Cuma Cicek*
The dynamics behind the “State Initiative,” launched by Bahçeli during the Turkish Parliament’s opening on October 1, 2024, have become clearer in the past week following the fall of the Assad regime.
While previous discussions on Bahçeli’s initiative emphasized internal dynamics, external factors were often highlighted as well. Exploiting the “military and political opportunity” created by Hamas’s attack on October 7, 2023, Israel has dealt significant blows to the “Axis of Resistance” led by Iran in several areas. Israel’s actions have severely weakened Hamas in Gaza and Hezbollah in Lebanon while dismantling Iranian positions in Syria.
Regional Transformation: The Second Wave
The fall of the Assad regime in Syria on December 8, 2024, and the takeover of the central government by Hay’at Tahrir al-Sham (HTS) mark the second phase of the regional transformations initiated on October 7, 2023. In other words, the consequences of Assad’s fall have the potential to bring about changes at the regional level, on par with the results of Israel’s war against the Gaza-Lebanon-Iran axis.
The keys to understanding this potential lie in HTS’s rapid march—within 12 days—from Idlib to the capture of Aleppo, Hama, Homs, and Damascus with little resistance, culminating in the collapse of the Assad regime.
As Barış Özkul elaborates, HTS’s advance and the fall of the Assad regime were partly driven by internal dynamics. However, the primary factor was a tacit agreement among the global powers conducting proxy wars in the region. The main driver of Assad’s downfall appears to be an understanding between the U.S. and Russia. Russia’s failure to provide the expected support to Assad, despite having the capacity to halt HTS’s advance, while protecting its naval bases in the Mediterranean, alongside Israel’s strategic priorities being met, are significant indicators of this understanding.
This shift in Russian policy must also be seen in light of the Ukraine war, as negotiations and agreements likely included Ukraine. It is highly probable that the first repercussions of these changes in Syria will be observed on the Ukrainian front.
Israel Expands Its Sphere of Influence
Israel’s primary regional strategy is to weaken the “Axis of Resistance” led by Iran. With Iran’s cross-border operational capacity significantly diminished and the Assad regime toppled, the new political and military configuration in the region appears to favor Israel.
The fall of Damascus to HTS has resulted in Iran and its ally Hezbollah losing the war in Syria entirely. Israel, which has long claimed the Golan Heights as its “eternal and inseparable territory,” is now positioned within 20 km of Damascus while continuing attacks to dismantle Syria’s military infrastructure. In short, the Netanyahu administration has seized upon the fall of Assad as a military and political opportunity, significantly expanding its sphere of influence.
Ankara Back at the Table
In addition to Israel, the new equation emerging in Damascus offers Ankara opportunities to regain its status as a key player in Syria. While Turkey has long operated within the constraints of the U.S.-Russia balance, it has often acted more as a spoiler than a game-changer. Now, Turkey’s room for maneuver has widened. As Russia and Iran withdraw from Syria, Turkey remains the only major power in the field besides the U.S. and Israel.
The acceleration of Syrian refugees returning home represents a major political gain for both the Erdoğan administration and Ankara in general. Given the expected rise in repatriation, the government may alleviate domestic pressures stemming from the refugee crisis, which has become a significant electoral risk for the ruling coalition.
Furthermore, Turkey now has an opportunity to shrink the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF)-controlled Rojava region in geographical, demographic, political, administrative, economic, and military terms. The SDF’s withdrawal from Tell Rifaat and Manbij, the severing of logistical links between Kurds in Aleppo and Rojava, and ongoing discussions over Raqqa and Deir ez-Zor signal Ankara’s intentions to curtail the influence of Rojava with the help of the Syrian National Army (SNA). Erdoğan’s statements and messages from Ankara already make this objective clear.
Ankara’s Constraints and Turkey’s Risks
However, Turkey’s gains are relative and limited and come with significant risks. The most concerning is the potential threat posed by extremist Islamist groups like ISIS and al-Qaeda-affiliated organizations, which now hold power in neighboring Syria. In the medium and long term, this scenario could destabilize Turkey by escalating uncertainties and risks.
