Russia has suffered a major setback in Syria—its gateway to the Middle East and Africa, and its only warm-water military base—and has begun withdrawing a significant portion of its forces from the country. This development stems from various factors, including the Ukraine war, Israel’s heavy blows against Hezbollah and Iran, and the years-long consolidation of Syrian opposition forces, partially due to Turkey’s tacit approval.
Now the question arises: Will Putin, who met with Erdoğan 69 times (24 in-person and 45 via phone) in the three years following the July 15 coup attempt, accuse him of betrayal again, saying, “You’ve stabbed me in the back once more!”?
Recall that after Turkish F-16 jets downed a Russian warplane in Syrian airspace in 2015, Putin said, “We were stabbed in the back!” and imposed a year-long food and tourism embargo on Turkey.
The silence from Putin and other senior Russian officials following the failure in Syria is being interpreted as a sign of deep anger in Moscow. Particularly striking are the remarks by Russian political scientist Aleksandr Dugin, who holds sway in certain Turkish circles, accusing Erdoğan of “betraying Russia” and warning, “He will pay the price!” These statements suggest that Putin may seek revenge on Erdoğan.
Yet only a month before the opposition’s November 27 offensive against the Assad regime, Erdoğan had met with Putin at the BRICS summit in Kazan, Tatarstan, where he expressed Turkey’s interest in joining the organization under Russia’s leadership.
Turkey’s ‘Exit Costs’ Were Higher
Russia’s struggles in Ukraine and Turkey’s increasing prominence in Syria seem to have temporarily disrupted the asymmetric and dependent nature of their relationship. Until the recent developments in Syria, any fallout between the two countries was expected to harm Turkey more significantly. In other words, Turkey’s “exit costs” were higher.
Since 2015, Syria has been central to both Turkish foreign policy and Turkish-Russian relations. From Libya to the Ukraine war, from Nagorno-Karabakh to the Russia-West gas crisis, Syria has been a key factor shaping ties between Moscow and Ankara.
However, relations between the two nations often defied diplomatic norms, being largely shaped by the personal rapport between Putin and Erdoğan. The two leaders have alternated between symbolic gestures of retribution—like making each other wait at meetings—and moments of camaraderie, like eating ice cream together as a message to the West. Despite being on opposing sides in almost every major issue, they have managed to sustain a pragmatic, mutually beneficial relationship.
Erdoğan’s diplomacy—balancing Russia against the West and vice versa—has gone down in the history of international relations as a feat of “diplomatic acrobatics.”
The July 15 Coup Attempt: A Turning Point
The July 15 coup attempt in Turkey marked a turning point in Turkish-Russian relations. While Western countries kept their distance from Erdoğan’s narrative, Putin called Erdoğan to offer his full support just two days after the coup. Before this, relations had been tense.
Following the November 24, 2015 downing of a Russian Su-24 warplane in Syrian airspace, Putin accused Erdoğan of betrayal and imposed severe economic sanctions on Turkey. Additionally, Erdoğan’s criticism of Russia’s invasion of Georgia (2008) and annexation of Crimea (2014) had made him a target of Moscow’s ire.
During this tense period, Turkey aspired to become a regional power in Syria amid the Arab Spring. However, with Iran and Russia’s intervention, the Syrian revolution was reversed, and the balance shifted in Moscow’s favor.
The coup attempt on July 15 altered the trajectory of Turkish-Russian relations. Just a month later, Erdoğan met Putin in St. Petersburg, ushering in one of the most extraordinary periods in their relationship. This meeting led to Erdoğan’s announcement of Turkey’s acquisition of Russian S-400 missile defense systems, creating a rift in Turkey’s relations with the West. In retaliation, the Trump administration removed Turkey from the F-35 fighter jet program in 2020.
Putin’s Checkmate Moves Against Erdoğan
The U.S. strategy of aligning with Kurdish forces to fight ISIS, reclaiming territory from Raqqa to Mosul between September 2014 and February 2015, further disrupted Turkey’s plans in Syria. For the West, combating ISIS took precedence over toppling Assad. As a result, Turkey was left as the sole force seeking Assad’s overthrow, putting it in direct conflict with Russia.
The assassination of Russian Ambassador Andrey Karlov in Turkey on December 19, 2016, was a nightmare scenario for Turkey. Yet, the unexpected outcome was the launch of the Astana process on December 20, 2016, where Turkey, Russia, and Iran initiated a new phase in Syria.
Before this, Russia had approved Turkey’s Euphrates Shield operation (August 2016) to clear ISIS from areas near the Turkish border and disrupt Kurdish territorial continuity. In January 2018, Turkey launched the Afrin operation with Russia’s acquiescence.
However, Turkey did not fulfill its obligations under the Sochi Agreement of September 17, 2018, which called for the removal of HTS militants from Idlib. In February 2020, Russian (or Syrian) airstrikes killed 34 Turkish soldiers in Idlib. Rather than retaliate, Erdoğan traveled to Moscow on March 5, where Putin kept him waiting for two minutes in front of cameras—a deliberate slight.
More Balanced Competition in Libya
Libya became another theater of conflict between Turkey and Russia. In 2019, Turkey intervened militarily at the invitation of the UN-recognized Government of National Accord (GNA) in Tripoli. Russia supported General Haftar’s forces against Turkey’s operations.
Despite competing in Libya, Turkey and Russia also coordinated, mirroring their approach in Syria. They transported Syrian militants to Libya while simultaneously mediating peace talks.
Putin Opens the Door for Turkey in Nagorno-Karabakh
In the Second Nagorno-Karabakh War of September 2020, Russia allowed Turkey to play a decisive role in Azerbaijan’s victory against Armenia. Although Russia appeared to back Armenia, it avoided alienating Azerbaijan.
Erdoğan’s Gamble in Ukraine
Russia’s invasion of Ukraine in February 2022 strained Turkish-Russian ties. Turkey’s supply of drones to Ukraine and its enforcement of the Montreux Convention to restrict Russian naval movements drew Moscow’s ire.
Despite this, Russia continued collaborating with Turkey, relying on it for grain deal negotiations and prisoner swaps with the U.S. This cooperation reflected both Russia’s vulnerabilities in Ukraine and its economic dependence on Turkey.
In 2022, trade between the two nations reached $60 billion, making Turkey Russia’s second-largest trading partner after China. However, by 2024, trade volume had declined to $43 billion as Turkey sought alternatives to Russian gas and oil.
Can Putin Punish Erdoğan?
Given Russia’s ongoing challenges in Ukraine and its weakened position globally, it seems unlikely that Putin will seek immediate retribution against Erdoğan, despite his personal dislike for him.
On the contrary, as the war in Ukraine drags on, Putin risks losing influence from the Caucasus to Libya, Africa to Central Asia. This could provide Turkey with significant opportunities to expand its influence in these regions.
