Professor Eyal Zisser of Tel Aviv University tells Politurco that Ankara’s “Terror-Free Türkiye” initiative could eventually reshape regional alignments—but says Israel is still waiting for concrete action and that growing Turkish-Israeli friction in Syria remains the immediate test.
POLITURCO INTERVIEW
Turkey’s renewed Kurdish initiative has entered a decisive phase. Officially described by President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan’s government as the “Terror-Free Türkiye” process, the effort seeks to convert the Kurdistan Workers’ Party’s declared dissolution and disarmament into a new legal and political framework.
In August 2026, legislation setting out procedures for the suspension of certain investigations, prosecutions and sentences linked to the PKK/KCK took effect. Implementation remains conditional on Turkish security institutions verifying that the organization has ended its activities and surrendered its weapons. Ankara presents the process not merely as a domestic counterterrorism measure but as a project capable of strengthening Turkey internally and altering the security environment in Syria, Iraq and the wider region.
The implications extend well beyond Turkey’s borders. A durable settlement could affect the future of Kurdish actors in Syria and Iraq, Turkey’s relations with Washington, the balance between Ankara and Tehran, refugee movements, postwar reconstruction and the evolving political order in Damascus. It could also influence Israel’s security calculations at a moment when Israeli-Turkish competition in Syria has become increasingly visible.
Politurco spoke with Professor Eyal Zisser, a professor of Middle Eastern and African History at Tel Aviv University and a prominent specialist on Syria and the modern Middle East, about how the process is viewed in Israel, whether it could create new opportunities for regional stability, and why the gap between President Erdoğan’s declarations and actions remains central to Israeli assessments.
Zisser’s conclusion is cautious: the process may ultimately have strategic consequences, but Israeli policymakers are not yet convinced that Ankara’s rhetoric has been translated into an enduring change of policy.
“The regional dimension cannot be ignored”
Politurco: How do Israeli political leaders, diplomats, security officials, academics and other influential circles interpret the significance of Turkey’s Kurdish initiative? Is it regarded primarily as a domestic Turkish matter, or as a process with wider consequences for Israel and the region?
Prof. Eyal Zisser: On one level, many aspects of the initiative are clearly connected to domestic politics and may have little immediate effect outside Turkey. Nevertheless, the process is unfolding amid major regional changes.
The Syrian regime collapsed, creating new room for maneuver. Saudi Arabia is seeking additional security support, while Turkey and Pakistan are presenting themselves as potential partners. These developments show that the initiative cannot be understood solely through a domestic lens. It also affects the regional balance.
When assessing Erdoğan’s policies, however, we repeatedly encounter a gap between rhetoric and action. His discourse and declarations can be ambitious, while the steps taken on the ground remain cautious. This is therefore a developing story, and we need to wait and see what it produces.
If Erdoğan feels more secure and politically stronger, he may move from declarations to action. That possibility is something Israel and every other regional actor will follow closely.
Politurco: In other words, Israel is waiting for concrete results before drawing conclusions?
Zisser: Yes. At this stage, concrete results matter more than declarations.
Washington remains the principal restraining power
Politurco: From Israel’s perspective, what wider effects could follow if the process succeeds? Could it contribute to greater political and security stability across the Middle East, and which regional actors would be most affected?
Zisser: The United States must be considered first. Washington still has significant influence over both Turkey and Israel. It can communicate with both governments and contain limited tensions or conflicts. Its role is important because it can restrain some of the ambitions and actions of both sides.
The relevant region is the Greater Middle East, including Greece and Cyprus. Both are non-Arab and predominantly non-Muslim states that watch Turkey carefully. They are part of NATO’s broader security environment, but they are also directly involved in regional disputes and tensions.
Then there is Syria, whose new government has developed a close relationship with Erdoğan. I would describe Damascus as an ally of Ankara—not a puppet, but certainly an ally.
Other Arab governments have become more willing to engage Turkey but remain suspicious. Egypt is a good example. Cairo may be prepared to cooperate with Ankara, yet the legacy of Turkey’s support for the Muslim Brotherhood means that genuine trust has not been restored.
The Gulf states are also important. Their relations with Turkey have improved, and they are more willing to cooperate than in the past. Yet we still need to distinguish symbolic declarations and limited economic cooperation from a deeper strategic partnership.
Relations are improving, but at present I would not go further than that.
Does Washington influence the Kurdish process?
Politurco: Does the United States directly support or encourage Turkey’s “Terror-Free Türkiye” process?
Zisser: I cannot say with confidence. The United States generally avoids direct involvement in such domestic political issues unless they develop into a conflict or threaten American interests.
