The appointment of a trustee in place of CHP’s Esenyurt Mayor Ahmet Özer in Istanbul, Turkey, who was arrested on charges of “membership in a terrorist organization,” is a meticulously planned project by the regime. There’s no need for code-breaking here. Here’s what happened within 24 hours:
- Esenyurt was intentionally selected to be a focus area of “urban consensus” in the last local elections between the CHP and DEM Party.
- The split leadership within the CHP, with three factions, stoked divisions.
- The rivalry between Özgür Özel, Ekrem İmamoğlu, and Mansur Yavaş became more evident.
- It became clear that actions against İmamoğlu would be pursued not for the “fool case” but under “terror” charges.
- Mansur Yavaş, unhappy with the situation, began moving closer to splitting from the CHP.
- The notion that the CHP is a party without strategy or unity was further reinforced.
Since the immediate aftermath of the March 31 local elections, the initial victory celebration within the CHP has given way to a power struggle between Istanbul and Ankara mayors İmamoğlu and Yavaş, who have been competing for a presidential bid since 2019.
Party leader Özgür Özel tried to take advantage of this tension to create a space for himself. His lack of competence, however, has led the CHP into a directionless and fragmented state.
The reason for the regime’s rush is unclear, but the Esenyurt operation has brought the CHP’s internal issues to light. Özgür Özel didn’t consider canceling his programs in Ankara. Due to his ongoing appeals process, Ekrem İmamoğlu, who is facing a potential political ban, couldn’t give a strong reaction. Mansur Yavaş, who won Ankara with 60% in the last election, remained silent, only tweeting 28 hours after the operation: “No one has the freedom to commit crimes.” A puzzling statement, indeed.
The CHP and DEM Party formed an “urban consensus” during the last local elections, with Esenyurt as one of the regions where this cooperation was most visible. Ahmet Özer, selected as the candidate, was a bridge between the two parties. However, Ekrem İmamoğlu is making a misstep and knows it: “If we’re going to consider Ahmet Özer a ‘terrorist’ because he was seen as someone who could contribute to peace during the solution process, what are we going to do about the public officials who initiated the process?”
Let’s respond to İmamoğlu in his own words: The time for saying this has passed. The public already knows. In a street interview on T24, an elderly woman summarized it in two sentences: “If they knew, why did they let him get elected only to take him away afterward? Were they deceived, or are they always being deceived?”
The appointment of a trustee to Esenyurt is a blow to the strategic electoral alliance between the CHP and DEM Party, with two main objectives:
- To take action against İmamoğlu for “terror association” rather than the “fool case,” thereby deterring those who would support him as a victim.
- To provide an opportunity for Mansur Yavaş, who is critical of the “urban consensus,” to break away. Yavaş, who openly criticized Devlet Bahçeli’s recent “Öcalan statement,” is not hiding his intentions to run for president in the next election.
So, what will happen now?
If the CHP doesn’t establish a strong strategy, internal conflicts will weaken the party further. A comprehensive roadmap and effective action plan are needed.
The top brass of the CHP had adopted a secret agenda of “not pressing Erdoğan too hard” until the elections, but that’s not enough for the palace. This is what has left the headquarters stunned. Led by Özgür Özel, the party is essentially in a “What haven’t we given you?” mode.
The CHP is torn between waiting for Erdoğan and Bahçeli to leave power “naturally” (i.e., not through elections) and “stopping the erosion.”
In a few days, it will become clear. Özgür Özel will push for “normalization” politics, with his weak initial reaction in the first 24 hours as an indicator of this.
Former leader Kemal Kılıçdaroğlu proposed “sine-i millet” – a collective resignation from parliament. However, suggesting now what he should have done during his tenure carries little weight. Özgür Özel rejected it, claiming it was a trap.
This alone shows his intentions. If I’m not mistaken, the government will limit its operation to Ekrem İmamoğlu and his circle, with Özgür Özel maintaining his position as a leader who prevents the Istanbul conflict from spreading to Ankara.
The CHP’s historical role as a “crutch” in every critical period of AKP’s 22-year rule is no longer a secret. Previously, if the mayor’s seat was vacated, the municipal council would elect a new mayor.
With the “coup attempt” as a pretext, an emergency decree issued on August 15, 2016, reorganized this. If the mayor is targeted for “terrorism,” a trustee is appointed in their place. This was later enacted as a law by parliament, and the CHP did not see the need to bring it to the Constitutional Court, making the trustee system permanent. The practice, which was met with silence when it concerned Kurdish municipalities, is now impacting the CHP.
I don’t place much importance on Özgür Özel; he is a shallow character who failed the test, prioritizing personal career over the party and the country.
The CHP is at a crossroads too crucial to leave to petty ambitions. The trajectory is clear enough, yet there is almost no motivation to push the party leadership out of their comfort zones.
