Turkey’s financial markets have experienced more than an abrupt stock-market correction over the past several days. The turmoil has exposed a much deeper problem of institutional credibility that has been accumulating for years.
At first glance, the sequence appears to be a technical liquidity squeeze. Some investment funds could not meet investors’ redemption requests. To raise cash, fund managers began selling shares they could readily dispose of. Those sales pushed prices lower, encouraging further withdrawals and setting off a self-reinforcing cycle.
Yet the episode reported across the international financial press is not simply another bout of market volatility. The emerging picture suggests that certain funds accumulated unusually concentrated positions in thinly traded shares, helping drive up their quoted prices. Those paper gains attracted new investors, but once redemptions accelerated, the inflated valuations could not be converted into cash without causing prices to collapse.
It would therefore be premature to describe what is happening as a currency or banking crisis. But it raises a more consequential question: Is Turkey’s appearance of financial stability supported by credible market institutions, or has part of that stability depended on weak supervision, administrative intervention and losses that were allowed to remain hidden?
How the turmoil began
The visible trigger was an announcement by Pusula Portföy, a major Turkish asset manager, that it could not satisfy redemption requests from some of its investment funds. Investors reportedly withdrew roughly $1 billion from Turkish funds on September 16. The BIST 100 fell more than 5 percent that day, while its cumulative weekly decline at one point exceeded 8 percent. Financial Times
At the center of the turmoil were funds that had built exceptionally large positions in companies with limited free floats and low trading volumes. In such shares, relatively small transactions can produce dramatic price movements. Repeated purchases by funds holding the same or affiliated stocks can lift market prices; those higher prices, in turn, increase the reported net asset values and returns of the funds.
As the funds reported extraordinary gains, more investors were attracted to them. The new money enabled managers to buy more of the same shares, pushing prices and published fund returns higher still.
On paper, everyone appeared to be winning. But much of the apparent wealth did not arise from broadly traded assets whose valuations had been tested by a deep market. It depended on the last quoted prices of securities for which there might be very few buyers.
When fresh inflows slowed and existing investors demanded their money back, the weakness of the structure became visible. A fund could show billions of lira in assets on its balance sheet, yet be unable to sell those assets at anything close to their stated valuations. That is the essence of a liquidity crisis: assets may exist, but the market needed to turn them into cash at their recorded prices does not.
This helps explain why the international press has used the term “Ponzi-like.” Still, it is important to distinguish an economic resemblance from a definitive legal finding. Investigations have not yet established that the entire structure constituted a classic Ponzi scheme. What is evident is a mechanism that functioned as long as new money entered and quoted asset prices remained elevated—and began to buckle when redemptions accelerated.
Why did sound companies fall as well?
The sell-off was not confined to the illiquid or allegedly manipulated stocks at the heart of the controversy. Funds in need of immediate cash sold the assets for which buyers still existed.
If a portfolio contains a highly valued speculative stock that cannot be sold without causing its price to collapse, as well as shares in major banks and industrial companies with deep liquidity, the manager will initially sell the liquid blue-chip holdings to meet redemptions. The troubled assets remain in the portfolio while fundamentally stronger companies come under selling pressure.
This produces a misleading but dangerous result. Although the original problem may be concentrated among a limited number of funds and thinly traded shares, the need for cash pushes the entire index lower. As prices fall, investors who purchased shares with borrowed money face margin calls. Forced liquidations then produce further declines, which trigger still more margin calls.
Financial fires frequently spread not because the worst assets can be sold, but because the best and most liquid ones are sold first.
Ankara’s extraordinary intervention
The scale of the authorities’ response demonstrates that this was not regarded as an ordinary day of market volatility.
Turkey’s central bank increased repo funding to 300 billion lira and raised interbank borrowing limits to keep liquidity circulating. The Capital Markets Board, known by its Turkish initials SPK, suspended trading in funds operated by seven asset-management companies and ordered the liquidation of roughly 130 funds.
According to figures reported by Reuters, the affected funds had combined portfolios of approximately 891 billion lira, or $21.4 billion, and some 353,000 investors. Estimates vary depending on which funds and accounts are included, but there is no dispute that the episode involves hundreds of thousands of investors and assets worth many billions of dollars. Reuters
İşbank and state-controlled Ziraat Bank were assigned roles in a liquidation process expected to take as long as three months. Regulators also temporarily lowered the minimum equity-maintenance requirement for margin trading from 35 percent to 20 percent. The purpose was clear: slow redemptions, reduce forced selling and prevent a disorderly liquidation from spreading across the market.
The SPK also filed criminal complaints against 38 individuals over suspected manipulation involving shares in Katılımevim, Gündoğdu Gıda and Destek Finans Faktoring. It imposed two-year trading bans on the individuals and on Pusula Portföy. Several executives linked to the affected financial groups have reportedly been arrested, while others face travel restrictions and asset freezes. Reuters
The intervention achieved an immediate objective. After the initial plunge, the BIST 100 rebounded. But temporarily stabilizing prices is not the same as restoring confidence.

Did the new regulations cause the crisis—or expose it?
Some accounts have blamed regulatory changes introduced in August for triggering the turmoil. This is technically true but analytically incomplete.
The new rules restricted how much exposure funds could maintain to related, concentrated and illiquid shares. When managers began reducing excessive positions to comply, they discovered—or were forced to acknowledge—that many of the securities could not be sold at their published valuations.
The regulations did not create the underlying fragility. They exposed it.
If a financial structure can survive only while it remains lightly supervised and new investors continue to provide cash, enforcement is not the true cause of its collapse. The cause lies in the unhealthy structure that had already been constructed.
The more troubling question is how long the authorities had known about the problem.