There may be understandings connected to the regional dimensions of the Kurdish question, particularly in Syria. But as long as Washington does not regard the process as a threat, a challenge or a development damaging to American interests, I do not think it will make the initiative a central concern.
Syria is the immediate test
Politurco: Given Israel’s geographic, political, economic, security and humanitarian interests in Syria, what risks could a change in Turkey’s Kurdish policy create for Syrian stability, refugee movements and the prospects for a broader regional settlement?
Zisser: The United States is trying to build a deconfliction mechanism that can promote coordination—or at least contain tensions—among Turkey, Israel and Syria. That is important. Even a limited understanding, rather than a comprehensive agreement, could reduce the danger of incidents and unintended escalation.
At present, however, there is a serious political gap, no genuine agreement and considerable mistrust. Under those conditions, even local events can lead to military incidents.
If Turkey intends to assume a much larger role in Syria, it will need to operate within a general understanding involving both the United States and Israel. Ordinary humanitarian activity, such as delivering food, is unlikely to create a major dispute. But any expanded military or strategic role would require communication, agreed boundaries or at least a practical framework for avoiding confrontation.
A long-term question, not an immediate strategic shift
Politurco: How might a successful process reshape the balance among Turkey, Iran, Syria, the Gulf states and other regional actors? Could it alter alliances and zones of competition in ways that create opportunities—or new pressure—for Israel?
Zisser: The process is still at an early stage. In the long term, it may become a significant subject for strategic analysis. In the short term, however, I do not believe Israel should regard it as an immediate cause for alarm.
Its eventual importance will depend on whether Turkey’s domestic initiative produces a durable political settlement, how it affects Ankara’s approach to Kurdish actors beyond its borders and whether it changes Turkey’s behavior in Syria and Iraq. Those consequences cannot yet be measured.
Political agreement must precede economic opportunity
Politurco: Could developments involving Turkey, Syria, Iraq and the Kurdish question generate new opportunities for Israel in trade, transportation, reconstruction, energy, tourism or investment? What political and security conditions would be necessary?
Zisser: In the past, there was a belief that political relations and economic relations could proceed on separate tracks. Governments could disagree politically while trade and investment continued to advance independently.
That model is no longer functioning effectively in the region. Today, political understanding must come first. Only after a basic political framework has been established can the parties seriously discuss transportation, energy, reconstruction or other forms of economic cooperation.
At the moment, I do not see the necessary political understanding emerging.
Israeli elections could change the calculation
Politurco: Which indicators should observers monitor in the coming years? Which outcome—full success, limited progress, deadlock or renewed conflict—would have the greatest consequences for Israel, and how is Israel preparing for these possibilities?
Zisser: We need to wait, partly because Israel is approaching elections and a change of government could alter the country’s regional posture.
The present government is very right-wing. In my view, it does not believe sufficiently in dialogue, frequently relies on force, and often behaves like a regional bully. It is deeply distrustful and pursues political objectives that many countries in the region consider unacceptable.
A change of government could open new opportunities. Even the current government could create movement if it revised some of its policies. The region contains many possible openings, but at present the diplomatic environment is largely stuck.
Was Israel’s strike near the Turkish border a warning to Ankara?
Politurco: Israel recently struck a Syrian airbase near the Turkish border. Was the attack intended as a message to Ankara? Are Israel and Turkey moving toward war?
Zisser: First, Israel is moving toward elections, and governments often want to project strength in such periods.
Second, Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu has made Israel’s position clear: Israel does not want Turkish forces deployed in Syria and is prepared to act against such a deployment. The strike was therefore an unmistakable message to Ankara.
But the United States remains above both countries in the regional power structure. Israel pays close attention to what Washington—and President Donald Trump—will or will not accept. That makes it possible to contain the confrontation.
I do not believe war is in the interest of either Israel or Turkey. The greater risk is not a deliberate decision to begin a war, but an incident caused by mistrust, overlapping military activity and the absence of reliable coordination. This is precisely why an American-backed deconfliction mechanism is so important.
From a domestic initiative to a regional test
Turkey’s Kurdish initiative may have begun as a response to a conflict rooted in the country’s domestic politics, but its ultimate consequences will depend heavily on developments beyond Turkey’s borders. The future of Kurdish forces in Syria, Ankara’s influence over Damascus, Washington’s regional role and the trajectory of Turkish-Israeli rivalry will all shape the process.
For Israel, the central question is not simply whether the PKK disarms. It is whether the process makes Turkey more predictable and internally stable—or gives Ankara greater freedom to expand its military and political influence across Syria and the wider region.
For now, the Israeli assessment presented in this interview remains deliberately restrained: watch the actions, not the declarations; follow Syria more closely than the rhetoric coming from Ankara; and judge the process by whether it produces a genuine political transformation rather than a tactical pause.