Celebrations in Turkey following Assad’s fall revealed significant sympathy among Syrians in Turkey for these extremist groups. Considering that a substantial portion of this population will remain in Turkey, the rise of radical Islamism poses a medium-term risk within the country.
Beyond the dangers of radical Islamism, the U.S.-Russia consensus itself delineates Turkey’s boundaries in Syria. Turkey’s ability to reassert itself as a game-changer depends on aligning with this consensus.
These limits are particularly evident in the differences and boundaries between the SNA and HTS. While the U.S. and Russia raised no objections to the SNA’s entry into Tell Rifaat and Manbij, the SNA was excluded from operations targeting Aleppo, Hama, Homs, and Damascus. The interim government established by HTS also excludes the SNA. The future of relations between HTS and the SNA remains uncertain and fraught with risks, especially when considered alongside the Rojava issue.
Ankara and the “External Kurdish Issue”
A key question remains: Does Turkey’s strategy for Rojava include reconciliation with a diminished and restricted Kurdish entity, or does it aim for the outright elimination of Rojava, excluding Syrian Kurds from the new central government in Damascus?
Examining U.S. policy since 2011, it seems unlikely that Washington will abandon Rojava. As seen in Iraq after the Gulf War, where the U.S. supported Iraqi Kurdistan’s de facto autonomy despite Turkey’s objections, and later its formal recognition post-2003, the U.S.’s presence in the region is likely permanent.
Over the past decade, the U.S. has managed to maintain relations with Ankara while supporting the Kurdish administration in Rojava. Washington has neither unconditionally opened the way for the Kurds nor fully acceded to Turkey’s demands to abandon Rojava. Instead, the U.S. appears to favor a cooperative relationship between Ankara and the Syrian Kurds.
This balance may continue for some time, depending on Turkey’s preferences. However, the new dynamics in Syria are pushing both Iraqi and Syrian Kurds closer to Israel along a southern axis, especially as Iran’s regional influence wanes. Statements from Israeli officials reinforce this possibility.
In summary, Turkey’s decisions will shape the medium- and long-term trajectory of the Kurdish issue across borders, determining whether this historical opportunity for peace is seized or squandered.
The Grand State Initiative and Our Small Lives
At this juncture, Ankara could view the rising Kurdish dynamic in the region not as a threat but as an opportunity, fostering friendly relations with Syrian and Iraqi Kurds to address the Kurdish issue across borders. Such a political choice could end the long-standing conflict, alleviating losses and suffering, and transform Turkey into a regional economic and political hub.
This strategy would also contribute to rebuilding Iraq and Syria. Iraq remains unstable 21 years after Saddam Hussein’s fall, and Syria’s civil war has dragged on for 13 years. Achieving reconciliation and stability in these neighboring countries could enable millions of people who have suffered immense loss to make a fresh start. It would also facilitate the repatriation and reintegration of Syrian refugees in Turkey, helping them rebuild their lives.
However, if Ankara continues to perceive the Kurdish issue primarily as a security risk, this historic window of opportunity could close, leaving the Kurdish issue as a persistent source of conflict. In such a scenario, the Kurdish issue would remain a functional political investment for both regional and global actors, and instability could persist in Syria, as it has in Iraq.
Turkey undoubtedly has the military, political, economic, and diplomatic capacity to contain Kurdish politics on a regional scale. Yet, given the Kurdish population, geography, mobilization capacity, historical tradition of resistance, and the new dynamics of regional alliances, such a choice would only delay the problem.
While delay may buy Turkey time, it will come at increasing social, economic, and political costs. These costs will not only be borne by cities like Diyarbakır, Mardin, Van, Erbil, Qamishlo, and Mahabad but also by Ankara, Istanbul, Izmir, Damascus, Aleppo, Baghdad, Basra, and Tehran.
It is worth remembering that this burden will fall most heavily on ordinary people—especially the weakest among them: the poor, women, the elderly, children, and the disabled.
*Cuma Cicek is a prolific author and a columnist at Birikim Magazine.
*This article was originally published in Birikim Magazine in Turkish and translated into English by Politurco.
