MELİKE DEMİR-TR724
From time to time, the Turkish Ministry of Justice brings public attention to its claim that Turkey’s compliance rate with judgments of the European Court of Human Rights (ECHR) stands at an impressive 91%, well above the European average. As in the Selahattin Demirtaş case, the Court’s binding rulings inevitably turn the spotlight back onto the Ministry.
But what is really happening behind the scenes of this complex legal struggle between Ankara and Strasbourg? Do the numbers truly tell the whole story?
When we look beyond the official narrative, we encounter a set of far more surprising—and troubling—truths about Turkey’s human rights record. Here are some of the most striking findings:
The 91% compliance rate is an illusion
What the Numbers Hide: “Leading Cases” and the Crisis of Quantity
At first glance, the 91% compliance rate cited by Minister of Justice Yılmaz Tunç seems encouraging, particularly compared to the Council of Europe average of 79%. But this figure is misleading because it ignores a critical category: “leading cases.”
Leading cases don’t merely point to individual rights violations; they identify structural or systemic problems in a country’s legal system. They require not only compensation to a single victim but also deep legislative or judicial reforms.
According to figures cited by MP (and attorney) Mustafa Yeneroğlu based on Council of Europe data, Turkey’s compliance rate for these crucial leading cases is only 68%. With this figure, Turkey ranks 39th out of 47 European countries—13 points below the European average.
This reveals a kind of statistical distortion: Because Turkey faces an exceptionally high number of applications before the ECHR, compliance with a large volume of minor or easily resolved cases artificially inflates the overall rate.
A comparison makes this distortion obvious: Turkey currently has 448 unimplemented judgments, while Belgium—with similar general compliance rates—has only 25, and North Macedonia just 36. The sheer volume hides the depth of structural problems.
The ECHR diagnoses a “systemic problem” in the Turkish judiciary
ByLock Cases and a Warning of “Crimes Against Humanity”
The ECHR is no longer addressing only individual breaches of rights; it is now openly pointing to fundamental flaws in the functioning of the Turkish judiciary. The Court’s judgments in Yüksel Yalçınkaya v. Turkey and Demirhan and Others v. Turkey demonstrate this clearly.
These rulings highlight systemic issues in post–15 July 2016 prosecutions based on evidence such as ByLock usage, deposits in Bank Asya, enrolling children in certain schools, or membership in unions and associations. The Court concluded that these categories of evidence had been used in ways that violate the European Convention.
The scale of the problem is underscored by the approximately 8,500 pending applications before the ECHR involving similar complaints. The Demirhan judgment—finding a violation for 239 individuals within a single case—is unprecedented in the Court’s history and illustrates the immense scope of the issue.
International reactions further highlight the gravity of the matter. The UN Working Group on Arbitrary Detention (UNWGAD) warned that such widespread and systematic detentions in Turkey could amount to crimes against humanity under international law. This suggests that the situation is no longer merely a matter of European Convention violations but may fall into the category of the gravest international crimes.
As the Turkish judiciary continues to struggle with this systemic collapse, the ECHR faces tens of thousands of similar applications. The Court’s own case-management mechanisms, designed to cope with extreme caseloads, are inadvertently obstructing a large group of victims in their quest for justice.
There is a law for implementing ECHR judgments—but no will to apply it
The Dysfunction of the “Retrial” Mechanism
It is a common misconception that Turkey fails to implement ECHR judgments due to a gap in domestic law. In fact, Turkish law provides a specific mechanism for this: the retrial (yargılamanın yenilenmesi) procedure.
This mechanism, found in criminal, civil, and administrative procedural codes, allows domestic courts to reopen cases when the ECHR finds a violation and to issue new judgments remedying that violation.
Yet, despite this legal clarity, the mechanism is consistently refused in politically sensitive cases such as those of Osman Kavala, Selahattin Demirtaş, and Yüksel Yalçınkaya. The law is clear, the path exists, but judicial and political authorities simply refuse to use it.
This shows that the problem is not a legal loophole but a rule-of-law crisis. In an environment where judicial independence has eroded and political power overrides legal norms, even the best-designed legal mechanisms cannot function. The issue is not the absence of law but the presence of a political will that subordinates the rule of law to political loyalty.
Conclusion: A Deepening Crisis of Law
Turkey’s relationship with ECHR judgments has evolved far beyond normal compliance practice; it has become a pattern of selective implementation shaped by political convenience.
Today, the non-implementation of ECHR rulings is not only a breach of international obligations; it is also a mirror reflecting the erosion of the rule of law inside the country. A state that disregards ECHR judgments inevitably disregards its own constitution, its own laws, and its own judicial safeguards.
Failing to activate the retrial mechanism is not merely sidelining Strasbourg—it is suspending Turkey’s own legal norms. Such a situation is unsustainable. When illegality becomes chronic, the cost is not paid in foreign policy, but in the country’s social fabric, economic stability, and institutional legitimacy.
This brings us to the central question:
How much longer can Turkey bear the weight of this illegality?
Because ignoring ECHR decisions generates an internal tension that corrodes Turkey’s constitutional order and democratic institutions. This tension accumulates across many spheres: political crises, economic vulnerabilities, social polarization, and widespread distrust in the judiciary.
History teaches us one thing:
When the amount of illegality within a legal system exceeds a certain threshold, the system collapses even without external intervention—because once the public’s trust is gone, the system simply stops functioning.
Thus, the solution lies not in external pressure or international sanctions, but in producing, within Turkey, the political, social, and institutional will to rebuild the rule of law.
Otherwise, the problem will not remain a mere human-rights issue; it will turn into a full-scale crisis of state capacity and legitimacy—one that will shape Turkey’s future for years to come.
