacy.”
Moore’s statement reflected the enduring British reflex to view Turkey as a “backyard” or “semi-colony.”
Following the Oval Office meeting, Erdoğan called the British Prime Minister to share the details of the meeting. This was not a mere courtesy call but had the flavor of an accounting—an act of having Washington’s legitimacy confirmed in London.
In my book Monser, I set out findings that help us better understand how Britain established influence from the Ottoman Empire to the Republic. One of Britain’s most important strategies was to secure influence not directly through political institutions, but through families and dynasties. In the Ottoman period, this occurred through palace families; in the early Republic, through bureaucratic and economic elites. Thus, without direct occupation, Britain managed to shape the country’s fate through “invisible bonds.” Today’s debates about legitimacy still echo this historical legacy.
Former MIT Undersecretary Sönmez Köksal’s interview adds another layer to this tableau. Köksal stated: “If Turkey manages a transfer of power with free, secure, multiparty elections like in 1947, it would have not only regional but global effects. This is the essence of the Republic: the possibility of peaceful power change.”
This statement was not merely personal—it also reflected the perspective of Encümen-i Daniş, the unofficial “deep state” council of which Köksal was known to be a member. Composed of retired generals, ambassadors, and senior bureaucrats, this body claimed to protect the Republic’s core parameters and always saw deviation from multiparty democracy as a “regime crisis.”
Köksal’s words, then, allow us to read today’s legitimacy debates not only as current power struggles but also through the eyes of the state’s old guard. On one side is the seal given by Britain a century ago; on the other, the Oval Office photo with Trump; between them, the call to London and the challenge of the MI6 chief in Istanbul. Turkey still stands in the middle of a legitimacy game played between England and the U.S.
Richard Moore’s presence near Erdoğan’s hotel in Marmaris on the night of July 15, 2016, shows that British intelligence was not merely observing developments in Turkey but was present at their very core. When combined with international allegations that the Erdoğan family was linked to British financial circles in the marketing of ISIS oil at the time, it becomes clear that darker networks of interest lurked behind Turkey’s legitimacy struggles.
The operations and purges against the Gülen Movement also unfolded not only under British interests but in the shadows of many global actors, reinforcing the reminder that Turkey remains a pawn in others’ games.
As Köksal’s Encümen-i Daniş perspective highlights, the real issue is the risk of closing the door that was opened in 1947. Unless Turkey derives legitimacy solely from the will of its people and from democratic values, it will not escape being a pawn in this century-long chess game.
