Necip F. Bahadir
Turkey’s DEM delegation has completed its first round of talks. Ahmet Türk, who was removed from office in Mardin, gained prominence in Ankara and became a permanent member of the delegation. The delegation met with all parties in parliament, from the Speaker of the Parliament to the MHP, from the CHP to the Saadet Party, at the leadership level. Only the AKP received DEM with a “low profile.” Erdoğan did not attend the meeting.
Aside from the İYİ Party, no one completely shut their doors to DEM. This should be noted as a “positive development” for the process. Almost all parties are ready to contribute to the “process.” But the real question is: What process? There is visible activity, but it has no name. Bahçeli stated, “There is no new resolution or opening process.” AKP’s Abdullah Güler said, “This is not a resolution process!”
So, what is it? It is true that this is a development initiated by Bahçeli’s initiative and willpower. The AKP could not remain indifferent; Erdoğan could not say “no” to his partner. The political cost of opposing it was too high, and Erdoğan couldn’t take that risk. Bahçeli demanded it, the delegation went to İmralı, met with Öcalan, and returned with messages.
Who is the recipient of İmralı’s messages? The MHP? Parliament? Or the Saadet Party?
Is Everything Going Well?
None of them. There is only one recipient: AKP and Erdoğan. Other parties are mere “props” at best. Let’s not belittle them that much—they can only take on a position of facilitation. But even that is unlikely. On such an issue, failing to adopt a political stance and attitude would be against the nature of things. Which party can remain “neutral”? Can an issue with repercussions among party bases, in the streets, and in society be insulated from being turned into “political material or capital”? Certainly not.
What did the DEM delegation discuss with the political parties? Did separate messages come from İmralı for each party? Has anything substantial been added since the initial statement? Were Öcalan’s demands discussed? No one knows. It is hard to believe that there were no leaks from so many extensive and crowded meetings. Perhaps the core issue wasn’t addressed, and only general outlines were discussed.
If we look at the statements made to the media, both the DEM delegation and all the parties are pleased with the meetings. Every sentence and word is loaded with “goodwill and a positive attitude.” Can we conclude from these brief and optimistic statements that “everything is going well”? I think not. The essence of the issue hasn’t been addressed. The most sensitive and critical matters haven’t been brought to the table.
For Example?
Will the parties say “yes” to a general amnesty that includes Öcalan and all political prisoners? Will the CHP, which says, “Respect the sensitivities of the martyrs,” support a “general amnesty”? Özgür Özel does not have a clear policy on this matter. What he says and means is unclear. Yet a left-wing party like the CHP should have a concern for “democratization and freedom.” It must.
Can Özgür Özel Propose a “Democratization Initiative”?
Does the CHP leadership not see that the “pulse of democracy” in the country is not beating? Are they unaware that freedoms are “almost nonexistent” and severely restricted? Is Özgür Özel unaware that prisons are overflowing? Most of the detainees and convicts are inside for “political reasons.” While Bahçeli is reversing his political stance to make an “Öcalan initiative,” can Özel not propose a “democratization initiative”?
What we call the “process” is directly related to “democratization.” It’s about rights and freedoms. Can there be a main opposition party that has no connection to democracy and freedoms? Can a left-wing party be imagined without such concerns? Even society, ordinary people on the street, demand democracy and freedoms more than the CHP and other parties. Rarely has the opposition in this country fallen so far behind the public.
In a country where democracy and freedoms have been eradicated, the issue of “general amnesty” never falls off the agenda. Turkey will inevitably head in that direction. Achieving societal peace and healing wounds is not possible otherwise. Don’t pay attention to AKP’s Güler, who says, “General amnesty is not currently on our agenda.” What he means is “not currently.” It doesn’t mean it won’t be in the future. Even in Güler’s statement, that door is left open. A similar statement was made by MHP’s Feti Yıldız: “The conditions for a general amnesty are not present.” How so? According to what, or whom, are they not present? He might be referring to the political climate. That too is a matter of will and timing.
A Process Without Erdoğan Won’t Work!
After noting the opposition’s policies disconnected from the realities of the country and society, we can return to the matter of the process. The burning question in Ankara is why Erdoğan did not meet with the DEM delegation. Why did the AKP not receive DEM at the leadership level? Is this a stance? What is the political significance? Surely it’s not without reason; there must be a justification. Could it be a result of his distant and reserved position from the start?
Erdoğan, who comments on almost every topic morning and night, has not said a word about “İmralı.” He hasn’t made any remarks or evaluations, not even a hint. He has been content with repeating his usual rhetoric on terrorism. It’s natural for the opposition to want to see Erdoğan’s move first. A process without Erdoğan cannot proceed. If there were an independent parliament capable of taking initiative and showing will, it might be different. But parliament is entirely under the influence of the AKP and Erdoğan. It’s no different from a notary.
Erdoğan didn’t meet with the DEM delegation, but he did meet with his partner Bahçeli. Again, there’s no statement beyond a photo and video. What they discussed and whether they agreed remains unknown. İmralı, Syria, and military operations are Ankara’s hottest topics. It’s not hard to guess that the 40-minute meeting revolved around these issues. But what was the outcome?
The DEM delegation will visit the prison over the weekend to meet with Selahattin Demirtaş and Figen Yüksekdağ. Bahçeli included İmralı in the discussions but explicitly excluded Demirtaş. Erdoğan’s personal grudge against Demirtaş is also well known. He’s still not over Demirtaş’s “We won’t make you president” declaration. Including Demirtaş in the delegation’s meeting traffic is important in this context. A process that excludes Demirtaş is unthinkable. Demirtaş’s influence in Kurdish communities is no less than Öcalan’s.
Based on DEM’s first-round meetings, it’s impossible to make a sound assessment of the process. The current landscape can be described as DEM and the MHP being “eager,” CHP and other opposition parties being “cautious,” and Erdoğan being “reluctant.” The real process will begin once Erdoğan shows his hand.
For now, we’re still in the prelude…
