M. Ahmet Karabay
In the coming period, it seems that there will be more surprises in politics than what we’ve left behind. You might immediately say, “There’s nothing surprising left in this country!” You wouldn’t be entirely wrong. But who knows what unopened doors there still are?
AK Parti is making an extraordinary effort to erase the memory of its historic defeat in the March 31 elections and to act as if it never happened. The Presidential Palace is functioning like a project production center. Erdoğan is pressing all the buttons at once in order to stay in power. He appears to be distributing favors to all parties while simultaneously engaging in high-level friction with them.
Those who don’t realize that Erdoğan is pressing the buttons randomly, or haphazardly, think he is making a single move.
DEM PARTY: By hinting at the possibility of initiating a new Peace Process, Erdoğan seems to be winking at DEM Party, a Kurdish political movement. Only the leaders of the DEM Party or Kurdish opinion leaders, who think they are being winked at, start talking about the virtues of the ‘peace process’.
CONFRONTATION WITH MHP: Erdoğan’s relationship with MHP, which has been tumultuous, took a significant hit after his meeting with CHP leader Özgür Özel following the local elections. Erdoğan cornered MHP using the murder of former Ülkü Ocakları President Sinan Ateş. There’s also the increasingly significant case involving the crime organization leader Ayhan Bora Kaplan.
Looking at the indictments in both cases, there seems to be no organic link established with MHP. However, very concrete evidence not included in the indictment was leaked to the media the day the case was accepted. By leaking documents to the public, distinct messages were sent both to the MHP leadership and the public.
Interior Minister Ali Yerlikaya’s visit to Devlet Bahçeli to discuss certain names related to the Sinan Ateş murder became public knowledge. Following this meeting, former MHP deputy Olcay Kılavuz, who was suggested to belong in the defendant’s chair, was distanced from his position in MHP.
No one would think that Yerlikaya, as a minister, went to Bahçeli without the Presidential Palace’s knowledge. It is very likely that the visit was made under the directive of the Palace. Thus, he intended to show Bahçeli that he was ready to make a significant move, while also implying, “If you cooperate, taking Olcay Kılavuz will suffice!”
CHP ATTRACTED BY THE BLUE BEADS: CHP management seems to be the most convinced by the blue beads distributed by President Tayyip Erdoğan, who also holds the chairmanship of AK Parti. Erdoğan met with CHP leader Özgür Özel, showing a different demeanor. He dismissed nearly all of Özel’s requests, only freeing the generals of February 28.
At AK Parti Headquarters, with a third-chair maneuver, Erdoğan conveyed the message that he had put Özgür Özel in his place, thus evaporating all the topics discussed.
The triple chair is concrete, but all the topics said to have been discussed are abstract. Moreover, Erdoğan’s side shared no information about the content, and everything we learned about the meeting depends on what the CHP side reported. None of the content might stick in the mind, but the empty chair remains etched in the memory.
THE MAIN GOAL IS TO BE RE-ELECTED
Looking at today’s claims that Erdoğan will form a coalition with CHP and include a few CHP members in the cabinet, it doesn’t seem very realistic. However, forming a coalition does not necessarily involve appointing ministers. In the presidential system, the ministers in the cabinet do not function as they do in a parliamentary system; they act more like the president’s secretaries.
MHP is currently in a coalition with AK Parti, but has no ministers in the cabinet. A potential alliance formed by CHP could be similar to the MHP-AK Parti coalition.
Erdoğan believes he can convince CHP’s new management to enable him to run again. If Erdoğan did not want to be a candidate himself, he would have started promoting a leader he thought had the notion of leadership.
He is using the constitutional amendment as a driving force and a cover to be re-elected. He is planning to overcome the limitation of being elected no more than twice by interpreting it as “contrary to the freedom to be elected” and aiming to run again.
ERDOĞAN, CHASING TWO CANDIDATES FROM CHP
Erdoğan has calculated something else. If the presidential election threshold is reduced to 40%, Erdoğan would be freed from carrying MHP as a burden. Erdoğan wants to pit CHP’s strong figures against each other.
In Beştepe’s equation, ensuring that Ankara Mayor Mansur Yavaş enters the presidential race is certain. Once Yavaş is secured, it no longer matters whether the other candidate is Istanbul Mayor Ekrem İmamoğlu or Özgür Özel.
If Erdoğan manages to produce two candidates from CHP, he firmly believes he will surpass 40+1% in the first round. Planning to run for president again, Tayyip Erdoğan wants the new constitution solely for this 40+1% condition.
All other reasons listed by Erdoğan are presented as a pretext for this 40+1% adjustment. The occupant of the Beştepe Palace plans to take the country to a referendum next year to get himself re-elected. Erdoğan, knowing he could make this journey with all parties, believes CHP will be the easiest to work with.
While discussing this topic, a friend said, “If Erdoğan was going to form an alliance with CHP, would he have prepared the national education curriculum this way?” I reminded him of what he said before Sweden’s NATO membership and said that the curriculum was prepared to strengthen his hand in negotiations.