Finance Minister Mehmet Şimşek acknowledged as early as November 2025 that certain investment funds were being used in market-manipulation schemes and promised tougher penalties and closer supervision. Reuters
In June 2026, global index provider MSCI warned of recurring signs of potentially coordinated trading involving investment funds, insufficient transparency regarding beneficial ownership and uncertainty over the actual free float of Turkish-listed companies. MSCI demanded “tangible and credible progress” by its November review and raised the possibility of reconsidering Turkey’s treatment within its indices. MSCI
S&P Dow Jones Indices separately placed Turkey under review for a possible downgrade from emerging-market to frontier-market status, citing transparency and accessibility concerns.
The present crisis, coming after those warnings, suggests not that regulators were entirely unaware of the danger, but that effective intervention came too late.
The speculative economy created by inflation
The fund scandal cannot be separated from Turkey’s prolonged high-inflation environment.
Inflation does more than raise consumer prices. It changes how households save. When people believe bank deposits will not preserve their purchasing power, they seek refuge in foreign currency, gold, equities, cryptocurrencies or funds advertising unusually high returns. Savers are no longer primarily trying to increase their wealth; they are trying to prevent it from evaporating.
In that environment, funds publishing extraordinary monthly or annual gains become irresistible, particularly to retail investors. Questions about how the returns were generated, how liquid the underlying assets were and how much risk was being assumed receive less attention. A steadily rising fund price is treated as proof of professional management and security.
Inflation therefore drives savings away from productive, long-term investment and toward financial speculation. Gains unsupported by productivity, technology or genuine corporate growth become normalized. Investors ask how many consecutive limit-up days a stock has recorded rather than what the company produces. They focus on what a fund earned last month rather than what assets it owns.
Turkey’s fund turmoil is consequently not only a story about allegedly unscrupulous managers. It is also a product of an economic environment shaped by persistent inflation, currency distrust and the shortage of savings instruments that ordinary people regard as both safe and capable of preserving value.

A credibility test for Şimşek’s program
Mehmet Şimşek’s economic program was built largely around the restoration of credibility: a more predictable central bank, lower inflation, renewed foreign investment and a return to rules-based economic management.
The fund crisis tests the institutional rather than merely the monetary dimension of that program.
A country can increase its policy rate, reduce its budget deficit and rebuild foreign-exchange reserves. But it cannot attract stable, long-term capital if investors do not believe that securities are priced honestly, related-party transactions are properly monitored and minority or retail investors are protected.
For foreign institutions, the central issue is not simply the loss of several billion dollars. It is whether regulators can enforce market rules independently of commercial or political connections. If funds were allowed for an extended period to sustain one another’s valuations through concentrated trades in illiquid securities, the problem extends beyond individual misconduct. It becomes a question of regulatory capacity and institutional independence.
Şimşek’s message that the problem is contained and manageable may reduce immediate panic. Available evidence also suggests that Turkey is not currently facing a generalized banking crisis. But describing the affected segment as roughly 10 percent of the investment-fund industry hardly makes it insignificant. Financial contagion travels through confidence as well as balance sheets.
Is this an economic crisis?
Three different concepts need to be separated.
First, Turkey is clearly experiencing a capital-market and investment-fund crisis. Funds have failed to meet redemptions, trading has been suspended and an extraordinary collective liquidation has been ordered.
Second, there is not yet evidence of a banking crisis. There has been no indication of a generalized inability by banks to honor deposits, widespread credit losses or a breakdown in the interbank payments system.
Third, whether the episode becomes a broader macroeconomic crisis will depend on confidence. The risk would rise if redemptions spread beyond the affected companies, foreign investors began rapidly cutting Turkish exposure, pressure intensified on the lira or public institutions resorted to opaque rescue operations.
One of the most serious dangers is that losses could be concealed rather than recognized—quietly transferred onto public banks, the Treasury or other state-controlled balance sheets. Such a strategy could stabilize markets in the short term, but it would socialize private losses and encourage similar risk-taking in the future.
What should investors watch next?
Five developments will reveal the true scale of the crisis:
- Whether redemptions remain confined to funds associated with the seven affected asset managers;
- How closely liquidation prices correspond to the values previously reported by the funds;
- Whether banks or public institutions absorb part of the losses;
- The effect of foreign outflows on the lira, bond yields and central-bank reserves;
- Whether the SPK investigations extend beyond a limited group of managers to examine earlier supervisory failures.
If these indicators stabilize, the episode may remain a painful but manageable cleanup of Turkey’s capital markets. If they deteriorate, the fund crisis could become the starting point of a broader loss of confidence in the country’s economic management.
The real crisis is confidence in prices
The most important consequence of the latest turmoil is not the number of points lost by the BIST 100. It is whether investors can continue to believe that the prices appearing on their screens were genuinely formed in a functioning market.
If share prices were elevated through coordinated transactions, if fund returns depended on paper valuations of assets that could not be sold and if regulators intervened only after withdrawals began, the problem is no longer technical. It becomes an institutional crisis of trust.
Ankara can inject liquidity and halt a panic. It can liquidate funds to contain the fire. It can arrest executives and demonstrate that those responsible are being punished.
But confidence cannot be restored through liquidity alone. The authorities must disclose which funds were connected to which companies, how valuations were inflated, why regulators failed to act earlier despite repeated warnings and who will ultimately bear the losses produced by the liquidation.
Turkey’s economy has for years been debated through the familiar categories of interest rates, inflation and the exchange rate. The latest crisis has exposed something more fundamental.
The scarcest resource in an economy is not foreign currency. It is trust.
And trust cannot be printed by a central bank.




