Trump—who has tried every possible way to unseat Maduro—is now almost offering the Venezuelan leader the promise of a “comfortable exile in Turkey” as a new bargaining chip. But despite certain murky dealings between them, can Maduro really rely on Erdoğan?
Across media outlets and social platforms, there has been a flurry of claims suggesting that the United States might allow Nicolas Maduro, the Venezuelan dictator under U.S. sanctions, to flee to Turkey in return for a deal. Most recently, U.S. Republican Senator Lindsey Graham hinted at this by posting: “I hear Turkey and Iran are beautiful this time of year…”
A November 27 article in The Washington Post—titled “Maduro’s ties to Turkey could smooth the path to a possible exile”—argued that Maduro’s close relationship with Erdoğan, as well as his alleged criminal dealings, could make Turkey an ideal destination for him.
Venezuela, which sits atop the world’s largest proven oil reserves, became an even greater target for Trump as the U.S.–China trade war escalated. Calling Maduro “a dictator at the center of drug trafficking,” Trump launched a naval blockade in the Caribbean. Maduro, meanwhile, has tried to turn the political crisis into a theatrical performance—sometimes showing off behind the wheel, sometimes challenging Washington with salsa moves.
Maduro, accused of crimes against humanity, pictured with Tayyip Erdoğan.
But this time Trump signaled seriousness: He put Venezuela under both aerial and maritime siege. On one hand, he keeps sending the message “An operation could happen at any moment”; on the other, he is exerting increasing pressure over the phone to push Maduro toward relinquishing power.
For now, it is not easy to foresee Maduro’s fate. A U.S. ground invasion of Venezuela seems unlikely; the experiences in Afghanistan and Iraq have shown that quick results are hard to achieve. Moreover, unlike those cases, Venezuela does not have large, well-organized minority groups Washington has previously backed. Therefore, the U.S. is prioritizing negotiations—pressuring or frightening Maduro into stepping down voluntarily.
Yet suggesting Turkey as a “heavenly exile destination” makes little sense. Turkey’s fragile geopolitical position and Erdoğan’s unpredictable political maneuvers immediately complicate the idea. Although Turkey occasionally flirts with anti-Western blocs, it is still a NATO member and part of the Western alliance. Under even minimal pressure from the U.S. or Europe, Erdoğan would struggle to justify protecting Maduro. Past precedents—such as the Brunson and Deniz Yücel cases—show how quickly Erdoğan can back down when faced with Western pressure.
Moreover, considering Erdoğan’s sudden foreign-policy reversals—from Egypt to the UAE, from Russia to Saudi Arabia—there is no rational basis for Maduro to view Turkey as a secure haven. Trump might propose Turkey as a temporary layover, but a final destination like Russia seems far more plausible.
Even if rumors are true that Maduro holds gold or funds—allegedly stemming from drug trafficking—in Turkey, the country still does not present a logical choice. If Maduro were detained or extradited, not only his freedom but also his entire wealth would be at risk.
Russia, currently weakened by the war in Ukraine, is avoiding any steps that might anger Trump. As a result, it is hard to say Moscow is offering significant support to Venezuela under U.S. blockade.
Still, given that Russia previously hosted deposed Ukrainian leader Viktor Yanukovych and Syrian dictator Bashar al-Assad, welcoming Maduro in Moscow remains a much more realistic scenario than Turkey.
Cuba is another possibility. Iran, on the other hand, is as unlikely an option as Turkey—if not more so.
